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Abstract
This dissertation contains three chapters. Each applies the tools of applied microeconomics
to questions in labor economics, the economics of education, and social economics,
respectively. In the first chapter, which is joint work with Amanda Pallais, we present
the results of a series of field experiments in an online labor market designed to test
whether workers referred to a firm by existing employees perform differently from their
non-referred counterparts and, if so, why. We find that referred workers have higher
performance and lower turnover than non-referred workers. We demonstrate a large role
for selection: referred workers perform better and persist longer even at jobs to which
they are not referred at a firm where their referrers do not work. Team production is also
important: referred workers are much more productive when working with their own
referrer than with someone else’s referrer.
In the second chapter, I examine growth in educational attainment over the past
thirty years by gender and demographic characteristics. I show that both the rise in
educational attainment and the rise of the female advantage in educational attainment
occurred relatively similarly across socioeconomic status (SES). I also demonstrate how a
prior result showing an increased gradient of education by SES used incorrect sampling
weights and is not robust to a more permanent measure of SES.
In the third chapter, which is joint work with Duncan Gilchrist, we exploit the
randomness of weather, and the relationship between weather and movie-going, to
iii
test for and quantify network externalities in movie consumption. We instrument for
opening weekend viewership with unanticipated weather shocks when a movie first
opens and estimate the effects of early viewership shocks on later viewership. Given the
large set of potential weather measures, we implement Least Absolute Shrinkage and
Selection Operator (LASSO) variable selection methods. We find large momentum from
network externalities in movie consumption. Neither a supply response nor information
dissemination plays a significant role in our estimates. Network externalities appear to
be stronger for females than males, and for youth than adults.
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Introduction
The first chapter presents the results of three field experiments in an online labor market
designed to determine whether referred workers perform better than non-referred workers
and, if so, why. We first hired experienced workers and asked them to refer other workers;
we then hired all referred and non-referred applicants that met our basic criteria. We find
that referred workers have significantly better observable characteristics than non-referred
workers, but perform substantially better and have less turnover even conditional on
these characteristics.
We consider three potential explanations for this performance difference: selection
(referred workers would perform better than non-referred workers even if they had not
been referred), peer influence (referred workers perform better because they believe their
performance will affect their referrer’s employment outcomes or their relationship with
their referrer) and team production (referred workers perform better because they are
working with their referrer). We find that team production is important: referred workers
are much more productive when working with their own referrer than with someone
else’s referrer. However, we also find a large role for selection: referred workers perform
better and persist longer even at jobs to which they are not referred at a firm where their
referrers do not work. A referral contains information about worker quality that is not
present in the worker’s resume. This information is more valuable (the referral performs
better on average) when the referrer is more productive and when the referral is closer
with her referrer.
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In the second chapter, I examine changes in educational attainment between a cohort
of Americans born in the early 1960’s and one born two decades later, in the early
1980’s. Using detailed and nationally representative longitudinal data from the National
Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSYs), I estimate growth by gender and by SES. In the
older of these cohorts, females are at parity with males in years of schooling; by the later
cohort, females surpass males in nearly all measures of educational attainment. I then
pool males and females and examine the growth in educational attainment across socioe-
conomic status. I show that this female educational advantage rises in approximately
equal magnitudes across the SES distribution
I also find that aggregate growth in attainment also occurs quite similarly across
SES, pooling males and females. I demonstrate how a prior result showing an increased
gradient of education by SES used incorrect sampling weights and is not robust to a more
permanent SES measure.
The third chapter explores crowd-following in movie-going. Previous work on mo-
mentum in the consumption of entertainment goods like movies has highlighted the
role of information dissemination and learning. In this chapter, we explore a different
explanation for crowd-following: network externalities in consumption (i.e., a preference
for shared experience).
We quantify the effects of network externalities in movie-going by exploiting unan-
ticipated weather shocks when the movie first opens. These weather shocks provide a
plausibly exogenous source of variation in opening weekend viewership. Given the large
set of potential weather measures, we implement Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection
Operator (LASSO) variable selection methods and instrument for opening weekend view-
ership with the machine-chosen measures. For 100 additional viewers opening weekend,
we estimate that network externalities drive 51 additional viewers the second weekend
and 27 the third. By the end of the sixth weekend, network externalities have doubled the
effect of the initial shock.
2
Testing a range of alternative explanations for the estimated momentum, we show
that our results are not driven by supply shifts. They are, moreover, independent of both
movie quality and the level of ex-ante information about movie quality, suggesting we are
also not picking up the effects of social or observational learning. Estimating separately
by target demographics, we find that network externalities are significantly larger for
women than for men, and for youth than for adults. Finally, we show that most additional
viewers are substituting across activities, not simply across movies.
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Chapter 1
Why the Referential Treatment?
Evidence from Field Experiments on
Referrals 1
1.1 Introduction
A large body of empirical literature has shown that many workers find jobs through
networks (e.g., Bewley (1999); Ioannides and Loury (2004); Granovetter (1995)). A
consensus estimate is that at least half of jobs are found through informal contacts (Topa
(2011)). Theoretical literature (e.g., Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004); Montgomery
(1991)) suggests that the use of referrals may disadvantage workers without labor market
connections; consistent with this, empirical findings show that applicants who are not
referred by current employees are much less likely than referred applicants to receive an
offer (e.g., Fernandez and Weinberg (1997); Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel (2000); Brown,
Setren, and Topa (2012); Burks, Cowgill, Hoffman, and Housman (2013)).
1Co-authored with Amanda Pallais
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Yet the prevalence of referrals suggests that firms likely benefit from their use. Existing
empirical work finds that referred workers have less turnover than non-referred workers
(e.g., Brown, Setren, and Topa (2012); Holzer (1987); Simon and Warner (1992); Datcher
(1983); Burks, Cowgill, Hoffman, and Housman (2013)). It remains divided, however,
on whether referred workers are more productive. A few studies directly compare the
performance of referred and non-referred workers working at the same or very similar
firms: Castilla (2005) finds that referred workers perform better, Blau (1990) finds that
they perform worse, and Burks, Cowgill, Hoffman, and Housman (2013) find that referred
workers perform better, but only on a few metrics. Other papers use wages or promotion
rates to proxy for the performance of referred and non-referred workers; their findings
are similarly mixed (e.g., Dustmann, Glitz, and Schönberg (2011); Simon and Warner
(1992); Brown, Setren, and Topa (2012); Pistaferri (1999); Bentolila, Michelacci, and Suarez
(2010)).
We undertook three field experiments in an online labor market to identify whether
referred workers perform better and have lower turnover than non-referred workers and,
if so, why.2 Our experimental approach affords us a unique opportunity to compare
the performance of referred and non-referred workers without the filter of firms’ hiring
decisions. Most of the existing empirical literature compares the performance of referred
and non-referred hires (where hires are a subset of all applicants). Differential selection of
referred and non-referred workers into employment, however, complicates the interpreta-
tion of these results. For example, suppose a firm knows that referred applicants are on
average more productive than non-referred applicants; a rational firm would incorporate
this information into its hiring decisions such that, in order to be hired, a non-referred
applicant would have to look relatively better on other characteristics. Indeed, the exist-
2There are other reasons firms might benefit from hiring referrals. For example, referrals might decrease
the cost of recruiting or be a perk to existing (referring) workers. In this chapter, we focus on productivity
and turnover differences between referred and non-referred workers and abstract away from other potential
benefits of hiring referrals.
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ing literature finds that even conditional on resume quality, referred workers are more
likely than non-referred workers to be hired (e.g., Fernandez and Weinberg (1997); Burks,
Cowgill, Hoffman, and Housman (2013)). Amid differential hiring by firms, hired referred
workers may not perform any better than hired non-referred workers, even when referrals
provide positive information about worker quality.
In our experiments, we hired workers directly so that no differential employer selection
could confound our comparisons between referred and non-referred workers. To recruit
our experimental sample we first hired experienced workers, asked them to complete a
short task unrelated to the experimental tasks, and solicited referrals from those who
complied. We then invited referred workers and a random sample of non-referred
workers to apply, and hired all applicants who met our basic wage criteria. Our design
thus facilitates comparisons between referred and non-referred applicants.
In all three experiments (the "individual," "supplemental," and "team" experiments), we
find that referred workers performed better than non-referred workers. Referred workers
also had less turnover. These facts hold even conditional on resume characteristics; that is,
referrals contained information about worker quality that was not contained in workers’
resumes. The heart of this chapter (and the motivation behind the three experiments) lies
in assessing three potential explanations for these performance and turnover differences.3
The first explanation, selection, says that a referred worker would perform better and stay
longer at the firm even if she had not been referred. This may be, for example, because
high-ability referrers also have high-ability friends (e.g., Montgomery (1991); Granovetter
(1995); Rees (1966)), or because workers have information about their friends and select
relatively productive and persistent contacts to refer (e.g., Beaman and Magruder (2012);
3There is little empirical evidence on the mechanisms underlying performance and turnover differences
between referred and non-referred workers. A prior version of Burks et al. (2013), entitled "The Value of
Hiring through Referrals", analyzed potential mechanisms. But this discussion has been mostly removed
from the current version, which focuses on observed differences (e.g., in offer rates, turnover, and per-
formance) between referred and non-referred workers, rather than on the mechanisms underlying these
differences.
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Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore (2000); Rees (1966)).4
The second and third explanations, in contrast, emphasize how the productivity
and turnover of referred workers may be affected by on-the-job interactions with their
referrers. In the second explanation, peer influence, a referred worker exerts more effort
and stays at the firm longer because she believes her performance and persistence will
affect her friend’s employment outcomes and/or their relationship. Consistent with this
explanation, Heath (2013)’s model suggests that referred workers work hard because if
they perform poorly the firm will punish their referrers through lower wages; and Kugler
(2003) model assumes referrers directly exert peer pressure on their referrals to perform
well.5
In the third explanation, team production, a referred worker performs better and may
enjoy her job more when working directly with her referrer. While this explanation
for referrals’ positive performance has not been emphasized to the same extent in the
economics literature, general research on team production implies that it may be an
important benefit of referrals. Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2012)’s model, for example,
finds that when working in teams with their friends, workers receive more utility and
are less likely to free-ride. Furthermore, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) find that
workers are more able to cooperate with their teammates when their teammates are
friends; and Costa and Kahn (2003, 2010) find that Civil War soldiers were less likely to
desert and were more resilient to job-related stress when more of their unit was from
their own birthplace.
Our three experiments are designed to test these three explanations: the individual
4Our experiments were designed so that referring workers had no information about the job itself at
the time they submitted their referrals. Our results thus speak to selection on general observable and
unobservable characteristics, and not to selection on match quality (i.e., workers referring friends who
would be a good fit for the particular job).
5The peer influence explanation is also related to group lending in microfinance wherein a worker’s
peers may pressure the worker to repay the loan (e.g., Bryan, Karlan, and Zinman (2012)).
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experiment distinguishes between selection and peer influence, the supplemental experi-
ment explores selection more deeply, and the team experiment isolates team production.
We find that selection is important. On-the-job interactions between referrers and their
referrals are also important; while we see only limited evidence of peer influence on the
job, we find substantial evidence of team production.
The individual experiment distinguishes between selection and peer influence. All
referred and non-referred workers in this experiment performed an individual task:
testing an airline flight website by answering a few questions about the flights listed
on the site every other day over the course of 12 days.6 Referrers were simultaneously
completing a different task and were randomized, along with their referrals, into one
of two treatment groups. Treatment 1 was designed to maximize peer influence. For
example, each referrer in this treatment received an update on her referral’s performance
after each day of work and the referred worker knew her referrer was receiving these
updates. We implied to each referrer that her referral’s performance and willingness to
continue working for us would affect whether the referrer was promoted. Treatment 2, in
contrast, was designed to minimize peer influence. Each referred worker in this treatment
was told her referrer would never know how she performed, and referrers were told
explicitly that they would be judged on their own merits, not on the performance of their
referrals. At the end of the job, we asked each worker if she would like to continue with
the firm.
From the individual experiment, we learn that selection is important. Even non-
monitored (Treatment 2) referred workers performed better and stayed longer than
non-referred workers. We also find that the referral provides information to employers
that could not easily be obtained through observables or initial job performance: the
non-monitored referred workers had better observable characteristics than non-referred
6The tasks for all three experiments were chosen to be similar to tasks that are common on oDesk. In
particular, many jobs on oDesk require visiting websites and answering questions about them.
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workers, but they outperformed and outlasted their non-referred counterparts conditional
on these.7 They even outperformed non-referred workers on the last day of the con-
tract, controlling for their performance on all of the prior days. Comparing Treatment 1
(monitored) and Treatment 2 (non-monitored) referred workers, we do not find evidence
that peer influence had large effects on workers’ productivity or persistence: monitored
referred workers performed slightly better, but the difference was not statistically signifi-
cant. They were, if anything, slightly less likely to want to continue working for the firm,
perhaps because they disliked being monitored.
Since even referred workers who were not monitored may have faced some subtle
peer influence in the individual experiment, we ran a supplemental experiment four
months later to isolate the effects of selection. We made job offers to all referred and non-
referred workers from a new firm that had no affiliation with the firm from the individual
experiment and had no contact with any of the referrers. The task was designed to be
credibly different from that in the individual experiment, though it similarly measured
diligence over time and willingness to stay on at the firm.
The supplemental experiment provides the strongest evidence that selection is a key
driver in the superior performance and persistence of referred workers. Even at a firm
to which they had not been referred and at which their referrers did not work, referred
workers exhibited substantially higher performance and lower turnover than non-referred
workers. The effects are generally large and significant, regardless of whether we restrict
attention to workers who accepted our offer of employment.
Our third experiment, the team experiment, isolates the effect of team production. The
task was to work with an assigned partner to create a single, shared slogan for a public
service announcement (PSA). Each of the two partners was given a different information
7The online marketplace in which these experiments take place is a unique setting in that we see
workers’ entire resumes. Because interviews are relatively uncommon and workers and employers do not
meet face-to-face, we observe most characteristics that an actual employer would observe when making its
hiring decisions.
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sheet containing a distinct criterion for the slogan (e.g., be written in all capital letters,
be exactly three words long). We asked the partners to use the chat box provided on
the site to discuss the task and then to each submit the same slogan, which should have
satisfied both criteria. Workers completed three such PSA tasks, each with a different
partner. Every referrer participated exactly once in each of three team types: a Type
A team (where she was paired with her own referral), a Type B team (where she was
paired with someone else’s referral), and a Type C team (where she was paired with a
non-referred worker). We measured performance in each pairing and, after all three PSA
tasks had been completed, also asked which partner(s) they would want to work with
again.
We find substantial evidence of team production. Referred workers outperformed non-
referred workers even when both types were assigned partners they did not previously
know, but referred workers performed substantially better still when paired with their
own referrers. They also worked longer on the task when paired with their own referrers
and were more likely to report wanting to continue working with their own referrers
than with their other partners. These results suggest team production is an important
benefit of hiring referrals.
Across experiments we find that referrals provide (positive) information about worker
performance on top of workers’ observable characteristics, but not all referrals are created
equal. Workers referred by high-performers performed particularly well themselves.
Part of this can be explained by a tendency among referrers to refer workers with
observable characteristics similar to their own: referrers with stronger resumes on average
provide referrals with stronger resumes. But even controlling for workers’ observable
characteristics, those referred by high-performers tended to perform better themselves.
We also explore the relationship between the strength of the referrer-referral tie and the
performance of the referred worker. At the time of referral, we asked the referrer three
questions about her relationship with her referral: how well she knows her referral, how
10
many friends they have in common, and how often they interact. (A caveat is that these
were self-reported before the referral had been hired.) We find that when a worker refers
someone with whom she is not as close (a weak tie), she tends to refer someone who
looks better on paper. Nevertheless, it is the referral who has a stronger tie to her referrer
who performs better, even before controlling for observable characteristics.
Finally, we use our experimental data to show that if we had only compared the perfor-
mance of those referred and non-referred applicants whom employers had actually chosen
to hire, we could have obtained misleading results about the information contained in a
referral. We first simulate which of our applicants employers would choose to hire if they
observed both resumes and referral status, assuming they knew the relationship between
resumes and referral status, and performance. Because referred workers substantially
outperformed non-referred workers conditional on observable characteristics, employers
would hire relatively few non-referred workers, and the non-referred workers hired would
be very positively selected on observables. We then compare the actual performance of
the workers hired in our simulations. We show that even though the referral contained
important information about worker quality, there would be no significant difference in
the performance of hired referred and non-referred workers.
All three field experiments took place on oDesk, the largest online labor market,
with over 2.5 million workers (Horton (2013)) and 35 million hours billed in 2012 (oDesk
Corporation (2013)). In this context, we were able to hire workers directly, thus eliminating
the concern that employers differentially selected referred and non-referred workers into
employment. Equally important, the online labor market allowed us to carefully alter
the parameters of the jobs and what workers observed in order to tease out the effects
of selection, peer influence, and team production in ways that would be very difficult
to execute effectively in brick-and-mortar firms. The trade-off is that our results come
from a specific labor market. Before detailing the experiments or their results, we first
describe the marketplace (Section 2). We also discuss external validity and the main
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way we think oDesk differs from more traditional labor markets: oDesk workers are
often less strongly tied to employers than are workers in other labor markets. Selection
and peer influence may thus be less important on oDesk than in other markets. For
example, if oDesk workers are less concerned with remaining in good standing with their
employers, they may not refer particularly talented workers (selection) or put pressure on
their referrals to work hard (peer influence). Thus, given that we find that selection is
important even on oDesk, it seems likely that selection is also quite important in other
contexts. However, the fact that we don’t find strong evidence of peer influence on oDesk
does not eliminate the possibility that it is important in other contexts.
After describing the marketplace and discussing external validity, Section 2 also
explains the sample selection for our experiments and provides descriptive statistics
about our sample. The three subsequent sections describe the design and results from
the individual experiment (Section 3), the supplemental experiment (Section 4), and the
team experiment (Section 5). Section 6 analyzes how referrers’ performance and the
referrer-referral relationship predict referred workers’ performance. Section 7 shows that
the comparison of referred and non-referred workers’ performance could be biased if
we only observed the performance of workers employers chose to hire and Section 8
concludes.
1.2 Experimental Context and Recruitment Design
1.2.1 Online Labor Market
oDesk is an online labor market where employers, mostly from the United States, hire
independent contractors from all over the world for tasks ranging from software develop-
ment to administrative support.
Employers post job listings and can invite workers to apply; workers, meantime, post
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online resumes and bid on those jobs. Resumes typically include previous oDesk jobs, a
one-to-five feedback score from these jobs, and an hourly wage suggested by the worker.
Many also list other qualifications, such as degrees held and oDesk tests passed. Figure 1
shows a sample oDesk resume. (This worker was not in our experiment.)
Figure 1.1: oDesk Profile ExampleFigure'1.'oDesk'Profile'Example''
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 Figure 3. Submission Rates by Day, Individual Experiment
Employers decide which of the two oDesk job types they want to offer: hourly jobs
or fixed-wage jobs. Hourly jobs are the more popular type of job and the type used
throughout our experiments. In these jobs, workers propose an hourly wage when they
apply. Employers choose which workers to hire. Hired workers track the time they are
working and oDesk monitors that they are actually working during these periods by
taking screenshots and analyzing keystroke volume. Workers are then paid their set
hourly wage for the time worked regardless of output quality.8
Many workers have friends and relatives who also work on oDesk. Though there is
at present no explicit referral mechanism on oDesk, employers can solicit referrals from
8In contrast, in fixed wage jobs workers and employers agree on a price for the entire job and employers
have discretion at the job’s end over how much to actually pay.
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their current workers and workers can recommend people they know to their employers.
1.2.2 External Validity
Completing these experiments in an online labor market allows us to observe the per-
formance and persistence of workers without the filter of firms’ hiring decisions. It also
allows us to vary parameters of the jobs workers completed to cleanly identify why
referred workers perform better and have less turnover than non-referred workers. The
trade-off, however, is that the results of this experiment come from one particular labor
market. Perhaps the biggest difference between oDesk and other labor markets is that
because oDesk jobs are relatively short and oDesk workers work for many employers,
oDesk workers are less tied to any particular employer than are workers in other markets.
Prior to our experiment, the average job taken on by the referrers in our sample paid $237
and lasted 81 working hours.
The fact that oDesk workers are less tied to any particular employer could mean
that selection and peer influence are weaker here than in other markets. For example,
suppose that selection stems from workers choosing their most talented friends to refer
(as opposed to homophily in friend networks). If workers are not as tied to employers,
they may be less careful to refer only their particularly talented friends. Similarly, if
referrers are not as worried about their standing with the employer, they may exert less
pressure on their referrals to perform well.
Because we were concerned that peer influence might not be as strong a motivator on
oDesk as in other labor markets, we aimed to maximize the effect of peer influence in
Treatment 1 of the individual experiment. It is hard to imagine another context wherein a
worker’s promotion would be so closely tied to her referral’s performance. Still, in this
experiment, we find limited effects of peer influence. Despite this, our findings do not
rule out the fact that peer influence may be important in other markets.
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However, the fact that selection might be less important in oDesk than in other labor
markets is of limited concern. Given that we find strong evidence that selection is
important on oDesk, it seems likely that it is important in other markets as well.
1.2.3 Hiring our Experimental Samples
We hired workers for the individual and team experiments in the same way. We first
invited a random sample of oDesk workers who (1) were from the Philippines, (2) listed
an hourly wage of $5 or less on their resume, (3) had earned $50 or more on oDesk, and
(4) had an average job feedback score of four or higher to apply to our job. We eliminated
workers with ratings below four because we only wanted referrals from workers we would
actually hire; because most oDesk ratings are very positive, only 16 percent of workers
who met our other criteria had ratings below four.9 We told these workers very little
about the task, only that we were hiring "for a variety of ongoing administrative support
tasks of varying durations" and that we were looking for "diligent and highly-motivated
individuals who are competent in the English language and interested in an ongoing
relationship with our firm." We also told them that the position came with the possibility
of promotion to managerial roles. We gave workers 48 hours to apply and then hired all
workers who applied at an hourly wage of $3 or less.
Original hires were asked to visit our website to initialize the job. The initialization
step was intended to give workers some connection to our firm and to weed out the least
responsive workers. (We fired the 5 percent of workers who did not initialize.) We then
asked the workers who initialized to refer up to three other oDesk workers who were
"highly-qualified" and whom they thought would "do a good job and be interested in an
ongoing relationship with our firm." On each referral form we included questions about
9We only included workers from the Philippines because we wanted all workers in the team task to be
able to communicate easily and the Philippines is the most common country of residence for low-wage
oDesk workers doing these types of jobs.
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how well the referrer knew her referral, how often they interacted (remotely and/or or in
person), and how many people they knew in common. We also asked if they ever worked
in the same room; since referrers might have more easily monitored and/or collaborated
with referrals working in the same room, we eliminated from our sample any referral
who ever worked in the same room as her referrer.
We invited to our job all referred workers who listed an hourly wage of $5 or less; (all
workers who were referred were located in the Philippines). We simultaneously invited
to our job a random sample of oDesk workers from the Philippines with hourly wages of
$5 or less.10 We again gave workers 48 hours to apply and then hired all referred and
non-referred workers who applied at an hourly wage of $3 or less.11
This recruiting process, used for both the individual and team experiments, produced
an experimental sample with three types of workers: referred workers, non-referred
workers, and "referrers" (i.e., workers who made a successful referral). Workers who did
not refer anyone or who referred a worker we did not hire performed a different, shorter
task and are not included in any performance results. In the supplemental experiment, we
made job offers to all referred and non-referred workers from the individual experiment;
no referrers were included.
10We eliminated from the pool of both referred and non-referred workers any workers who had already
been invited as a potential referrer. We also eliminated from the team experiment anyone who had been
invited to the individual experiment. As a result, referred and non-referred workers in the team experiment
look worse on observables than do referred and non-referred workers in the individual experiment.
11We designed the recruitment process so that when referrers were submitting their referrals, they had
no information about our actual tasks. The initialization step, for example, was unrelated to the tasks
themselves. From their own invitation to apply and from our request for referrals, referrers did know that
we were hiring "for a variety of ongoing administrative support tasks of varying durations" and that we
were looking for "diligent and highly-qualified individuals who are competent in the English language and
interested in an ongoing relationship with our firm." However, all referred and non-referred workers saw
this same description on our job posting. Since referred workers had no private information about the job
before referring, in our context there is no scope for selection on match quality.
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1.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 describes the characteristics of three groups of workers: (1) all referred workers,
regardless of whether they met our criteria, (2) included referred workers (i.e., referred
workers who met our criteria and applied at a wage of $3 or less), and (3) included non-
referred workers (i.e., non-referred workers who met our criteria and applied at a wage
of $3 or less).12 Included referred workers had, on average, been on oDesk for about 15
months. Almost two thirds had prior oDesk employment; those who had been employed,
had, on average, about nine jobs and earned about $1,350. Non-referred workers had
been on oDesk for about four months longer, but were much less likely to have been
previously hired; only 28 percent had prior experience. Referred workers also appeared
to be more qualified than non-referred workers: they had higher feedback scores from
prior employers, had passed more oDesk tests, and had higher self-assessed English
abilities. Despite being seemingly more experienced and qualified than non-referred
workers, referred workers posted wages on their resumes that were over 20 percent lower
than those posted by non-referred workers, and they proposed significantly lower wages
to our jobs. Referred workers were also much more likely to apply to our job: 68 percent
of referred workers applied versus only six percent non-referred workers. (The six percent
of non-referred workers who took the time to apply were themselves a very positively
self-selected group.) This suggests referrals are a way to identify workers with good
12While we hired all referred workers who met our criteria and applied at a wage of $3 or less, only
one (randomly-selected) referred worker per referrer was actually included in the team experiment. (The
remaining referred workers completed the same tasks, but with different partners. Their performance data
is not presented.) Thus, there are some referred workers who applied and met our hiring criteria but are
not considered "included referred workers." After all three experiments, we were required by the Harvard
IRB to inform all participants about the study and give them the opportunity to remove their data from our
study. One worker who was referred but had been excluded from our experiments requested to have his
data removed and we have done so. Removing this worker’s data only affected the "All Referred Workers"
column in Table 1.1 and the "Excluded Referred Workers" column in Appendix Table A.8.
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resumes who are interested in the job.13
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Individual and Team Experiments
All Referred 
Workers
Included Referred 
Workers
Difference
Has Prior Experience 0.62 0.64 **
Earnings $1,481 $864 **
Number of Previous Jobs 7.29 5.79 **
Has Feedback Score 0.53 0.55 **
Feedback Score 4.54 4.55 **
Posted Wage $2.97 $2.58 **
Days Since Joining oDesk 501 462 **
Has Portfolio 0.46 0.48 **
Number of Tests Passed 4.14 4.49 **
Has English Score 0.98 0.99 **
English Score 4.67 4.68 **
Agency Affiliated 0.18 0.12 **
Number of Degrees 1.27 1.35 **
Proposed Wage $2.34 **
Observations 1,854 537
Notes: Each statistic in the table presents the mean of the characteristic indicated by the row for the 
sample indicated by the column. All Referred Workers denotes all workers who were referred, while 
Included Referred Workers is the subset of All Referred Workers who applied for our job and whom 
we hired for the individual or team experiment. Included Non-Referred Workers are non-referred 
workers who applied for our job and whom we hired for the individual or team experiment.  English 
Score is self-reported English ability on a one-to-five scale, a portfolio is where a worker posts prior 
work, and agency-affiliated workers pay a fraction of their earnings to report they are part of a given 
group of oDesk workers (an agency). ** denotes that the means of the characteristic for Included 
Referred Workers and Included Non-Referred Workers are significantly different at the 5% level. 
$2.59
274
Included Non-
Referred Workers
0.28
$353
1.01
4.58
0.06
3.19
2.05
4.26
$3.29
572
0.23
0.24
0.96
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
Individual and ea  xperi ents
13Appendix Table A.1 describes the characteristics of workers whom we asked to refer. It shows that
workers who referred someone look somewhat more qualified than those who did not.
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1.3 Individual Experiment
1.3.1 Design: Identifying Selection and Peer Influence
The task for the individual experiment was designed to measure referred and non-referred
workers’ diligence when working alone on a project. We designed our task to emphasize
diligence because showing up to work and completing tasks in a timely manner are key
determinants of success for low-skilled workers, both in more general labor markets
and on oDesk.14 We also designed the task to measure worker turnover, since decreased
turnover is emphasized in the literature as a benefit of hiring referrals (e.g., Brown,
Setren, and Topa (2012); Holzer (1987); Datcher (1983)). The treatments were designed to
determine the extent to which observed differences in workers’ performance and turnover
were driven by selection relative to peer influence.
All referred and non-referred workers completed the same task. We told them they
would be doing testing for an airline flights website, and asked that they visit the site
every other day for twelve days (six visits total), answering the questions on the site each
day. For each worker on each day, the site displayed a table with a randomly-generated
set of ten flights. Each flight was identified by a flight number and included a departure
and arrival city, price, and number of available seats. Just below the flights table were six
fill-in-the-blank questions (e.g., the flight number of the cheapest flight). The questions
were the same each day, but the correct answers changed with the set of flights shown.
Appendix Figure 1 displays a sample flights table followed by the questionnaire.
We told all referred and non-referred workers to complete the task on the assigned
14For example, on oDesk, Pallais (2014) finds that employers care more about whether a worker
completed a data entry task by the deadline than the worker’s accuracy. In more general labor markets,
firms respond to absenteeism by having other employees work overtime, reassigning workers from other
jobs, and/or hiring temporary workers. These adjustments are all costly and often require manager time.
Moreover, the replacement workers may not be as productive as the absent workers (e.g., Herrmann and
Rockoff (2010)).
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day and asked, but did not require, that they complete each day’s task by 11:00 am
Philippine Time. We also informed all referred and non-referred workers that we would
send performance updates to a manager after each working day reporting (1) whether
they submitted a response on the assigned day, (2) whether they submitted a response by
11am on that day, (3) whether they answered all the questions, and (4) the percentage of
working days they had met each of these three performance criteria. Appendix Figure 2
shows an example performance report.
Referrers were randomized to Treatments 1 and 2. Each referred worker was assigned
the same treatment as her referrer. Appendix Table A.2 shows that the randomization
produced balanced samples between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 within both the referrer
and referred worker samples. Out of 26 comparisons between the two treatments groups,
only one difference is significant at the 10 percent level.15
Treatment 1 was designed to facilitate monitoring of the referred worker by her
referrer, while Treatment 2 was designed to minimize peer influence on the referred
worker. Referred workers in Treatment 1 were told that their daily performance statistics
would be sent to their referrer as well as the manager. Referred workers in Treatment
2, meantime, were explicitly told that their referrer would never see their performance
statistics, only the manager would.
Referrers worked on a different task. We wanted to employ them for the duration of
their referrals’ contracts, and we wanted them to understand the performance metrics we
would be sending them about their referrals. Thus, we asked them to answer questions
on a website every other day over the same time twelve day period, and we assigned
them a soft deadline for submitting on each day. We did not, however, want the referrers
to garner insights from their own task with which they could potentially help their
referrals, so we had them work on a site that had a different login method, was focused
15While there are 28 comparisons in the table, by construction, there is no variation in prior experience
or in having a feedback score among referrers.
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on consumer products rather than flights, and asked a different set of questions; referrers
also had a different soft deadline (2:00 pm Philippine Time).
To strengthen the treatment, we told all referrers before work began that they were
being considered for a higher-paying management position. We implied to referrers in
Treatment 1 that whether they were promoted would depend on their referrals’ perfor-
mance.16 Referrers in Treatment 2 were also informed of the management position, but
were assured that they would be "judged on their own merits" and that the performance
of their referral would in no way influence the promotion decision. As promised, we
sent the performance statistics of each referred worker in Treatment 1 to her respective
referrer. We also sent referred and non-referred workers’ statistics to a manager we hired.
At the end of the task, we invited all referred and non-referred workers to re-apply to
continue on the same project. We use this as an (inverse) measure of worker turnover.
Re-application updates by worker type and treatment mirrored performance updates.
Each referred and non-referred worker was told that the manager would receive an
update on whether she accepted our offer to re-apply. Referred workers in Treatment 1
were told this update would also go to their referrers, while referred workers in Treatment
2 were explicitly told their referrers would not see this information. To strengthen the
treatment, when we invited referrers in Treatment 1 to apply for the management position,
we told them that we had just invited their referrals to continue on with their task and
hoped their referrals would accept the invitation. We invited referrers in Treatment 2 to
apply for the management position as well, but made no mention at all of their referrals.
16All referrers were told that the management position would require being able to identify "high-ability
workers interested in an ongoing relationship with our firm." When we told referrers in Treatment 1 about
the position, we also said that they would receive daily performance updates on their referrals "because we
care about workers’ performance."
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1.3.2 Performance and Persistence by Worker Type and Treatment
Table 1.2 shows how monitored referred workers (Treatment 1), non-monitored referred
workers (Treatment 2), and non-referred workers compare on three measures of perfor-
mance and our measure of persistence with the firm (the inverse of turnover).17 Each
column presents the results of regressing an outcome on an indicator for being a referred
worker in Treatment 1 (a referred worker monitored by her referrer), an indicator for
being a non-referred worker, and workers’ observable characteristics.18 The omitted
group is referred workers in Treatment 2 (non-monitored referred workers).
17Two of the performance metrics are metrics the workers were told the manager would see daily: an
indicator for submitting any response on a given day and an indicator for submitting the response by
11:00 am. Workers were also told that the manager would see whether the worker answered all questions,
but we exclude this metric from our analysis since 99.8 percent of submissions were complete. The final
performance metric is accuracy (non-responses are marked as incorrect).
18 The observable characteristics included in the regressions are as follows: an indicator for having any
oDesk experience, total oDesk earnings, the number of previous oDesk assignments, oDesk feedback score,
an indicator for not having a feedback score, the wage listed on the worker’s resume, the number of days
since joining oDesk, an indicator for having a portfolio, the number of oDesk tests passed, the self-reported
English skill level, an indicator for not reporting an English skill level, an indicator for being affiliated with
an agency of oDesk workers, and the number of degrees listed on the resume.
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Table 1.2: Performance and Persistence
Individual Experiment: Base Group is Non-Monitored Referred Workers (Treatment 2)
Submission On-Time Submission Accuracy Re-Application
0.021 0.039 0.015 -0.033
(0.042) (0.047) (0.040) (0.035)
-0.127** -0.090* -0.102** -0.216**
(0.046) (0.048) (0.042) (0.043)
Base Group Mean (Treatment 2) 0.757 0.563 0.640 0.953
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,610 2,610 2,610 435
R-squared 0.078 0.063 0.075 0.130
Submission On-Time Submission Accuracy Re-Application
-0.055 0.000 -0.051 -0.047
(0.044) (0.053) (0.039) (0.035)
-0.163** -0.125** -0.120** -0.180**
(0.048) (0.050) (0.043) (0.041)
Daily Performance Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 435 435 435 435
R-squared 0.528 0.405 0.535 0.306
Notes: Each column in each panel presents the results of a separate regression of the dependent variable 
(indicated by the column) on an indicator for being a referred worker in Treatment 1 and an indicator for 
being non-referred. In the first three columns in each panel, observations are worker-days and standard 
errors are clustered at the worker level. Regressions in Panel A include all six days of work while 
Regressions in Panel B are limited to observations on workers' last day of work. In the final column, 
observations are workers and Huber-White standard errors are presented. All regressions include the 
controls for worker characteristics listed in footnote 18. Regressions in Panel B add daily performance 
controls: each of the first three columns includes controls for the worker's performance as measured by 
the dependent variable on each of the first five days. The final column includes controls for each of the 
three performance measures on each of the six days. *, ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively.
Table 2.  Performance and Persistence
Non-Referred
Monitored Referred (Treatment 1)
Non-Referred
B. Last Day Only, Controlling for Performance on First Five
Monitored Referred (Treatment 1)
A. All Days
Individual Experi nt:  r  i  - onitored Refer ed Workers (Treatment 2)
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Although referred workers had more positive observable characteristics than non-
referred workers, the referral still had substantial predictive power even conditional on
these characteristics. Referred workers consistently outperformed non-referred workers,
even when the referred workers were not monitored. For example, non-monitored
(Treatment 2) referred workers submitted responses on just over three-quarters of assigned
days; conditional on observable characteristics, non-referred workers were 13 percentage
points less likely to submit. Referred workers were also much more likely to want to
continue with our firm. While almost all referred workers in Treatment 2 (95 percent)
wanted to continue working with us, non-referred workers were 22 percentage points
less likely to re-apply to continue the task (conditional on observables).
Across the three performance metrics, the coefficients on the Treatment 1 dummy
suggest that peer influence may have led referred workers to perform better still. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that referred workers in Treatment 1 were, in fact, monitored
by their referrers. Many Treatment 1 referrers replied to our daily performance reports
and indicated a strong interest in their referrals’ performance. They often apologized
when their referrals had not completed the task on the preceding day and/or had not
completed it by the soft deadline, and assured us they would encourage their referrals to
do better on subsequent days. Nonetheless, all of the performance differences between
referred workers in Treatments 1 and 2 appear smaller than the differences between the
referred workers in Treatment 2 and non-referred workers, and none is significant. The
negative (though again insignificant) coefficient on the Treatment 1 dummy in the final
column suggests that referred workers in Treatment 1 were, if anything, slightly less
likely to be interested in continuing with the firm, perhaps because they disliked being
monitored.
Throughout the chapter, we use the covariates listed in footnote 18 as our main
controls. Our results are, however, robust to adding the squares of each of the (non-
binary) covariates and the interaction of each pair of covariates to the regressions (what we
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call "second order controls"). The first two panels of Appendix Table A.3 shows the results
of replicating Panel A of Table 1.2, eliminating all the worker controls (Panel A) and
adding the second order controls (Panel B). When the second order controls are added,
two of the coefficients on the non-referred dummy increase and two decrease, though
none changes significantly. Unsurprisingly given random assignment, adding control
variables does not affect the estimated differences between monitored and non-monitored
referred workers.
Referrals provide the firm with information about worker quality; firms might also
get information about a worker’s quality by hiring the worker for some trial duration
and observing her performance directly. Longer trials almost certainly provide better
information, but at a direct wage cost to the firm. Panel B shows that the referral still
has predictive power for worker performance on the last day of the contract, conditional
on worker performance on all prior days. Panel B replicates Panel A, limiting the
observations to the last day of the contract. Regressions in the first three columns now
additionally control for the worker’s performance (on the same metric as measured by
the dependent variable) on each of the first five days. All differences in performance
between referred and non-referred workers remain large and significant.
The referral also provides information about worker persistence at the firm above
and beyond the information provided by the worker’s performance throughout the full
contract. The final column of Panel B adds controls for each of our performance measures
(submission, on-time submission, and accuracy) on each of the six days. Even controlling
for all our performance measures on all days, referred workers were 18 percentage points
more likely than non-referred workers to want to continue on with the firm.19 Panel C
of Appendix Table 1.3 shows that these results are robust to adding the second order
controls.
19Unreported coefficients in the final column of Panel C show that workers who performed better were
more likely to want to continue.
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Figure 2 shows worker performance over the course of the experiment by worker type
and treatment. Submission rates of referred workers were consistently higher than those of
non-referred workers. Both types of workers became less diligent over time, but diligence
fell off much more for non-referred workers. Thus, the performance gap between referred
and non-referred workers grew with time. The performance gap between Treatment 1
and Treatment 2 referred workers was less stark. On the first day of work, before any
performance reports had been sent out, monitored and non-monitored referred workers
performed equivalently. The graph suggests that peer influence may have stemmed the
drop-off in performance in days two, three, and four among Treatment 1 referred workers,
though the differences between monitored and non-monitored referred workers on these
days are not significant. By day six, however, monitored referred workers were no more
likely than their non-monitored counterparts to submit.
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Figure 1.2: Submission Rates by Day
Individual Experiment
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 Figure 3. Submission Rates by Day, Individual Experiment
Taken together, the results of the individual experiment suggest that selection is
important. Even when referred workers were not monitored by their referrer, they
performed much better than non-referred workers and were more eager to continue on
with the firm. The referral, moreover, contained information that was not present on a
worker’s resume or in her performance on the majority of her contract. In contrast, we
do not find robust evidence in favor of peer influence, though we cannot rule out the
presence of peer influence, particularly at the beginning of the contract.
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1.4 Supplemental Experiment
1.4.1 Design: Isolating Selection
Even though all referrers in Treatment 2 of the individual experiment were assured that
they would be judged only on their own merits and all referred workers in this treatment
were assured that their referrers would not see their performance statistics, these referred
workers may still have been influenced by the presence of their referrers at the firm. They
may have, for example, felt grateful for having been referred or faced informal pressures
from their referrers, either of which could have affected their performance or persistence
in the individual experiment. The supplemental experiment was designed to eliminate
any such potential influences.
In the supplemental experiment, we measured the performance and persistence of
referred and non-referred workers in a job to which the "referred workers" had not been
referred. Four months after the individual experiment, we created a firm with a different
name, location, job posting, and writing style from that of the individual experiment.
None of the referrers was contacted by this firm. To minimize selection, we sought to hire
the maximum possible number of referred and non-referred workers. We made direct job
offers to all referred and non-referred workers from the individual experiment and sent
three reminders to accept to workers who had not yet responded.
Workers who accepted were given a task that, like the task of the individual exper-
iment, measured individual diligence over time. They were asked to visit the Twitter
pages of three successful musicians and to answer a ten-question survey about those
accounts every day for five consecutive days (Monday through Friday). We assured
workers they needed no prior knowledge of Twitter and explained where to find the
relevant information. Most of each day’s task involved reporting on the Twitter activity
of the artist from the day before. Although we asked workers to complete the task on
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the correct day, we also accepted retroactive submissions and automatically recorded the
time of submissions. Appendix Figure 3 displays the site and questionnaire. After the
last assigned day of work, we again invited workers to a continuation of the task and
recorded whether they re-applied.
1.4.2 Pure Selection Effects
The majority (61 percent) of workers from the individual experiment accepted our offer
and so were hired for the supplemental experiment; referred workers were significantly
more likely to accept than non-referred workers. However, regardless of whether we
include all referred and non-referred workers in the analysis (counting as not submitting
work those who did not accept our employment offer) or instead analyze performance
conditional on accepting our job offer, our key results remain unchanged: even working
at a job for which they were not referred at a firm with which their referrers were not
affiliated, referred workers outperformed non-referred workers and had less turnover.
The three performance metrics in the supplemental experiment mirror those of the
individual experiment: an indicator for submitting a response for a given day, an indicator
for submitting that day’s response on the correct day (analogous to the soft deadline of
the individual experiment in that it was requested, but not required), and the fraction of
questions answered correctly. Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that unconditional on accepting
our employment offer, referred workers were 9 percentage points more likely to submit
a response and to submit it on the correct day, even conditional on their observable
characteristics. In addition to performing better, referred workers were 12 percentage
points more likely than non-referred workers to apply for a continuation of the task.
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Table 1.3: Performance and Persistence in New Firm
Supplemental Experiment: Base Group is All Referred Workers
Accepted Job 
Offer
Submission On-Time  
Submission
Accuracy Re-Application
Non-Referred -0.064 -0.090* -0.088* -0.028 -0.121**
(0.055) (0.048) (0.047) (0.026) (0.056)
Base Group Mean 0.678 0.518 0.499 0.247 0.553
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 435 2,175 2,175 2,175 435
R-squared 0.126 0.130 0.132 0.100 0.132
Submission On-Time 
Submission
Accuracy Re-Application
Non-Referred -0.104* -0.104* -0.026 -0.131*
(0.057) (0.058) (0.033) (0.071)
Base Group Mean 0.763 0.735 0.363 0.815
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,325 1,325 1,325 265
R-squared 0.096 0.098 0.063 0.088
Notes:  Each column in each panel reports the results of a separate regression of the dependent 
variable (indicated by the column) on an indicator for being a non-referred worker. All regressions 
include the controls for worker characteristics listed in footnote 18. Panel A includes all workers to 
whom we made employment offers; Panel B includes only workers who accepted these offers. 
Observations in the first and last columns (Accepted, Re-Application) are workers; observations 
the middle three columns of regressions (Submission, On-Time Submission, Accuracy) are worker-
days. Accepted Job Offer is an indicator for whether the worker accepted our invitation to work for 
the new firm created for the supplemental experiment. Huber-White standard errors are presented 
when observations are workers and standard errors are clustered at the worker level when 
observations are worker-days. *, ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Table 3.  Performance and Persistence in New Firm
A. All Workers
B. Conditional on Accepting  Job Offer
Supplem ntal Experiment: Bas  Group is All Referred Workers
Next, we compare the performance of referred and non-referred workers who accepted
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our job offer. Appendix Table A.4 provides suggestive evidence of, if anything, differen-
tially positive selection of non-referred workers into accepting. In this table, we regress an
indicator for accepting our job offer in the supplemental experiment on an indicator for
being non-referred, a metric of performance or persistence in the individual experiment,
and the interaction of that metric and the non-referred dummy. Each column uses a
different performance or persistence metric from the individual experiment. The large
standard errors render many of the results statistically insignificant, but the coefficients
suggest that there was positive selection of non-referred workers relative to referred
workers into accepting our job.
Panel B of Table 1.3 shows the results of estimating the same regressions as in Panel
A, now limited to workers who accepted our job offer. In this sample, referred workers
were 10 percentage points more likely to submit work and 13 percentage points more
likely to re-apply. However, given the results in Appendix Table A.4, we might expect
the conditional results to slightly underestimate the true performance and turnover
differences between referred and non-referred workers.
The magnitudes of these estimates are similar to those from the individual experiment.
Referred workers performed about as well here as did the non-monitored (Treatment 2)
referred workers in the individual experiment (both submitted 76 percent of days, for
example). The performance gap between non-referred workers and referred workers is
also similar to that of the individual experiment. Appendix Figure 4 shows that, as in
the individual experiment, the gap between referred and non-referred workers widened
over the contract, while Appendix Table A.5 shows that the results in Table 1.3 are robust
to the addition of the second order controls. It also shows results without controls for
worker characteristics.
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1.5 Team Experiment
1.5.1 Design: Identifying Team Production
The team experiment was designed to measure whether referred workers outperform
non-referred workers in a task involving teamwork and, if so, to determine how much of
the performance difference between referred and non-referred workers is due to the fact
that referred workers may perform particularly well when working with their referrers
(team production).
The task involved brainstorming and we encouraged teamwork. Each worker was
paired with three successive partners and asked to come up with a slogan for each of
three different public service announcements (PSAs).20 The first PSA was to encourage
highway drivers to wear seat belts, the second was to encourage children to practice
good dental hygiene, and the third was to encourage college students to get the flu
vaccine. For each PSA, we asked the worker to use the chat box we provided on our site
to communicate with her partner and to come up with a single slogan that both partners
would submit through our online form. Appendix Figure 5 gives an example of what
workers saw when they logged in to the team task site.
Though a worker could complete the task without her partner, the task was designed
so that the best output necessitated teamwork. Each partner received a different sheet
with information relevant to the PSA. For the first PSA, for example, one partner received
information on seat belts’ efficacy, while the other received information about highway
drivers. The justification was that there was a lot of information to process and that by
giving the partners different information, each partner would only have to read half as
much. We told workers we wanted them to work with a partner to come up with their
slogan because brainstorming is often more effective in teams.
20As with the prior tasks, we chose this task because there are many jobs on oDesk that ask low-skill
workers to come up with advertisements, for example in the form of flyers, posters, and/or slogans.
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Each information sheet contained a specific criterion we wanted the slogan to meet as
well as a reason for that criterion. In the first round, for example, we told one partner
that we wanted the slogan to be only three words long (so as not to distract drivers) and
we told the other that we wanted the slogan to be in all capital letters (so drivers would
be more responsive to it). In the second round, we told one partner to use an emoticon
in their slogan (to make dental hygiene seem more upbeat) and the other to use the
name of a real or fictitious person (since kids may respond to role models). In the third,
we told each partner we wanted one of four specific words included in the PSA; one
partner’s word choices emphasized that getting the flu shot would be quick, the other
partner’s word choices emphasized that flu shots are effective. When giving workers
their information sheets, we told them only that the sheets would contain information,
not particular criteria for the slogans.
When workers submitted their slogans, we asked them also to answer a "team ques-
tion": a multiple choice question about the slogan. Each of the three PSA assignments
had a different team question (what color sign the PSA should be printed on, what type
of lettering the slogan should be written in, and where the PSA should be placed). This
question had no correct answer, but partners were instructed to give the same answer.21
For comparison with the individual and supplemental experiments, we also collected
measures of individual diligence. We monitored whether each worker logged in to the site
and whether she submitted work. We also asked each worker an "individual question,"
the answer to which was in her own information sheet (e.g., the fraction of highway
drivers who wear seatbelts). Because workers were instructed that they should complete
the task even if they could not make contact with their partner, workers should have
logged in, submitted work, answered their individual question correctly, and used the
21Because we wanted to measure how effectively workers worked with their partners, we strongly
encouraged each worker to complete each PSA. Unlike in the individual experiment, in which we sent
workers no reminders about the task, in the team experiment we sent two reminders about each PSA to
each worker who had not already submitted work.
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criterion from their own information sheet in their slogan regardless of whom they were
partnered with.
In the experiment, each referrer completed three different PSA tasks as part of three
different types of teams: (1) a Type A team, in which she was paired with her own referral,
(2) a Type B team, in which she was paired with someone else’s referral, and (3) a Type C
team, in which she was paired with a non-referred worker. Each referred worker worked
with her own referrer when her referrer was in a Type A team and with someone else’s
referrer when her referrer was in a Type B team. (When her referrer was in a Type C
team, she worked with another referred worker in the same position; results from this
treatment are not presented.) Non-referred workers worked with referrers for all three
rounds; that is, they were always in Type C teams.
Because we thought worker performance might be correlated not just between partners,
but also among partners’ partners, we placed workers into blocking groups. By definition,
every worker in the blocking group only ever partnered with others in the same blocking
group. In all analyses of the team experiment, we cluster standard errors by blocking
group.
Each of the 47 blocking groups contained six referrers, their six referred workers, and
two non-referred workers. The placement into blocking groups was random, except that
a referrer and her referral were always in the same group.22 Within a blocking group, the
ordering of the type of team workers participated in was random. And, within team type,
when relevant, workers’ assigned partners were also random.
In addition to measuring worker performance, we collected a proxy for worker
enjoyment of the partnered task and willingness to continue working with each partner.
After the worker submitted her last slogan, we asked, "In case we have more tasks like
22As in the individual experiment, we hired all referred and non-referred workers who met the selection
criteria. However, only one randomly-selected referral from each referrer and only 94 non-referred workers
were included in this experiment.
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this in the future, which if any of the partners that you’ve worked with would you be
interested in working with again?" Workers could select all, none, or a subset of their
partners.
1.5.2 Performance by Team Type
Panel A of Table 1.4 compares referred and non-referred worker performance across team
types on measures that do not rely on teamwork, but may be indicative of individual
diligence. These are indicators for logging in to our site to see the given PSA task,
submitting work, correctly answering the question about their own individual reading,
and including the criteria from their own information sheets in their slogans.23
23If a worker did not answer the question about her reading, she is marked as not answering it correctly.
Similarly, if she did not submit a slogan, she is marked as not including her own criteria in the slogan.
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Table 1.4: Individual Diligence and Team Performance
Team Experiment: Base Group is Referred Workers Paired with Someone Else’s Referrer (Type B)
Logged in Submitted Individual 
Question Correct
Own Criteria in 
Slogan
0.018 0.046** 0.053* 0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.034)
-0.194** -0.229** -0.245** -0.087
(0.055) (0.053) (0.052) (0.058)
Base Group Mean (Type B) 0.883 0.837 0.755 0.440
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 846 846 846 846
R-Squared 0.188 0.187 0.147 0.066
Both Submitted Team Question 
Matches
Same Slogan Same Slogan
 & Both Criteria
0.099** 0.287** 0.372** 0.103**
(0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024)
-0.206** -0.165** -0.108** -0.031
(0.053) (0.048) (0.044) (0.031)
Base Group Mean (Type B) 0.730 0.496 0.337 0.142
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 846 846 846 846
R-Squared 0.155 0.193 0.213 0.055
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a separate regression of the dependent 
variable indicated by the column on indicators for being in a Type A team and for being in a Type C 
team. Observations in Panel A are at the worker-PSA level; only referred and non-referred workers 
(not referrers) are included. Observations in Panel B are at a team-PSA level. All regressions include 
the controls for worker characteristics listed in footnote 18. Standard errors are clustered at the 
blocking group level. *, ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Table 4. Individual Diligence and Team Performance
Non-Referred Worker and 
Referrer Team (Type C)
A. Individual Diligence
Referred Worker When Working 
with Own Referrer (Type A)
Non-Referred Worker When 
Working with Referrer (Type C)
B. Team Performance
Referred Worker and Own 
Referrer Team (Type A)
Team Experiment: Base roup is eferred orkers Paired ith So eone Else's Referrer (Type B)
Each outcome is regressed on an indicator for being in a Type A team (a referred
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worker paired with her own referrer) and an indicator for being in a Type C team (a
non-referred worker paired with a referrer). Controls for the referred and non-referred
worker’s own characteristics are included throughout. The omitted group contains
workers in Type B teams (referred workers paired with someone else’s referrer). Thus, the
coefficient on the Type A dummy indicates how much better referred workers perform
when paired with their own referrer than with someone else’s referrer; the Type C dummy
indicates how much worse non-referred workers perform than referred workers when
both are paired with someone else’s referrer. Each observation is a partner pair, but in
these diligence measures, we consider only referred and non-referred workers. Referrers’
performance does not vary significantly across team types.
On average, referred workers performed well on these diligence measures. When
paired with someone else’s referrer, referred workers logged in 88 percent of the time,
submitted work 84 percent of the time, and correctly answered their own question 76
percent of the time. Less than half (44 percent), however, included the criteria from
their own information sheet in their slogan.24 Non-referred workers, meantime, were
substantially less diligent than referred workers, even when neither group was working
with a partner they previously knew. As compared to referred workers in Type B teams,
non-referred workers (all on Type C teams) were approximately 20 percentage points less
likely to log in to the site, to submit a slogan, and to correctly answer their individual
question, even conditional on their observable characteristics.
The coefficients on Type A teams show that referred workers were five percentage
points more likely to submit their work and to correctly answer the question about their
own reading when they were paired with their own referrer instead of with someone
else’s referrer. Given that these are measures of diligence more than teamwork, it could
suggest that peer influence may have played a role in the team task. When working
24For comparison, referrers on these teams were four percentage points more likely to log in and eight
percentage points more likely to use their own criteria in their slogan.
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together, referrers may have put more pressure on their referrals to be diligent because in
this context, their referrals’ performance affected their own.
Panel B compares team performance by team type. Observations are again at the
partner-pair level. It shows that, on measures of team performance, teams with a referred
worker consistently outperformed those with a non-referred worker, even when the
referred worker was working with someone else’s referrer. For example, while half of
Type B teams answered the team question (e.g., what color sign the PSA should be printed
on) the same way, Type C teams were 17 percentage points less likely to do so.
While referred workers did well relative to non-referred workers even when not
working with their referrers, they did particularly well when working with their referrers.
Referred workers were, for example, substantially (29 percentage points) more likely to
answer the team question the same way when working with their own referrers than
when paired with referrers they did not know; of the Type A teams that both submitted
responses, only 6 percent failed to submit the same response to the team question. The
results are consistent across team performance metrics. The third column shows similar
results for submitting the same slogan. Only about one-third of Type B teams submitted
the same slogan. Type C teams were about a third less likely to do so; Type A teams were
more than twice as likely.25 Appendix Table A.6 replicates this table, both removing the
individual controls and by adding the second order controls.
25One potential explanation for why referred workers performed better when working with their
referrers is that a referred worker and her referrer were, on average, more similar than a randomly-selected
referrer and referred worker. We find no evidence, however, that this drives our results. We create indicators
for whether both partners were of the same gender (using workers’ names and honorifics), whether they
lived in the same city, and whether they had previously worked at the same oDesk firm; we also measure
the difference between the partners’ wages. Partners in Type A teams look more similar on each of these
dimensions than do partners in Type B teams. But none of these similarities positively predicts performance,
nor does including measures of them in the regressions affect the estimated effect of working with one’s
own referrer.
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1.5.3 Enjoyment and Time Spent by Team Type
One potential motivation for hiring referrals is that workers might enjoy working with
their friends and, thus, might be willing to spend more time on the job. Because oDesk
requires workers to record the time they spend working on oDesk tasks, we can analyze
the amount of time workers spent on each of the three PSAs. Panel A of Table 1.5
shows time spent on the task by team type, first for referrers and then for referred and
non-referred workers.
Table 1.5: Time Spent & Wanting to Partner Again, by Team Type
Team Experiment: Base Group is Referred Workers Paired with Someone Else’s Referrer (Type B)
Referrers Referred & Non-
Referred Workers
Referrers Referred & Non-
Referred Workers
5.922** 5.142** 0.556** 0.451**
(1.752) (1.559) (0.030) (0.033)
1.135 -15.532** -0.100** 0.009
(1.445) (3.121) (0.041) (0.060)
Constant 37.482 38.723 0.406 0.477
(1.291) (1.492) (0.029) (0.031)
Controls No No No No
Observations 846 846 717 612
R-squared 0.009 0.087 0.338 0.211
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a separate regression of the dependent 
variable indicated by the panel title on indicators for being in a Type A team and for being in a Type C 
team. No controls are included. Observations are at a worker-PSA level. The first regression in each 
panel includes only referrers while the second includes only referred and non-referred workers. 
Standard errors are clustered at the blocking group level.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level.  
Table 5. Time Spe t & Wanting to Partner Again, by Team Type
Referred Worker Paired with 
Own Referrer (Type A)
Non-Referred Worker Paired  
with Referrer (Type C)
A. Time Spent (Minutes) B. Wants to Partner Again
Team Experiment: Base roup is Referred orkers aired with o eone Else's Referrer (Type B)
When partnered with someone they did not know, referrers spent the same amount
of time (around 37 minutes) on the task regardless of whether their partner was a
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non-referred worker or someone else’s referral. When working with their own referral,
however, they spent an average of six extra minutes on the task. Referred workers also
spent significantly (14 percent more) time on the task when working with their referrers.
In general, workers who spent more time on the task performed better. Even control-
ling for the time workers spent on the task, however, Type A teams performed better
than Type B teams. A separate but related reason Type A teams might have performed
better is that they communicated via different methods. While each worker always had
access to a chat box on the site in which she could chat live with and/or leave messages
for her partner, Type A teams may have been advantaged by having other means of
communicating. While Type A teams did communicate more both inside and outside of
the chat box, this cannot explain their superior performance. Appendix A describes these
analyses in more detail.
Panel B of Table 1.5 provides additional insight into how much workers enjoyed their
work experience on each type of team. After they had completed all three tasks, workers
reported which partner(s) they would be interested in partnering with again; workers
could choose as many or as few partners as they wanted.26 We find that referrers were
significantly more likely to want to work again with referred workers they did not know
than with non-referred workers.27 But, referrers were more than twice as likely to want to
partner again with their own referral as with someone else’s referral. Similarly, referred
workers were substantially more likely to want to work again with their own referrer
than with someone else’s referrer.
26Some workers (about 20 percent) did not answer the question, mostly because they did not complete
the third PSA task. But for those who answered, we know whether or not they wanted to work again with
each of their three partners.
27Referrers did not know who, besides their own referrals, had been referred to the firm.
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1.6 Predictors of Referral Performance
We find across our experiments that having been referred is a powerful, positive predictor
of performance: in each of our three experiments, referred workers substantially outper-
formed their non-referred counterparts. But not all referrals are created equal. In this
section we focus on referred workers and identify predictors of their performance. We
look first at a referrer’s performance as a predictor of the performance of her referral and
then turn to the relationship between the referrer and her referral.
1.6.1 Referrer’s Performance
The first column of Table 1.6 shows that a referrer’s performance is a strong predictor
of her referral’s performance. We regress the referred worker’s performance in the
individual experiment on her referrer’s performance in the same experiment. (We use
submission as our performance metric here, but using other performance metrics provides
similar results.)
What this result does not illuminate is why the performance of the referring worker is a
good predictor of her referral’s performance. For example, referrers and referred workers
may perform similarly because on any given day they experience common shocks, or
because they have similar underlying ability or diligence. In fact we find that (1) even
absent common shocks, workers tend to refer people who perform as they do, (2) part of
this seems to be driven by the positive correlation between a worker’s own observables
and those of the worker she refers, and (3) even absent common shocks and controlling for
the referred worker’s observable characteristics, the referrer’s performance still predicts
her referral’s performance.
Because it was executed four months after the individual experiment, the supplemental
experiment allows us to disentangle the common shocks hypothesis from others. (This
assumes that common shocks do not persist for four months.) In the second column of
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Table 1.6, we regress the referred worker’s performance in the supplemental experiment
on her referrer’s performance in the individual experiment four months earlier. Even
absent common shocks, the referrer’s performance remains a powerful predictor of
the referral’s performance. In fact, knowing the performance of a worker’s referrer
four months prior leads to almost two-thirds as much updating as knowing her own
performance four months ago (Table 1.6).
Table 1.6: Relationship between Referred Worker’s Performance and Referrer’s Performance
Individual and Supplemental Experiments
Dependent Variable: 
Referrer's Submission Rate, 0.421** 0.246** 0.132
Individual Experiment (0.066) (0.079) (0.082)
0.409**
(0.078)
Constant 0.456 0.331 0.222 0.201
(0.059) (0.065) (0.421) (0.063)
Controls No No Yes No
Observations 255 255 255 255
R-squared 0.192 0.034 0.184 0.087
Notes: Each column presents the results of a regression of the dependent variable indicated by 
the column on the independent variable indicated by the row. Each observation is a referred 
worker. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. No controls are included except in the 
second-to-last column, which includes controls for referred worker characteristics listed in 
footnote 18.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level.
Referred's Submission Rate, 
Supplemental Experiment
Table 6. Relationship betw en Referred Worker's Performa c   eferrer's Performance
Referred's Submission Rate, 
Individual Experiment
Dependent Variable: 
Individual and Supplemental Experiments
Referred Worker's Submission Rate,
Individual Experiment
Only some of this can be accounted for by observables. Appendix Table A.7 shows
that workers with better observable characteristics refer workers who also have better
observables. Controlling for the referred worker’s observables in the regression in Table
1.6 reduces the point estimate on the referrer’s performance by about half. Nonetheless,
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the referrer’s performance remains a large and positive (albeit not statistically significant)
predictor of her referral’s performance.28 This suggests that higher performers refer
workers who perform better than would even be expected based on their observable
characteristics.
1.6.2 Strength of Referrer-Referral Relationship
We turn now to the relationship between referrers and their referrals. Appendix Table A.8
shows the distributions of the three relationship variables we have from referrers’ reports
at the time of the referral.29 Referrers tended to refer workers they were close to. Among
those included in the experiment, most reported knowing their referrals "extremely well"
(six on a scale of one to six), while only one percent said they knew their referral "hardly
at all" (one on the same scale). According to referrers, 32 percent of referrals interacted
with their referrers more than once a day (in person or remotely) and another 19 percent
interacted about once a day; meanwhile, only 7 percent interacted once a month or less.
We also asked workers how many other people they knew in common with their referral:
48 percent of referred workers knew 20 or more people in common with their referrer.
Because each relationship variable is consistently a positive predictor of the referral’s
performance, we build an index of relationship strength and for parsimony focus here on
the resulting estimates.30 We exclude the five referred workers whose referrers did not
28When on-time submission is used as the performance metric instead of submission, this coefficient is
significant at the five percent level.
29We caveat this section by emphasizing that these relationship characteristics are self-reported by
referrers. Referrers could have reported being close with workers whom they thought would perform
particularly well and/or whom they particularly wanted the employer to hire.
30In building the index, we first create dummy variables for reportedly knowing the referred worker
well (responding more than three on a scale of one to six when asked how well she knew the referred
worker), interacting with the referral at least once a week, and knowing at least twenty people in common.
Our relationship index is defined as the standardized sum of these three binary variables. The magnitudes
of the coefficients are similar if we define the index instead as the standardized average of z-scores for the
three raw variables (on scales of 1 to 6 for how well the referrer knew her referral, 1 to 7 for how often they
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answer all the relationship questions at the time of the referral.
Panel A of Table 1.7 shows how characteristics of the referred worker vary with the
strength of her relationship with her referrer. Each column shows the results of a different
observable characteristic regressed on the relationship index. The reported coefficients
show that referred workers who have stronger relationships with their referrer look worse
on observables. They have passed fewer oDesk tests, completed fewer assignments, and,
conditional on receiving feedback, have received (insignificantly) worse feedback.31 These
results suggest that when referrers refer people with whom they have weaker ties, they
refer people who look better on paper.
interacted, and 1 to 5 for how many people they knew in common) or of z-scores for three constructed
variables (with how well they knew each other on the same scale, but with how often they interacted coded
as the estimated number of days per month they interacted and with how many people they knew in
common coded as the midpoint in the chosen range).
31They are also significantly (5 percentage points) less likely to have received any feedback, probably
because they have completed fewer assignments. Point estimates suggest they also look worse on the other
observable characteristics we have, but the coefficients are not generally significant.
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Table 1.7: Relationship Strength, Observable Characteristics, and Performance
Individual, Supplemental, and Team Experiments: Referred Workers
Tests Passed Number of Assignments Feedback Score
-0.462** -1.456** -0.038
(0.138) (0.579) (0.030)
Constant 4.447 5.774 4.545
(0.125) (0.593) (0.041)
Controls No No No
Observations 532 532 293
R-squared 0.025 0.011 0.003
Submission Submission Same Slogan
 (Individual Experiment)  (Supplemental Experiment) (Team Experiment)
0.041** 0.018 0.053**
(0.020) (0.027) (0.020)
Constant 0.780 0.518 0.514
(0.021) (0.029) (0.022)
Controls No No No
Observations 1,512 1,260 560
R-squared 0.012 0.003 0.009
Submission Submission Same Slogan
 (Individual Experiment)  (Supplemental Experiment) (Team Experiment)
0.047** 0.037 0.051**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.022)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,512 1,260 560
R-squared 0.106 0.155 0.048
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a separate regression of the dependent variable 
indicated by the column on an index for the strength of the referrer-referred worker relationship. This index is 
defined in Section 6 of the text and has mean zero and standard deviation one. All regressions in the table include 
only referred workers. Regressions in Panel A include referred workers in both the individual and team 
experiments. Observations are at the worker level. No controls are included; Huber-White standard errors are in 
parentheses. Regressions in Panel B include no controls, while regressions in Panel C include the controls for 
worker characteristics listed in footnote 18. The first two columns of Panels B and C include workers from only the 
individual and supplemental experiments, respectively. In these columns, outcomes are observed at the worker-
day level and standard errors are clustered by worker. The final column of Panels B and C includes only workers 
from the team experiment; outcomes are observed at the worker-PSA level and standard errors are clustered by 
blocking group.  ** denotes significance at the 5% level.
A. Observable Characteristics
B. Performance, No Controls
Table 7. Relationship Strength, Observable Characteri tics, and Performance
Relationship Strength 
Index
Relationship Strength 
Index
C. Performance, With Controls
Relationship Strength 
Index
Individual, Supplemental, and Team Experiments: Referred Workers
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Panel B investigates how a referral’s performance varies with the strength of the
referrer-referral relationship. For each experiment, a worker’s performance on a given
day (or a given PSA in the team experiment) is regressed on the relationship index. For
parsimony we present only one outcome per experiment, though within experiments,
the magnitudes of the coefficients are similar when performance is defined using the
other metrics. In each experiment, referred workers performed better the stronger their
relationship with their referrer. A referred worker with a one standard deviation stronger
relationship with her referrer was four percentage points more likely to submit work
in the individual experiment and two percentage points more likely to submit work
in the supplemental experiment, though the latter point estimate is not statistically
significant. In the team experiment a referred worker with a one standard deviation
stronger relationship with her referrer was five percentage points (nearly ten percent)
more likely to have her slogan match her partner’s.
Panel C presents the results of these same regressions with the inclusion of controls for
the referred worker’s observable characteristics. Given that referred workers with stronger
ties to their referrers tended to have worse observable characteristics, it is unsurprising
that the coefficients on the relationship index are, on average, larger when the controls are
added.32 These results are consistent with the idea that when workers refer people they
know well, they choose workers who do not look as good on paper, but who perform
well in ways that would not be predicted by their observables.
32We do not have enough power to test the interaction of the relationship variables and treatment (in the
individual experiment) or team type (in the team experiment). However, the coefficients on the interactions
are not consistently signed across outcomes within each experiment.
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1.7 Potential Bias from Employers’ Hiring Decisions
In each experiment, we hired all applicants who met our basic hiring criteria. This ensures
that employers’ hiring decisions did not lead to differential selection of referred and
non-referred workers into our sample. In this section, we use our experimental data to
simulate how our comparisons between referred and non-referred workers might have
been biased had we only observed the performance of workers an employer chose to hire.
Though the results of this exercise are qualitatively similar under different assumptions,
our aim in this section is not to pin down the particular bias that would be generated by
an employer’s hiring decisions, but rather simply to demonstrate that such a bias might
exist.
We first simulate which workers employers would hire if they only observed the
characteristics on workers’ resumes; we then simulate whom employers would hire if
they additionally observed which workers had been referred. In each hiring scenario, we
assume that employers want to maximize the fraction of workers who submit a response
on a given day and that they know the relationship between demographics and referral
status, and performance.33 Employers predict each applicant’s performance using the
information they observe and then hire the half of the applicant pool with the best
predicted performance.
Table 1.8 shows the results of the simple simulations. Results in the first row simulate
hiring under the assumption that employers only see workers’ resumes, not who was
referred. To calculate a given worker’s predicted performance, we first regress the
performance of all other workers (excluding herself) on their resume characteristics and
then use the estimated coefficients to predict the excluded worker’s own performance. We
33In practice, an employer may prefer to hire a referred worker over a non-referred worker who is
predicted to perform slightly better either as a source of compensation to an existing employee or because
the referred worker is predicted to persist longer at the firm. For simplicity and clarity, we abstract away
from any such considerations here.
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also use this same predicted performance as a summary measure of workers’ observable
characteristics. Results in the second row simulate hiring under the assumption that
employers observe not only workers’ resume characteristics but also who was referred.
We follow the same procedure to predict workers’ performance except that the regressions
of worker performance on observable characteristics also include an indicator for whether
the worker was referred.
Panel A shows the fraction of referred and non-referred applicants that would have
been hired under each scenario. If employers only took workers’ resume characteristics
into account, a higher fraction of referred (58 percent) than non-referred (39 percent)
workers would have been hired because referred workers had better observable charac-
teristics. However, if employers also observed who was referred, the fraction of referred
applicants that would have been hired jumps to 77 percent; meantime, only 12 percent of
non-referred applicants would have been hired. Panel B displays the summary measure of
the hired workers’ observable characteristics: when employers observe who was referred,
hired non-referred workers have substantially better observable characteristics than hired
referred workers.
Panel C shows the average actual submission rates of the referred and non-referred
workers that would have been hired in each scenario. If employers did not observe
who was referred, hired referred workers would have been substantially (19 percentage
points) more likely to actually submit work. However, this difference would have been
only five percentage points (and statistically indistinguishable from zero) if employers
also observed who was referred.34 This suggests that if we had only observed the
performance of hired workers and did not observe all the characteristics employers used
in hiring decisions, we might have mistakenly concluded that referrals contained little to
34In fact, if we assume employers hired the top third or top quarter of the applicant pool (rather than
the top half), hired referred workers would have performed two or three percentage points worse than
hired non-referred workers when the employer used referral status in hiring decisions. As in the main
specification, these differences are not significant.
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no information about worker performance.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter presents the results of three field experiments in an online labor market, com-
paring the performance and turnover of referred and non-referred workers. Throughout,
we find that even conditional on their resume characteristics, referred workers performed
better and had less turnover than their non-referred counterparts. That is, referrals
contained information about worker quality that was not present on workers’ resumes.
Much of the performance and turnover differential between referred and non-referred
workers was driven by selection. In the individual experiment, even non-monitored
referred workers outperformed and outlasted non-referred workers. In the supplemental
experiment, referred workers outperformed and outlasted non-referred workers, even at
a job for which they were not referred at a firm at which their referrers did not work.
However, we also find strong evidence that on-the-job interactions between referred
workers and their referrers drove some of the performance differential. In particular,
our results suggest that team production is an important benefit of referrals. Referred
workers in the team experiment performed particularly well when working with their
own referrers; they were also more eager to continue working in that pairing.
We find that workers referred by high-performers and workers with strong ties to
their referrers performed particularly well. High-performers tended to refer workers who
looked better on observables, but who performed better than expected, even conditional
on these characteristics. Referrals with strong ties to their referrers actually looked worse
on paper than did those with weak ties. Nonetheless, it was the referrals with strong ties
who performed better, even without conditioning on observable characteristics.
The existing literature finds mixed results on whether referred workers perform better
than non-referred workers (e.g., Blau (1990), Burks, Cowgill, Hoffman, and Housman
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(2013); Castilla (2005)). We see our results as consistent with these seemingly divergent
papers. The performance data in much of this literature come from workers firms chose
to hire. However, if employers incorporate referrals into hiring decisions (for example,
because referrals positively predict performance and persistence), hired referred workers
could perform better than, worse than, or similarly to non-referred workers even though
a referral is a positive signal of productivity.
We find that selection is important in explaining why referred workers outperform
and outlast non-referred workers, but we have limited evidence on why. One explanation
(as in Montgomery, 1991) is that there is simply homophily among friends: productive
workers have productive friends. Another explanation is that (as in Beaman and Magruder,
2012) workers have information on which of their friends are particularly productive and
may choose these particularly productive workers to refer. Understanding the relative
contributions of these two factors is an important question for future research.
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Chapter 2
Gen X to Gen Y:
Changes in Educational Attainment by
Gender and Socioeconomic Status
2.1 Introduction
Currently, gender and socioeconomic status strong predictors of educational attainment.
Females tend to outpace males; and individuals from high-income families on average
accrue more education than their lower-income counterparts. In this paper, I compare
two cohorts of Americans: one born in the early 1960’s and the other born in the 1980’s.
I examine the rise of the female advantage in education. In the older of these cohorts,
females are at parity with males in years of schooling; by the later cohort, females surpass
males in nearly all measures of educational attainment. I then pool males and females
and examine the growth in educational attainment across socioeconomic status.
The female advantage in education has attracted considerable interest, most recently
in its relation to socioeconomic status. Bailey and Dynarski (2011) posit that the growth of
the female advantage is tied to an increased gradient of education with respect to income.
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They argue that the recent increase in the relative educational attainment of females is
driven largely by the increase among females from higher-income families amid little
change for males throughout the SES distribution. Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006),
meantime, find that the reversal of the college gender gap over a slightly longer period
occurred somewhat continuously throughout the socioeconomic distribution.
Using the same data as in Bailey and Dynarski (2011) (henceforth referred to as BD),
but nationally representative weightings and more permanent measures of SES, I examine
the relationship between the female educational advantage and socioeconomic status. I
show that the recent rise of the female college advantage actually occurred quite evenly
across the SES distribution. That is, females gained on males in educational attainment,
but it was not due to any particular change in educational attainment by sex for the upper
part of the SES distribution.
The growth of female educational attainment relative to male educational attainment
has also attracted some interest in its relationship to household structure. Bertrand and
Pan (2013) show that in single-mother homes, more so than in two-parent households,
girls outpace boys in non-cognitive and academic skills through at least grade school.
Jacob (2002) provides evidence that non-cognitive skill differences between males and
females can explain part of the educational gender gap at later ages, including college
completion.
Between the earlier and later cohorts examined in this paper, the likelihood that a child
was raised in a single-mother household doubled. Although girls used to outpace boys
slightly (insignificantly) more in single-mother homes than in intact families, however, I
show that today’s female advantage in education is in fact seen in approximately equal
magnitudes across household structures, and is, if anything, slightly less pronounced
among those raised in single-mother homes. Examining the female advantage by race
and ethnicity, I also show that the Hispanic population exhibited the smallest female
educational advantage in each cohort. The doubling of the within-cohort percentage
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Hispanic over the period in question may have tempered somewhat the growth of the
female educational advantage.
Educational attainment in this period also grew quite similarly throughout the socioe-
conomic distribution for males and females taken as a group. I reconcile my results with
BD, who use the same data, but posit a rise in the gradient of education with respect to
income. First, I show how sampling weight errors drove an overstatement of the growth
of educational inequality in BD. I then show that with more permanent measures of SES,
the increase in educational attainment was more similar still across the SES distribution.
My results are loosely consistent with Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner (2014),
who find high levels of stability in intergenerational mobility for the 1971 to 1993 birth
cohorts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the national
longitudinal data on the two cohorts and present my educational attainment measures,
SES proxies, and other demographic variables. In Section 2.3, I quantify the rise of the
female educational advantage between the NLSY cohort born in the early 1960’s and that
born in the early 1980’s, and show relatively equally across SES. I also estimate the rise
of the female educational advantage separately by racial/ethnic group and by family
household structure. My results suggest that the increase in single-mother households
cannot explain much, if any, of the growth of the female advantage in education over this
period, and that the concurrent growth of the Hispanic population may have tempered
the rise. In Section 2.4, I pool males and females and show that overall educational
attainment also increased quite similarly throughout the SES distribution, and reconcile
my findings with BD, who find an increased gradient of education with respect to income
over the same period. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 The NLSY Education and Demographic Data
I use data from the 1979 and 1997 National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (henceforth
referred to as the NLSY79 and NLSY97, respectively). Each survey follows a nationally
representative sample of Americans beginning in young adulthood and tracks respondents
as they move through the educational system. For respondents completing school before
first interview, the surveys also include retrospective data on some educational outcomes.
Importantly, the high levels of consistency between the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 facilitate
cross-cohort research.
The sample restrictions imposed in most of this paper are minimal. To have a consistent
sample for each of the ages at which I measure educational attainment, I exclude NLSY
respondents for whom years of schooling attended and completed by ages 19 and 25,
and degrees completed by age 25, are not known (19 percent of NLSY79 respondents
and four percent of NLSY97 respondents). For the NLSY79, the excluded respondents
are primarily those for whom, on account of both having been older than 20 at age of
first interview and having incomplete retrospective data, are missing education data at
age 19. In the case of the NLSY97 sample, they are primarily respondents who were still
too young at the last available interview year (2009 Wave) to have been observed at age
25. From the remaining respondents, I drop only the small number for whom I have no
measure of SES (less than one percent in each cohort). The resulting sample includes
10,427 respondents from the NLSY79 and 8,575 respondents from the NLSY97.1
2.2.1 Education Measures
The NLSY surveys provide an array of potentially informative educational measures. I
focus for parsimony principally on a summary outcome measure: years of schooling
1To reconcile my findings with existing work, in Section 2.4 I impose additional sample restrictions in
line with the paper, which I will discuss in turn.
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completed by age 25. Relative to educational attainment measures like college entry and
college completion, years of schooling completed is a fairly precise measure of schooling.2
Less precise measures of educational attainment like college entry (to two- or four-
year college by age 19) and college completion (of 4-year institution by age 25) tend to
follow similar trends. There is some evidence that years of schooling are more prone to
misreporting than are these other, coarser measures.3 I return to entry and completion
measures in Section 2.4 when I reconcile my findings with an existing paper that uses
these outcomes.
2.2.2 Proxying for SES and Other Demographic Measures
I examine whether the rise in educational attainment (and in the female advantage in
educational attainment) has varied by the socioeconomic status of the household in which
the respondent was raised. To capture a relatively credible and permanent measure
of household SES, I proxy with the average of the z-scores for the following measures
(included for each respondent when available): (1) annual net household income for
each year the individual is 18 or under, and (2) the educational attainment (in years) of
each biological parent as reported in the first interview (Wave 1). Summary statistics on
these household income and parental educational attainment measures are displayed in
Appendix Table B.1. In the paper’s final section, I show educational attainment by cohort
2An important implicit assumption is that every year of schooling has the same value.
3Kane, Rouse, and Staiger (1999), for example, find that while less than ten percent of degree recipients
inaccurately report degree attainment, almost half of those with 1 or 2 years of college credit inaccurately
report their educational attainment. For robustness I thus also replicate the main specifications measuring
educational attainment instead as college entry (by age 19) and college completion (by age 25). High school
transcript data exists for most NLSY respondents; comparisons of this transcript data to self-reported
highest grades attended and completed suggest that misreporting is minimal. College transcript data is
only linked for a small fraction of college attendees in the sample, however, such that for most respondents
completing more than 12 years, similar misreporting checks are infeasible. The results are generally similar
also when the outcomes are categorical variables for degrees by age 25 (e.g. AA, BA, BS), or when the
outcome is years of schooling attended (rather than completed) by age 25; both are available upon request.
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and SES quartile for each of an array of different SES proxies.
I also study the rise of the female advantage by family structure and by race/ethnicity.
I classify respondents by family structure based on the composition their household when
young. I focus on two household structures: two-parent and single-mother. Two-parent
households include all households with a mother and father figure living at home; the
parental figures can be biological, adoptive, or step. Single-mother households include
all households with a biological mother present and no father figure in the house.4 For
both the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 samples, household structure classification is based on
retrospective respondent reports on household composition at age 12, collected during
the Wave 1 interview. I classify each respondent into one of three racial/ethnic groups
based on self-reported predominant race or ethnicity: Black, Hispanic, and non-Black,
non-Hispanic. These are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for demographic variables both by NLSY cohort
and by gender within NLSY cohort. Panel A reports the means of demographic variables
for the NLSY79 and NLSY97 cohorts, respectively. From the earlier generation to the later,
both the composition of household structures and racial diversity changed. Relative to
members of the NLSY79 cohort, members of the NLSY97 cohort were much less likely to
grow up in a household with both parents. Whereas over 80 percent of the earlier NLSY
cohort lived with both biological parents at age twelve, 70 percent of the later cohort did.
Instead, many members of the NLSY97 cohort were raised in single-mother households.
The proportion of individuals raised in single-mother households more than doubled
from 12 percent to 25 percent over this period. Members of the more recent NLSY cohort
were also slightly (2 percentage points) more likely to be Black and more than twice as
likely to be Hispanic (13 percentage points as compared to 6 percentage points).
4Two-parent and single-mother household categories are not mutually exhaustive; respondents raised
in households headed by grandparents, single fathers, and foster parents, for example, are not included in
this particular analysis.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics by NLSY Cohortsumstats
NLSY79 NLSY97
Female 0.492 0.486
Black 0.136*** 0.154***
Hispanic 0.063*** 0.129***
Both Bio Parents Household 0.825*** 0.679***
Single Mother Houshold 0.122*** 0.247***
Observations 10,261 8,575 18,836
18
Female Male
Black 0.135 0.137
Hispanic 0.063 0.064
Both Bio Parents Household 0.821 0.828
Single Mother Houshold 0.127 0.118
SES -0.004 0.004
Observations 5,107 5,154
Female Male
Black 0.162 0.157
Hispanic 0.127 0.131
Both Bio Parents Household 0.664*** 0.693**
Single Mother Houshold 0.263*** 0.231***
SES -0.013 0.011
Observations 4,172 4,403
A. By Cohort
B. NLSY79 Cohort by Gender
C. NLSY97 Cohort by Gender
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: Sample restrictions and variable definitions as outlined above. Sampling weights used throughout;
significance of differences calculated using population standard deviations. ** and *** denote rejection of
the null of equality of means for the two columns at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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The subsequent panels of Table 2.1 report means separately by gender for the NLSY79
cohort (Panel B) and for the NLSY97 cohort (Panel C). In the earlier cohort, there are no
significant differences between boys and girls in race or in our household structure. By
the later NLSY cohort, males are more likely than their female peers to have grown up in
a household with both biological parents and, correspondingly, less likely to have grown
up with a single mother. This is loosely consistent with Dahl and Moretti (2008), which
demonstrates that a first-born daughter is less likely to be living with her father than is a
first-born son.
2.3 The Rise of the Female Advantage in Education
2.3.1 Overview
The growth of female educational attainment in recent decades has garnered particular
attention, in part because it involves females surpassing males in educational attainment.5
Table 2.2 shows summary statistics on educational attainment by gender for nationally
representative samples of Americans. The first columns correspond to those born in the
early 1960’s; the next three columns to those born in the early 1980’s. The final column
reports the change in the female educational advantage across cohorts.
In the NLSY cohort born in the early 1960’s, females were at parity with males in
most measures of educational attainment. Although females in this NLSY cohort were
slightly more likely than males to enter a two- or four-year college by age 19, by age 25
they had completed just one-tenth of a year more schooling and were no more likely to
have graduated college. By the next generation, however, females had surpassed males in
educational attainment. In the NLSY cohort born in the 1980’s, the most recent cohort
5See, e.g., Peter and Horn (2005); Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006); Bailey and Dynarski (2011);
Quenzel and Hurrelmann (2013); DiPrete and Buchmann (2013).
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available for study at age 25, females were about ten percentage points more likely than
males both to enter college by age 19 and to complete college by age 25. And they on
average attained one-half a year of schooling more than their male counterparts.6
Table 2.2: Rise of the Female Advantage in Educationfadv
Δ Female 
Advantage
Females Males (µF-µM) Females Males (µF-µM)
0.436 0.405 0.594 0.471 0.092***
(0.496) (0.491) (0.491) (0.499)
0.205 0.206 0.342 0.245 0.098***
(0.404) (0.404) (0.474) (0.430)
13.055 12.942 13.614 12.987 0.514***
(2.199) (2.342) (2.695) (2.598)
Observations 5,107 5,154 4,172 4,403
18/7
0.25
5,107 5,154
18836
Female Male
0.155 0.154
0.128 0.129
0.514*** 0.543**
0.255*** 0.225***
-0.007 0.007
4,172 4,403
C. 1997 Cohort by Gender
0.113**
0.123***
0.097***
0.627***
1959 - 1965 Birth Cohort 1979 - 1985 Birth Cohort
Highest Grade 
Completed 
College 
Completion
College Entry 0.031**
-0.001
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: Sample restrictions as detailed in text. Entry is to two- or four- year college (by age 19); completion
is of 4-year college (by age 25); highest grade completed is measured at 25. Standard errors listed in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance of the differences at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
2.3.2 Female Educational Advantage by SES
Did the rise of the female educational advantage occur approximately equally throughout
the SES distribution, or did it occur more prominently within certain classes? I examine
the rise of the female educational advantage by SES using nationally representative
samples, consistent measures of educational attainment by ages 19 and 25, and consistent
and relatively stable proxies for childhood SES.
6Educational attainment of females relative to males was not stagnant in the preceding periods. Early in
the 20th century, females were about as likely as males to attend college. Male attendance began outpacing
female attendance in the 1930’s and through the 1940’s. Thereafter females began to catch up again in
enrollment numbers and began surpassing males as of the 1980’s (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006)).
60
I study the same NLSY cohorts as BD, but my methods differ from theirs in three
ways. First, BD restrict the sample to a subset of NLSY respondents: those born 1961 to
1964 and those born 1979 to 1982 for the NLSY79 and NLSY97 cohorts, respectively. I
only exclude respondents on whom educational data is missing at age 19 and/or 25, or
for whom I have no measure of SES. Second, BD proxy for socioeconomic status with
household income at the time of the first wave, when children were 15 to 18 years of
age. I use an SES proxy that is arguably less noisy and provides a more permanent
measure of household socioeconomic status. I include (where available) household
income for each year the individual was 18 or under and the educational attainment
of each biological parent (see Section 2.2 for details). Third, BD define SES quartiles
within the sample rather than within the weighted sample. Since the NLSY oversamples
from underpriviledged populations, and since the sampling changed across cohorts, their
results are not nationally representative. In Section 2.4, I compare my findings with theirs.
With minimal sample restrictions, more permanent measure of household SES, and na-
tionally representative weightings, I find that the rise of the female educational advantage
was actually fairly similar across SES groups. Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows average highest
grade completed by SES quartile for each gender in each NLSY cohort. In the earlier
NLSY cohort, females in each SES quartile were about on par with their male peers. By
the later NLSY cohort, educational attainment had risen significantly for females across
the board while male educational attainment was stagnant in the lower quartiles and rose
only slightly (insignificantly) in the upper quartiles. The results for other measures of
educational attainment like college entry by age 19 and college completion by age 25 are
highly comparable and are presented in Panels B and C, respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Female Educational Advantage by SES
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: Excludes individuals for whom educational attainment at 19 and/or 25 are not observed, or for
whom no SES measure is observed. Dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence bands. Sample restrictions
and SES definition as detailed in text. Panel A shows highest grade completed by age 25; Panel B shows
college entry (two- or four-year college) by age 19; and Panel C shows college completion (four-year college)
by age 25.
Table 2.3 shows the corresponding regression results for Panel A. Each of the first four
columns restricts to respondents from a single SES quartile and estimates the change in the
female educational advantage in highest grade completed from one NLSY cohort to the
next.7 The coefficient on the interaction of the indicator for female and the indicator for
the NLSY97 cohort captures the rise of the female educational advantage for that quartile
of the SES distribution. Consistent with Figure 2.1, the rise of the female educational
7Recall that SES quartiles are defined within each NLSY cohort.
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advantage is large and significant within each quartile. Though none of the differences is
significant, the magnitude of the rise is slightly larger in the second and third quartiles
than in the top and bottom quartiles. The underlying reasons, however, are if anything
more different between the bottom half and the top half of the SES distributions. In
the bottom half of the SES distribution, the rise of the female advantage came from
increased educational attainment among females amid decreased educational attainment
among males. In the top half of the SES distribution, educational attainment rose for both
genders, though the increase among females was significantly larger than among males.
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Table 2.3: Female Educational Advantage by SESbyses
Overall
Bottom Q 2nd Q 3rd Q Top Q
Female 0.198** 0.124 0.064 0.221* 0.155***
(0.080) (0.085) (0.093) (0.120) (0.047)
NLSY97 0.235** 0.049 0.498*** 0.691*** 0.370***
(0.102) (0.097) (0.109) (0.116) (0.053)
Female x NLSY97 0.304 0.765*** 0.926*** 0.284* 0.561***
(0.185) (0.189) (0.193) (0.161) (0.091)
SES 1.111***
(0.039)
Female x SES -0.004
(0.053)
SES x NLSY97 0.072
(0.057)
0.023
(0.083)
Constant 11.261 12.243 12.858 14.190 12.631
(0.058) (0.059) (0.068) (0.087) (0.034)
Observations 6,777 4,611 3,980 3,468 18,836
R-squared 0.009 0.020 0.051 0.044 0.202
18836
0
6944
By Quartile
Female x SES x NLSY97
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: NLSY79 and NLSY97 pooled for ease of exposition; population weights for both samples employed
together. Estimating separately by NLSY cohort, each with own set of weights, yields similar results.
Sample restrictions and variable definitions as detailed in text. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent levels, respectively.
The final column of Table 2.3 shows that the similarity of the rise in the female
educational advantage across SES holds also when measuring SES continuously, rather
than in quartiles. Consistent with the per-quartile evidence, the coefficient on the triple
interaction of an indicator for female, an indicator for the later NLSY cohort, and a
continuous measure of SES is small and statistically insignificant. These results are robust
also to the inclusion of controls for race and household structure (Appendix Table B.2).
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2.3.3 Female Educational Advantage by Race, Household Structure
Table 2.4 shows the rise of the female educational advantage separately by predominant
racial or ethnic group. The growth of the female advantage in education between the
NLSY cohorts was quite similar across races and ethnicities. The magnitudes in the later
cohort did, however, vary since the female advantage in education was already prominent
among Blacks in the earlier NLSY cohort.
The source of the rising female advantage in education also differed by race. For
Blacks, it was driven by an increase in female attainment amid only very small increases
in male attainment. For non-Blacks, it arose from a large increase in female attainment
combined with a relatively smaller but still substantial increase in male attainment (0.6
years for non-Hispanic, non-Black males and 0.9 years for Hispanic males). In each NLSY
cohort, moreover, the female educational advantage among Hispanics was lower than for
non-Hispanics, suggesting that the growth of the Hispanic population across the cohorts
if anything tempered the rise of the female advantage in education over this period.
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Table 2.4: Female Educational Advantage by Racebyrace
Non-Hispanic, 
Non-Black Hispanic Black
Female 0.060 -0.026 0.341***
(0.064) (0.130) (0.078)
NLSY97 0.579*** 0.852*** 0.082
(0.074) (0.128) (0.121)
Female x NLSY97 0.599*** 0.539*** 0.545***
(0.127) (0.197) (0.159)
Constant 12.773 11.507 11.992
(0.046) (0.092) (0.055)
Observations 10,264 3,679 4,893
R-Squared 0.029 0.045 0.022
blacks f advantage growth higher than for  hispanics, with and without controls
byhh
18836
-5
18,836
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: NLSY79 and NLSY97 pooled for ease of exposition; population weights for both samples employed
together. Estimating separately by NLSY cohort, each with own set of weights, yields similar results.
Sample restrictions and variable definitions as detailed in text. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent levels, respectively.
Bertrand and Pan (2013) show that among children from single-mother homes, girls
outpace boys up through at least grade school along measures of both non-cognitive
skills and academic success. In related work, Jacob (2002) shows that non-cognitive
skill differences between males and females can explain part of the college completion
gap between males and females. Given that the percentage of children raised by single
mothers doubled over the period in question, I examine the female educational advantage
by household structure.
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows the rise of the female educational advantage separately by
each of two types of households: two-parent and single-mother. Relative to single-mother
homes, homes with two parents may have had a smaller gender gap in educational
attainment in the earlier NLSY cohort, but the female educational advantage appears to
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have risen by somewhat more among children from two-parent households than among
children from single-mother homes (0.61 years versus 0.46 years). On net, then, the
magnitude of the female educational advantage in the later NLSY cohort is if anything
slightly smaller among children from single-mother homes.
Table 2.5: Female Educational Advantage by Household Structure and SEShh
Two Parent Single Mother Two Parent Single Mother
Female 0.109* 0.126 0.157*** 0.198
(0.060) (0.130) (0.052) (0.155)
NLSY97 0.719*** 0.074 0.572*** 0.110
(0.069) (0.135) (0.061) (0.142)
Female x NLSY97 0.606*** 0.456** 0.582*** 0.534***
(0.109) (0.187) (0.103) (0.203)
SES 1.139*** 0.848***
(0.045) (0.090)
Female x SES -0.019 0.063
(0.060) (0.141)
SES x NLSY97 0.001 0.269*
(0.065) (0.144)
Female x SES x NLSY97 -0.123 0.263
(0.098) (0.218)
Constant 12.707 12.090 12.644 12.514
(0.043) (0.095) (0.037) (0.105)
Observations 12,474 3,977 12,474 3,977
R-Squared 0.044 0.010 0.249 0.120
Demographic Controls No Yes
Observations 18,836 11,090
R-Squared 0.229 0.246
WITH CONTROLS 11,090
A. Overall B. By SES
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: Outcome is highest grade completed by age 25. Two-parent and single-mother households are as
defined in the text based on retrospective household structure at age 12 as self-reported at baseline (Wave
1) interview. NLSY79 and NLSY97 pooled for ease of exposition; population weights for both samples
employed together. Estimating separately by NLSY cohort, each with own set of weights, yields similar
results. Sample restrictions and variable definitions as detailed in text. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 2.2 shows educational attainment by household structure, gender, and SES
quartile. Though the rise of the female educational advantage was also generally similar
by SES among children from two-parent households, among children from single-mother
families the female educational advantage rose more at higher income levels. Panel B
of Figure 2.2 shows that the underlying story for single-mother homes is in fact similar
to the phenomenon set forth in BD for all: among those raised in single-mother homes,
the female educational advantage rose more at higher income levels than lower income
levels, driven by large advances among girls at the very top of the SES distribution, while
all other girls experienced little change in educational attainment and boys remained
stagnant or, in the case of the bottom three quartiles, lost ground.
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Figure 2.2: Female Educational Advantage by Household Structure and SES
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: Replicates Panel A of Figure 2.1 separately by household structure. Two-parent and single-mother
households are as defined in the text based on retrospective household structure at age 12 as self-reported
at baseline (Wave 1) interview.
Given that only a very small fraction of children from single-mother households fall
in the top SES quartile, I also present the corresponding results when SES is defined
continuously (Panel B of Table 2.5).8 For those not raised in two-parent homes, the
growth of the female advantage was if anything negatively correlated with socioeconomic
status while for those raised in single-mother homes the growth of the female educational
advantage was larger at higher levels of SES. In neither case, however, is the point estimate
8In the NLSY97 cohort, children from single-mother families comprised just 2 percent of children in the
top SES quartile; in the NLSY79 cohort, the corresponding statistic is a mere 1.3 percent.
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statistically significant.9
2.4 The Gradient of Education with Respect to Income,
from 1980 to 2000
BD posit that the growth of the female educational advantage is tied to an increased
gradient of education with respect to income. Their argument comes in two parts. First,
BD present evidence of an increased gradient of education with respect to income over
this period: they show more growth of educational attainment across the NLSY cohorts
for children from high-income than low-income families. Second, BD present evidence
suggesting that the increased gradient is seen more among females than among males.
The increased gradient of education with respect to income presented in BD is driven
largely by a lack of sampling weights in defining income quartiles. With proper weighting,
the estimated rise in educational attainment is much more similar across quartiles. With
more permanent SES measures, the estimated rise is more similar still. Incorrectly
weighted quartiles and temporary income measures overstate not only the increase in the
gradient overall, but also in the growth of the female advantage in education.
2.4.1 Implications of Weighting Errors in Bailey and Dynarski (2011)
Panel A of Figure 2.3 replicates BD’s evidence of an increased gradient of education with
respect to income. The first row shows college entry rates by family income quartile
in the base year (Figure 2 in BD). The second row shows the corresponding college
completion rates (Figure 3 in BD). BD interprets these figures as follows: “... (E)vident
in Figures 2 and 3 is that the college entry rate and the college completion rate rose
between the two periods. However, the increases were highly uneven, with gains largest
9The difference between the coefficients is just shy of significance at the ten-percent level (z=1.62).
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at the top of the income distribution and smallest at the bottom ... (T)he product of this
uneven growth was increased inequality in college outcomes during a period in which
educational attainments became increasingly strong determinants of subsequent income.”
Figure 2.3: Gradient of Education with Respect to Income by Weighted and Incorrectly Weighted Income
Quartiles
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: The first row shows college entry rates by 19, the second shows college competion rates by 25; each
is reported per quartile and per NLSY cohort. The sample restrictions in BD are used throughout. Panel A
replicates Figures 2 and 3 in BD, in which sampling weights are not used in income quartile definitions.
Panel B uses sampling weights in defining income quartiles.
In BD (and in Panel A), sampling weights are appropriately used in calculating
the means within each quartile. However, family income quartiles are defined without
sampling weights. That is, one-quarter of the sample – rather than of the weighted sample
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– is assigned to each income quartile. I refer to these as “incorrectly weighted quartiles.”10
Since the NLSYs oversample from underprivileged populations, the estimated rates of
entry and completion by incorrectly weighted quartile are not representative of national
levels of entry and completion by quartile. Moreover, sampling was not consistent
between the two NLSY cohorts. The top incorrectly weighted quartile in the NLSY97, for
example, is a more selected sample than the top incorrectly weighted quartile the NLSY79;
failing to use sampling weights in defining quartiles thus mechanically overstates growth
in educational attainment at the top.
Table 2.6 shows mean family income in the base year for the incorrectly weighted
quartiles and the weighted quartiles, respectively. (In all cases the means are calculated
using sampling weights.) Panel A corresponds to the NSLY79 cohort, Panel B to the
NLSY97 cohort. For ease of comparison, I maintain the sample restrictions in BD
throughout this section: only those born 1961 - 1964 or 1979 - 1982 (and for whom
education is observed at 18 and 25) are included. Because the NLSYs oversample from
underprivileged households, the mean income in the incorrectly weighted quartiles is in
all cases lower than in the weighted quartiles.
Table 2.6 also lists the proportion of the true population falling in each quartile.
The bottom incorrectly weighted quartile in the NLSY79, for example, includes only
the bottom 14.4 percent of the population. (In the weighted quartiles, the population
proportion is by construction very near 25 percent in all cases, but does vary slightly
since the sample restrictions are imposed after the quartiles are defined.) The final
column shows the difference in population proportion between each incorrectly weighted
quartile and the corresponding weighted quartile. Importantly, these differences are less
stark in the later NLSY cohort than in the earlier cohort. In the earlier NLSY cohort,
the bottom incorrectly weighted quartile was a more negatively selected sample than
10I am grateful to Martha Bailey for sending the data and code to replicate these figures.
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in the later cohort and, correspondingly, the top incorrectly weighted quartile was a
less positively selected sample. Since household income and educational attainment are
positively correlated, using the incorrectly weighted quartile definitions thus understates
educational gains between the two NLSY cohorts at lower income levels and overstates
these educational gains at higher income levels.
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Table 2.6: Incorrectly Weighted and Weighted Income Quartilesquart
Difference
Mean Income 
(S.D.)
True Population 
Proportion
Mean Income 
(S.D.)
True Population 
Proportion
True Population 
Proportion
Bottom Quartile 15,213 14.4% 21,937 24.7% -10.3%
(6,967) (9,776)
2nd Quartile 38,718 23.6% 50,453 24.8% -1.2%
(7,512) (7,513)
3rd Quartile 65,274 28.0% 75,670 25.9% 2.1%
(8,043) (7,589)
Top Quartile 117,902 34.0% 130,923 24.6% 9.4%
(40,273) (40,399)
Difference
Mean Income 
(S.D.)
True Population 
Proportion
Mean Income 
(S.D.)
True Population 
Proportion
True Population 
Proportion
Bottom Quartile 13,653 17.7% 18,022 24.41% -6.7%
(7,719) (9,727)
2nd Quartile 39,841 25.2% 47,630 26.33% -1.1%
(8,084) (7,911)
3rd Quartile 68,129 28.1% 75,833 25.11% 3.0%
(9,228) (9,521)
Top Quartile 142,528 29.0% 152,996 24.16% 4.8%
(69,128) (71,234)
A. NLSY79 Cohort
B. NLSY97 Cohort
Incorrectly Weighted Quartiles Weighted Quartiles
Weighted QuartilesIncorrectly Weighted Quartiles
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: This table shows the mean family income (in contemporary dollars) in the base year for the
incorrectly weighted and weighted quartiles, respectively. Panel A corresponds to the NLSY79 cohort (i.e.
1979 family income); Panel B to the NLSY97 cohort (i.e. 1997 family income). The sample restrictions
from BD as detailed in text are used throughout. The population proportion corresponds to the estimated
percentage of the population based on sampling weights that falls in that “quartile.” The final column
reports the difference between the incorrectly weighted and the weighted population proportions for each
quartile. Population standard deviations are in parentheses.
Panel B of Figure 2.3 shows college entry and completion rates by family income quar-
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tile and NLSY cohort when the quartiles are defined using sampling weights. Compared
to Panel A, the purported rise in the gradient of education with respect to income is
much less stark. The lack of sampling weights in BD’s quartile definitions had the effect
of understating the educational gains in the second and third quartiles and overstating
the gains in the top quartile.
Table 2.7 compares these entry and completion rates by cohort for incorrectly weighted
and weighted quartiles. Panel A reports entry rates, Panel B completion rates. The first
four columns correspond to the entry and completion rates in Figure 2.3, each with the
corresponding population standard deviation. The next two columns show the estimated
growth in educational attainment between the earlier and later NLSY cohorts for each of
the incorrectly weighted and weighted samples, respectively. The final column reports
the bias on estimated growth in educational attainment due to incorrectly weighted
quartiles. Consistent with the plots in Figure 2.3, the most striking bias for both entry
and completion measures is the upward bias on growth in the top quartile.11 incorrectly
weighted quartiles also downwardly bias estimated growth in educational attainment
within the second quartile (and, in the case of college completion, also within the third
quartile). With sample-weighted quartile definitions, the estimated rise in educational
attainment from across the NLSY cohorts is more equal across income quartiles.
11Incorrectly weighted quartiles do also result in overstating growth in the bottom quartile, though the
magnitude of the bias is smaller.
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Table 2.7: Incorrectly Weighted Quartiles and Estimated Educational Attainmententcompquart
Incorrectly 
Weighted Weighted 
Incorrectly 
Weighted Weighted 
Incorrectly 
Weighted Weighted Diff.
Bottom Quartile 0.186 0.235 0.292 0.309 10.6% 7.4% 3.2%
(0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
2nd Quartile 0.319 0.339 0.468 0.532 14.9% 19.3% -4.4%
(0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)
3rd Quartile 0.379 0.432 0.604 0.650 22.5% 21.8% 0.7%
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
Top Quartile 0.582 0.619 0.803 0.801 22.1% 18.2% 3.9%
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020)
Incorrectly 
Weighted Weighted 
Incorrectly 
Weighted Weighted 
Incorrectly 
Weighted Weighted Diff.
Bottom Quartile 0.049 0.074 0.092 0.109 4.3% 3.5% 0.8%
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
2nd Quartile 0.138 0.155 0.208 0.243 7.0% 8.8% -1.8%
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
3rd Quartile 0.173 0.207 0.317 0.377 14.4% 17.0% -2.6%
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024)
Top Quartile 0.357 0.403 0.545 0.540 18.8% 13.7% 5.1%
(0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025)
(NLSY97 - NLSY79)
(NLSY97 - NLSY79)
A. College Entry by Age 19
B. College Completion by Age 25
NLSY79 NLSY97
NLSY79 NLSY97
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: This table shows the college entry and completion rates by NLSY cohort and quartile for the
incorrectly weighted and weighted quartiles. Panel A reports college entry rates, Panel B college completion
rates. The first four columns correspond to the entry and completion rates in Figure 2.3, each with the
corresponding population standard deviation. The next two columns show the estimated growth in
educational attainment between the earlier and later NLSY cohorts for each of the incorrectly weighted
and weighted samples. The final column shows the difference in growth with weighted versus incorrectly
weighted quartiles. The sample restrictions from BD as detailed in text are used throughout. Population
standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Panel A of Table 2.8 shows entry and completion rates over time by a continuous
measure of BD’s SES proxy: z-score of baseline income. The results in the first column
suggest that the gradient of education with respect to family income in the base year was
if anything declining over this period.
Table 2.8: Gradient of Education with Respect to Base Year Family Incomeweighted
Entry Completion Entry Completion
NLSY97 0.1567*** 0.0973*** 0.1214*** 0.0545***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.018)
SES 0.1630*** 0.1439*** 0.1692*** 0.1266***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
SES x NLSY97 -0.0298** -0.0087 -0.0258 0.0155
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Female 0.0315* -0.0077
(0.019) (0.016)
Female x NLSY97 0.0704** 0.0842***
(0.029) (0.026)
Female x SES -0.0120 0.0371*
(0.020) (0.020)
Female x SES x NLSY97 -0.0085 -0.0511*
(0.027) (0.027)
Constant 0.4093 0.2122 0.3935 0.2167
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Observations 5,755 5,755 5,755 5,755
R-squared 0.1146 0.1203 0.1186 0.1239
A. Pooled B. By Gender
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: This table shows the college entry and completion rates by NLSY cohort and SES, where SES is
proxied for with the z-score of baseline family income. Panel A reports overall; Panel B reports by gender.
Sample restrictions from BD are imposed as detailed in text.
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2.4.2 Implications of Permanence of SES Measure
Recall that in BD, quartiles are defined based on family income in the base year. A similar
proxy for socioeconomic status is also used in Belley and Lochner (2007), who proxy with
family income when the youth were 16 to 17 in the NLSY79 and with Wave 1 income and
Wave 1 net family wealth in the NLSY97. Consistent with BD, Belley and Lochner (2007)
document a “dramatic increase in the effects of family income on college attendance
from the NLSY79 to the NLSY97”. I show that defining socioeconomic status with more
permanent measures reduces the perceived increase in the gradient.
Figure 2.4 shows college entry and completion for each NLSY cohort by SES quartile.
Sampling weights are used appropriately in defining quartiles (and in computing within-
quartile means). In each column, SES quartile is computed based on different proxies.
Moving from left to right in the figure, the proxies become arguably more permanent
and less noisy measures of SES. To isolate the effect of SES measure, I throughout restrict
to the sample definitions in BD (i.e. 15 to 18 years of age in the baseline survey).
Following BD, the SES measure in Panel A is simply household income in the base
year (1979 for the NLSY79 cohort and 1997 for the NLSY97 cohort).12 In Panel B, the SES
measure is the average of the z-scores of household income for each year the respondent
was 18 years of age or younger (i.e., a more permanent measure of income). In Panel
C, the measure is the average of the z-scores of each parent’s educational attainment,
where available. Finally, in Panel D the SES measure is the average of the z-scores of
these measures of income and parental educational attainment. Relative to each of the
more permanent measures (Panels B, C, and D), the single-year income measure (Panel
A) appears to overstate the rise of educational inequality. This is particularly true for
college entry rates, which are plausibly more impacted by a particular year’s income
when the child is 15 to 18 years of age, but holds also for completion rates.
12Panel A of Figure 2.4 thus replicates Panel B of Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.4: Gradient of Education by SES Proxy
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: This figure shows college entry by 19 (row 1) and completion by 25 (row 2) for different SES proxies.
Throughout, I impose the sample restrictions in BD: only those born 1961 - 1964 or 1979 - 1982 and for
whom education is observed at 19 and 25. Panel A uses BD’s proxy of family income in the base year. In
Panel B, the SES measure is the average of the z-scores of household income for each year the respondent
was 18 or under. In Panel C, the measure is the average of the z-scores of each parent’s educational
attainment, where available. And in Panel D, the SES measure is the average of the z-scores of the income
and parental educational attainment measures. Sample weightings are used both in quartile definitions
and in computing means.
2.4.3 Female Educational Attainment by Weighting and SES Measure
In Section 2.3, I presented evidence that the increase in the female advantage between
the earlier and later NLSY cohorts occurred relatively similarly throughout the SES
distribution. I here return briefly to these findings to reconcile them with BD, which
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posits, “... (T)he increase in inequality is largely driven by the increase in college
enrollment and completion among females from higher-income families.”
Figure 2.5 shows college entry by 19 (row 1) and completion by 25 (row 2) by gender
and NLSY cohort for each SES quartile. For comparison, I again impose the sample
restrictions as in BD. Panel A uses BD’s proxy of family income in the base year when
quartiles are defined as in BD, i.e. without sampling weights. (Subtracting female from
male completion rates in Panel A for each cohort yields the contents of Figure 5 in BD.)
Panel B corresponds to the same, but with quartiles defined using sampling weights. As
in the pooled analysis, when sampling weights are used in defining quartiles, growth
in educational attainment is smaller in the top quartile, both for males and for females.
It is also larger in the second quartile, with females in that quartile pulling away from
their male peers and from both genders in the earlier cohort. Panel B of Table 2.8 shows
the corresponding regression results for a continuous measure of SES: z-score of family
income in the base year. The coefficients on the triple interaction of an indicator for
female, an indicator for the NLSY97 cohort, and this continuous SES measure are negative,
suggesting that across the distribution, the gradient of education with respect to family
income if anything increased by less for women than for men over this period.
In Panel C, the SES measure is the average of the z-scores of the income and parental
educational attainment measures (and sample weightings are used in defining quartiles).
Here, as in Panel D of Figure 2.4, the rise in educational attainment – and in the female
advantage in educational attainment – looks quite similar in each quartile. Whereas in
Panel A (and Figure 5 in BD), the growth of the female advantage in education appears
to stem from females in high-income families pulling away from their male peers.
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Figure 2.5: Female Educational Advantage by Weighting and SES Proxy
Sources: NLSY79 and NLSY97.
Notes: This figure shows college entry by 19 (row 1) and completion by 25 (row 2) by gender and NLSY
cohort for different SES proxies. Throughout, I impose the sample restrictions in BD: only those born 1961 -
1964 or 1979 - 1982 and for whom education is observed at 19 and 25. Panel A uses BD’s proxy of family
income in the base year where quartiles are defined without sampling weights. Panel B corresponds to
the same, but defining quartiles with sampling weights. In Panel C the SES measure is the average of the
z-scores of the income and parental educational attainment measures and sample weightings are used in
quartile definitions. Sample means are used throughout in computing means.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the growth in educational attainment between a cohort born in the
early 1960’s and one born in the early 1980’s with an eye to differences by gender and
socioeconomic status. I show that when proxying for SES with more permanent measures
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like parental educational attainment and household income over several years, the rise of
the female educational advantage occurred quite similarly across the SES distribution.
The increase in the female educational advantage over this period was also seen in both
two-parent and single-parent households, and was if anything most pronounced among
children raised in two-parent homes. The Hispanic population exhibited the smallest
female educational advantage in each cohort, suggesting that its doubling over the period
in question if anything tempered the growth of the female educational advantage.
I show that growth in educational attainment from the earlier to the later NLSY
cohort occurred quite similarly throughout the socioeconomic distribution, pooling males
and females. I reconcile my results with an existing paper that uses the same data but
finds contradictory results. First, I demonstrate that Bailey and Dynarski (2011)’s failure
to use sampling weights in defining income quartiles upwardly biases their estimated
growth of educational inequality in this period. Sampling was not consistent between
the two NLSY cohorts: the bottom incorrectly weighted quartile was a more negatively
selected sample in the earlier cohort than in the later cohort and, correspondingly, the
top incorrectly weighted quartile was a less positively selected sample. Since household
income and educational attainment are positively correlated, failure to use sampling
weights in quartile definitions mechanically understates educational gains between the
two NLSY cohorts at lower income levels and overstates these educational gains at higher
income levels. With appropriate weighting, the growth of educational attainment looked
more similar across quartiles. Relative to proxying for SES with income in a single year,
more permanent measures of socioeconomic status that include income in several years
and/or parental educational attainment reveal a growth of educational attainment that
was more equal still across SES quartiles.
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Chapter 3
A Preference for Shared Experience:
Network Externalities in Movie
Consumption 1
3.1 Introduction
We grab a bite at a bustling restaurant, and then kick back at a top-selling movie. The
popular choices are probably better, we think. But is our crowd-following also driven by
some preference for shared experience? In this chapter, we examine network externalities
in consumption as a potential driver of choice convergence across individuals.
The tendency to follow in the footsteps of others has been observed in decisions
ranging from which stock to buy to what books to read, how many children to bear,
and whether or not to adopt a new technology. Much of the existing theoretical work
on crowd-following focuses on the role of information; examples include models of
1Co-authored with Duncan Gilchrist
83
information cascades, observational learning, and social learning.2 The exact mechanisms
and contexts vary but, in brief, the individual is generally assumed to have imperfect
information about the quality of a good or experience, and so relies on the observed
choices and/or reports of others in making her own decision. In an array of settings,
observational and experimental studies have found strong evidence of information stories
driving convergent, or herd, behavior.3
Our interest lies in a very different potential explanation for crowd-following: network
externalities in consumption. Amid classic network externalities (e.g., Becker (1991)), an
individual’s demand for a good is increasing in the total quantity demanded by others.
A good is simply more useful, or an experience more enjoyable, the greater the number
of others that share in it. Although network externalities and information stories can
certainly coexist, there is no role for either quality or information about quality in network
externalities themselves.4
Some goods have network externalities by construction. Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter,
or Instagram, for example, is more useful the more peers already have it and are thus
accessible through the application.5 But even for goods with no obvious network external-
ities, a preference for shared experience could yield an individual demand function that
is increasing in consumption by others. We explore network externalities in consumption
of a major entertainment good, in-theater movies.
The thought experiment is simple: Holding all other characteristics of a movie fixed,
2Examples include Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Ellison and Fudenberg
(1995), McFadden and Train (1996), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998), Çelen and Kariv (2004).
3See, for example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Welch (1992), Montgomery and Casterline (1996),
Segrest, Domke-Damonte, Miles, and Anthony (1998), Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), Hirshleifer and
Hong Teoh (2003), Çelen and Kariv (2004), Munshi and Myaux (2006), Sorensen (2007).
4Choi (1997) provides an example of the coexistence of network externalilties and information stories.
5Relatedly, at the firm level Katz and Shapiro (1986) analyze technology adoption in the presence of
network externalities.
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is an individual’s demand for the movie increasing in the number of others who have
already seen it? Whether network externalities contribute to clustering in consumption of
entertainment goods remains an open question. Moretti (2011), for example, finds strong
evidence of social learning effects in this context, but no evidence of network externalities;
(in our empirical specifications, we reconcile our findings with these).6
We focus on the relationship between opening weekend viewership of a movie and
viewership of that movie in subsequent weekends. Amid network externalities in con-
sumption, subsequent demand for a movie would be increasing in opening weekend
viewership. But there are many other reasons to expect a positive correlation in a movie’s
viewership over time. At the most basic level, choices could be convergent across individ-
uals over time simply because people have similar options, information, and preferences,
and thus make similar decisions. We would, for example, expect an excellent movie to
have higher viewership both this weekend and next if prospective viewers know it is
excellent (and like excellent movies). Furthermore, even if people had different informa-
tion about quality, an observational or social learning model could predict momentum.
Quality and information about quality aside, viewership could also be correlated over
time if people are subject to similar supply shocks (e.g., an unusually appealing movie
trailer) or demand shocks (e.g., a close World Series that leaves people tied to the tube)
over the course of the movie’s run.
To isolate the role of network externalities, we exploit weather shocks in a movie’s
opening weekend as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in its opening weekend
viewership.7 In our first stage, we instrument for opening weekend viewership with
6In related work, Chen (2008) finds evidence of herd behavior in online book purchasing; Sorensen
(2007) also tells an information story in the book market, identifying off of accidental placement on the
New York Times bestseller list.
7In much of the existing literature analyzing motion picture demand, researchers deal with potentially
confounding unobservables by conditioning on opening weekend audience size and then explore how
things like reviews or awards shift the demand curve in later weeks (see, e.g., Prag and Casavant (1994),
Mulligan and Motiere (1994), Sawhney and Eliashberg (1996), Nelson, Donihue, Waldman, and Wheaton
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weather shocks during that weekend. Controlling for general seasonality, these unantici-
pated weather shocks are likely orthogonal to unobserved demand and supply shocks,
and to movie quality. In our second stage, we estimate the effect of (instrumented) open-
ing weekend viewership on viewership in later weekends. To account for seasonality in
movie demand and supply, we throughout define viewership as audience size conditional
on year, week of year, day of week, and holiday fixed effects; to account for any auto-
correlations in weather, we also condition non-opening viewership on contemporaneous
weather. To isolate opening weekend viewership shocks that are orthogonal to other
potential demand or supply drivers, we focus on residualized viewership and instru-
ment for opening weekend residualized viewership with plausibly exogenous weather
shocks. Our second stage estimates are thus designed to capture momentum from network
externalities, purged of potential confounders.
Using weather as an instrument is appealing in this setting – and potentially in many
others – because weather is both unpredictably variable and because it has real effects on
behavior. Instrumenting with weather effectively, however, is non-trivial in part because
the set of potential weather measures is large.8 Concern about either over-fitting the
first-stage (e.g., by including all potential instruments) or data mining (e.g., by hand-
picking some instruments and excluding others ad hoc) make careful aggregation and
variable selection methods key in this context. To select from among a large set of
potential weather instruments, we follow Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2010) and
implement Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) methods. We
leave the details for our empirical section but, in brief, we run a penalized least-squares
(2001), and Moul (2007)). In an insightful twist, Moretti (2011) uses the number of opening theaters as
a proxy for expected demand and shows differential momentum from positive and negative shocks to
movie-going as evidence of social learning about film quality. Such approaches cannot, however, speak to
network externalities.
8Consider a simple Google search of “02138 weather,” which yields a deceptively simple-looking
widget with a wealth of information including Cambridge’s hourly maximum temperature, probability of
precipitation, humidity, wind speed, and cloud cover.
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regression of the first stage outcome on a large set of potential instruments and ask for
machine selection of the instrument(s) that are sufficiently explanatory to be included in
the first stage.
We find strong evidence of large and persistent momentum from random shocks
to opening weekend viewership. For 100 weather-induced additional viewers opening
weekend, we observe about 51 additional viewers in the second weekend and 27 the
third. By the sixth week, cumulative momentum has yielded more than one additional
subsequent viewer for each additional viewer during opening weekend.
Though our empirical strategy is designed to isolate momentum from network effects,
we perform several tests of alternative explanations. We find that potential supply
responses, such as adjusting the number of screens on which the movie shows or changing
its duration in theaters, can explain little, if any, of our estimated momentum. Nor do we
find any evidence that our estimated momentum is picking up information effects: the
magnitudes and persistence of our estimates vary neither with movie quality nor with
the level of ex-ante uncertainty about movie quality.
Our network externalities story is not dissimilar to the social influence model in
Young (2009) in which people buy when enough other people have already bought. In
related experimental research, Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, and Yuchtman (2013) show that
social utility plays an important role in stock picking; an individual’s utility from owning
a stock depends directly on the possession of that stock by another individual. And
DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, and Rao (2014) demonstrate that preference for shared
experience may underlie the decision to vote: since voting is motivated in part by pride
from telling others, people appear to be more likely to vote when they believe others will
subsequently ask them whether or not they voted.9
9We think of the estimated momentum as reflecting a preference for shared experience (e.g., utility
derived from being able to discuss the movie with peers). Although we cannot rule out a role of pure
conformity in which choices are influenced by a preference for social esteem (as in Bernheim (1994)), we
do not think a preference for social esteem would play much role in the decision to see a given movie, in
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Preference for shared experience has also been studied in the sociology and psychology
literature, with some exploration into demographic variation in the strength of those
preferences. Survey and experimental work has found, for example, that females may
have stronger preferences than males for shared experience (e.g., Barker (2009), Huberman
and Rubinstein (2000), Clancy and Dollinger (1993)). Since different movies appeal to
different demographics, we can apply our main empirical strategy to explore in this
real and large market demographic heterogeneity in preference for shared experience.
Our results suggest stronger momentum from network externalities among females than
males, and among youth than adults.
Finally, we ask whether the network-externality induced viewers are merely substi-
tuting across movies or whether they are, instead, substituting away from alternative
(non-movie-going) activities. We find only small and statistically insignificant levels of
substitution across movies. Instead, most of the observed momentum from network
externalities arises from an arguably more dramatic choice: substitution across activities.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 details our movie and
weather data, and our procedure for aggregating weather to the national level. In Section
3.3 we describe our empirical approach, including our instrument selection methods, and
present our first stage results. Our baseline estimates of momentum follow in Section
3.4. In Section 3.5 we demonstrate that any supply-side adjustments have little bearing
on our estimates. Given the large observed quantity effects and the fixed-price nature of
movies, this suggests demand shifts are at play. In Section 3.6 we show that our estimates
are independent of both movie quality and the level of information about movie quality,
suggesting an information story is not driving our results. Section 3.7 explores how
the magnitudes of network externalities vary with gender and age. Finally, Section 3.8
particular since public perceptions about an individual’s predispositions seem unlikely to be impacted
notably by the individual’s movie choices. A notable exception could be “rebel” viewerships, such as
adolescent viewership of an R-rated movie, but such viewerships are by definition rare.
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examines from where the network-induced viewers are coming, and shows that most are
substituting not simply movies, but rather across activities and Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Measuring Movie-Going and Weather
As set-up for the empirical section that follows, in this section we describe our movie
data and our nationally-aggregated weather measures.
3.2.1 Data on the In-Theater Movie Market
Box office data provide an excellent measure of a movie’s total market in the weeks just
following release (when a movie can generally be viewed exclusively in theaters).10 Our
box office data comes from BoxOfficeMojo, a reporting service owned by IMDB, and
includes both consumption quantities and supply levels at the movie level. U.S. ticket
sales are reported daily; the number of screens on which the movie shows is reported
weekly. The latter facilitates an analysis of any supply shifts that might impact our
observed quantity effects. This, combined with total ticket sales quantities, facilitates an
isolation of demand shifts since ticket prices are generally fixed.
Our sample is comprised of movies wide-released in U.S. theaters between January 1,
2002 and January 1, 2012.11 We track audience sizes during the six weeks following the
10Though a few distributors have tried experimenting with simultaneous release in theaters and in home
video, the vast majority do not release on home video until months (usually three to four) after the end of
the theatrical release. Additionally, although we do not observe viewership of pirated movies, as long as an
individual’s demand for the pirated version does not fall the more others have seen the movie in theaters,
then at worst our estimated network externalities would be biased downward.
11We follow Einav (2007) and Corts (2001) in defining as “wide-released” any movie that ever showed
on 600 or more screens, and omit from the sample the less than 1 percent of movies that never reached
wide release. For the 20 percent of films in our sample that start with a limited release before reaching
wide release, we again follow Einav (2007) in defining the wide release date as the first date on which the
movie is shown on more than the maximum of 400 screens and 30 percent of the eventual maximal number
of screens for that movie. Though box office data is available for earlier years, we focus on the post-2001
period because for earlier years most ticket sales data are reported only at the movie by week level.
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date of wide-release. To avoid truncation issues, the 19 percent of films that do not last at
least six weeks in theaters are excluded from our main analysis. (We return to them when
examining supply responses in Section 3.5 and show that our results are robust to their
inclusion.) We focus throughout on weekend (Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) audiences
since these are most responsive to weather shocks and weekend audiences account for
the vast majority (over 75 percent) of ticket sales.12
Figure 3.1 shows average daily ticket sales and average daily ticket sales per screen for
each of the first six weekends in theaters. Panel A plots averages across the 1,245 movies
in our sample. Average daily ticket sales approach one million during opening weekend,
but fall off quickly in subsequent weeks. The modal number of new movies per weekend
is two, though some weeks have no new releases and others have as many as five. Since
our weather instruments are at the daily level, in our analyses we group movies by the
weekend on which they were released.13 Our unit of observation for audiences, then, is
at the opening weekend by date level. In our eleven-year sample we observe 538 opening
weekends, or 1,614 opening weekend days. Panel B plots the average of daily ticket
sales (and ticket sales per screen) at the release weekend level. The average audience
for new releases is just over 2 million tickets. The corresponding number for movies in
their second weekend is just over 1 million; this falls to 200,000 by the sixth weekend in
theaters.
12In related work on movie audiences, Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) similarly restrict to weekend
audiences.
13Almost all movies are released on Fridays; a few are released on Wednesdays. For Wednesday releases,
we omit the first two daily observations, thereby treating the first Friday after opening as the opening date.
Grouping by opening weekend is thus equivalent to grouping by opening date or by opening week.
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Figure 3.1: Average Audience Sizes by Week in Theater
Notes: For our sample of 1,245 movies, in Panel A we plot average daily ticket sales (in 1,000,000’s) and
average daily ticket sales per screen for each of the first six weeks in theaters. In Panel B, we sum across
movies released in the same weekend and report average daily ticket sales and average daily ticket sales
per screen for each of the first six weeks after release. Here, and throughout our analysis, we restrict to
weekend (Friday, Saturday, Sunday) audiences.
3.2.2 Nationally-Aggregated Weather Measures
Our nationally aggregated weather measures reflect the percentage of movie theaters in
the country experiencing a particular type of weather. The raw data are from Weather
Underground, a commercial weather service provider of real-time and historical weather
information online; most U.S. data at Weather Underground comes from the National
Weather Service. From Weather Underground, we observe daily weather measures for
each of 1,941 U.S. weather stations.
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We focus on four daily weather measures: maximum temperature, precipitation,
and the interaction of temperature and precipitation.14 To reduce the effect of possibly
spurious outliers, we first winsorize our temperature and average hourly precipitation
measures at the one-percent levels. Then, to facilitate national aggregation, we create
temperature dummies in five degree bins and precipitation dummies in quarter-inch
per hour bins. We also create indicators for any snow or any rain. Our motivation
for dummying out before aggregating is perhaps best shown by example. Suppose the
population lived in equal numbers in two cities, Los Angeles and Boston. On a particular
summer day, Los Angeles had a maximum temperature of 105 degrees Fahrenheit (F)
while Boston had a maximum of 55. If we aggregated nationally by simply taking
the weighted average across cities, we might erroneously conclude that the country
experienced a beautiful (80 degree) day when in fact half the country was cold and half
was hot.
For each of our weather indicators (maximum temperature in five degree increments,
average hourly precipitation in quarter-inch increments, any snow, any rain), we take
weighted averages across weather stations. From the U.S. Census’ annual ZIP Code
Business Patterns data, we observe for each year from 2002 to 2011, inclusive, the number
of theater establishments in each ZIP code.15 We match each ZIP code (and all its movie-
theater establishments) to the weather station that is nearest in great-circle distance to the
ZIP code’s center, conditional on that distance being no greater than 100 miles.16 Weights
14We use maximum temperature (rather than minimum temperature) because we expect much of
weather’s impact on movie-going to be driven by its effect on alternative afternoon activities, and afternoons
are generally the warmest time of day. Evening substitutes for movies are activities like dinners and indoor
parties that are not heavily weather dependent. Afternoon substitutes like barbecues and pool-time, in
contrast, are more weather dependent.
15Since the 2012 data was not available at the time of writing, we proxy for the 2012 establishment
numbers with those from 2011. Though the “movie industry” spans across multiple six-digit NAICS codes,
we include only establishments with NAICS code 512131, i.e.“Motion Picture Theaters (except Drive-Ins)”.
16For the years in our sample, less than 1 percent of establishments fall outside a 100 radius of any
weather station.
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are assigned to weather stations annually based on the percentage of total movie-theater
establishments to which the weather station was matched.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
To isolate momentum from network externalities, as opposed to from unobservable
movie quality or from other supply or demand shocks, we first instrument for viewership
opening weekend with weather shocks that same weekend; we then estimate the effect
of (instrumented) opening weekend viewership on viewership in subsequent weekends.
This section details our empirical strategy, including our instrument selection methods,
and presents our first stage results.
3.3.1 Estimating Momentum from Network Externalities: An IV Ap-
proach
Given the indoor nature of movie-going, it is perhaps not surprising that a day’s weather
is an excellent predictor of viewership. When it’s beautiful out, there are generally fewer
movie-goers; when the weather is less ideal, ticket sales tend to be higher. That is not to
say, however, that the observed relationship is causal. As Einav (2007) demonstrates, the
seasonality of viewership is driven by seasonality in both underlying demand and, since
the supply side takes into account expected demand in timing releases, in the number and
quality of movies available in theaters. Because seasonality is an important component of
both the demand and supply, we throughout condition viewership on year, week of year,
day of week, and holiday fixed effects and refer to the resulting residuals as “abnormal”
viewership.
Denote the viewership on date t of movies that are in their jth-week of showing vt,j.
To compute abnormal viewership during opening weekend, we first regress viewership
93
in opening weekend, vt,1, on a constant and a vector of indicators for day of week, week
of year, year, and holidays, which we denote Ft:17
vt,1 = α1 + F′tΦ1 + εt,1 (3.1)
We call the resulting fitted, or predicted, values v̂t,1 and define abnormal viewership
opening weekend as the difference between realized and predicted viewership:
v_abnt,1 ≡ vt,1 − v̂t,1 (3.2)
We want to instrument for this abnormal viewership opening weekend with contempo-
raneous weather shocks. Given the natural (and anticipated) seasonality of weather, and
to capture the unanticipated component, we throughout condition each of our weather
measures on the same fixed effects as above. That is, for each weather measure wk,
k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, we estimate
wt,k = δk + F′tΦk + εt,k (3.3)
where t again indexes the date, k indexes the particular weather measure, and the fixed
effects, Ft, are as defined in Equation 3.1. We call the resulting fitted values ŵt,k and
define the weather shock w_shockt,k as the difference between the realized and predicted
weather measure:
w_shockt,k = wt,k − ŵt,k (3.4)
With our controls for seasonality and time trends in both weather and viewership, these
weather shocks are plausibly orthogonal to movie characteristics as well as to other
demand and supply shocks.
Figure 3.2 previews a simplified version of the relationship between weather shocks
and abnormal viewership during opening weekend. Each coefficient is the result of
a separate regression of abnormal viewership on contemporaneous weather shocks in
17Please see Appendix C.2 for the full set of holidays.
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5-degree F bins. For exposition, we focus on the common summer range of 65 to 95
degrees F. Amid unexpectedly beautiful weather (70 to 90 degrees F broadly speaking, but
most especially 75 - 80 degrees F), opening weekend ticket sales are lower than would be
predicted by seasonality. Amid weather that is unexpectedly a bit too cool or too warm, in
contrast, audiences are larger. Panel A shows the estimated magnitudes when weather is
measured as the percentage of movie theaters in the given temperature range. The plotted
coefficient represents estimated abnormal viewership when all (versus no) theaters are
unexpectedly in that temperature range. When ten percent of theaters unexpectedly
experience temperatures in the 65 to 70 degree range, for example, viewership rises by
about 320,000 (or one-tenth of 3.2 million). To facilitate comparison of effect sizes across
temperature ranges, Panel B shows the corresponding results when each weather shock is
normalized to zero mean and unit variance. For a one standard deviation increase in the
percentage of movie theaters unexpectedly in the the 65 to 70 degree F range, we estimate
an additional 150,000 viewers of new releases. Relative to average daily ticket sales to all
new releases, this corresponds to about a five percent (or 0.1 standard deviation) increase.
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Figure 3.2: The Effect of Weather Shocks on Viewership
Notes: We plot the coefficient of the regression of abnormal viewership on each listed weather shock,
along with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. Each plotted coefficient is from a separate
regression. Observations are at the opening weekend by date level (1,614 observations). National weather
measures are as described in the text; in Panel A, these are measured in percentage of theaters in that
temperature range, in Panel B they are normalized to zero mean and unit variance.
Although weather shocks are important predictors of abnormal viewership, the large
number of potential weather shock specifications makes variable selection methods ap-
pealing. We detail our motivation and methods for instrument selection in the following
subsection; for now let us take as given the machine-chosen instrument set, which we
denote WLASSO. To obtain the first stage, we run OLS on the LASSO-selected instru-
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ment(s):18
v_abnt,1 = η +WLASSOt
′Ω+ εt,1 (3.5)
We call the instrumented abnormal viewership ̂v_abnt,1.
In the second stage, we estimate the relationship between this weather-induced ab-
normal viewership opening weekend and abnormal viewership in subsequent weekends.
We define abnormal viewership in subsequent weekends as viewership conditional on
year, week of year, day of week, and holiday fixed effects; given the potential for auto-
correlation in weather shocks, we condition also on contemporaneous weather. That is,
separately for each week j > 1, we first regress viewership on the set of fixed effects and
contemporaneous weather:
vt,j = αj + F′tΦj + X′tΓj + εt,j (3.6)
The fixed effects in Ft are as defined in Equation 3.1 and Xt denotes the vector of
contemporaneous (date t) weather.19 We call the resulting fitted values v̂t,j and define
abnormal viewership in subsequent weekends as the difference between realized and
predicted:
v_abnt,j ≡ vt,j − v̂t,j (3.7)
Finally, to estimate the impact of abnormal viewership opening weekend on abnormal
viewership j− 1 weeks after opening, we run the the second stage separately for each
j > 1:
v_abnt,j = µj + θj ̂v_abnt−7(j−1),1 + εt,j (3.8)
The estimated momentum from network externalities in Week j is θˆj. Amid positive
18This is often referred to as post-LASSO and because of LASSO’s shrinkage bias (i.e., the presence of
the penalty in the LASSO optimization problem) it tends to perform better in terms of prediction and bias
than does LASSO.
19Xt includes maximum temperature in ten-degree increments as well rain, snow, and average precipita-
tion in quarter inches per hour.
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network externalities, we expect positive (negative) exogenous shocks to viewership
opening weekend to increase (decrease) viewership in later weeks.
3.3.2 LASSO Instrument Selection and First Stage Results
Instrumenting with weather is non-trivial in part because the set of potential weather
measures is large. One approach might be to hand-pick a select set of instruments that
together yield a strong first-stage and look “reasonable” ex post; with instruments and
weighting chosen in such a seemingly arbitrary manner, however, robustness of the
resulting estimates would almost certainly remain in question. A very different approach
might be to include a wider array of instruments. The latter is the approach taken by
Moretti (2011) in work closely related to ours. He instruments for opening weekend
movie ticket sales with the maximum and minimum temperatures on opening day and
the day prior to opening day for each of seven major metropolitan areas. This large set of
correlated instruments, however, yields a weak first stage: the F-statistic on the excluded
instruments is less than four in each of his specifications. The second stage results are
neither statistically nor economically informative. It is in this context that Moretti finds
no evidence of network externalities in movie-going.
Given the issues with either hand-picking a small number of instruments or including
a large number of instruments, we find variable selections methods to be appealing.
We follow Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2010), and implement Least Absolute
Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) methods to estimate optimal instruments
in linear IV models with many instruments. In simulation experiments, the LASSO
procedure performs well relative to recently advocated many-instrument robustness
procedures (see Belloni, Chen, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2012)). We here first provide a
brief overview of our LASSO methods, drawing heavily from Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2013), and then present the machine-chosen instrument sets and the corresponding first
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stages.
Consider our single endogenous variable, v_abnt,1, and our large set of potential
weather instruments, Wt = [w_shockt,1, . . . , w_shockt,p]. The econometrician would ideally
select instruments by solving the standard ordinary leased squares problem subject
to a binary penalty function that penalizes the inclusion of the instruments. That is,
with n observations of the outcome, v_abnt,1, and the vector of potential instruments
Wt = [w_shockt,1, . . . , w_shockt,p], we would minimize a binary integer criterion function:
1
n
n
∑
t=1
[v_abnt,1 −W ′tβ]2 + λ||β||0, where ||β||0 =
p
∑
k=1
1{β0k 6= 0}. (3.9)
This is an NP-Hard problem so it is generally not tractable. The LASSO approach,
originally due to Frank and Friedman (1993) and Tibshirani (1996), is to replace the
L0-norm in the problem above with the L1-norm, thus minimizing
1
n
n
∑
t=1
[v_abnt,1 −W ′tβ]2 + λ||β||1, where ||β||1 =
p
∑
k=1
|β0k|. (3.10)
This problem is globally convex so it is straightforward to solve using conventional
methods. Because the penalty function is kinked, the solution typically has many zeros;
that is, the estimator only includes the set of covariates that are sufficiently explanatory
to justify the penalty associated with their inclusion.20 Bickel, Ritov, and Tsybakov (2009)
show that the rate-optimal choice of the penalty parameter λ is
λ = 2σ
√
2 log(pn)/n, (3.12)
where p is the number of potential instruments, n is the sample size, and σ is the standard
20LASSO is particularly appealing as a method for instrument selection in circumstances where the
number of potential instruments is large, potentially even larger than the number of observations. Under
regularity conditions, the rate of convergence is bounded by
||βˆLASSO − β0|| ≤ σ
√
s log(n ∨ p)/n, (3.11)
which is close to the oracle rate
√
s/n. Notably, p only shows up through log(p).
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deviation of the residuals. σ is not known a-priori, so we estimate σ following the
iterative methods of Belloni, Chen, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2012). We follow Belloni,
Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2011) in using conventional standard errors and also in
adding a constraint on how many instruments are chosen.21 We denote the final output
of the LASSO methodology WLASSO; this is the machine-chosen instrument set.
With the single-instrument constraint, the LASSO-chosen instrument is the 65 - 70
degree F measure. Figure 3.3 shows the corresponding first stage relationship in a binned
scatterplot; the more theaters that are unexpectedly in this temperature range, the higher
is abnormal viewership. Table 3.1 shows the first stage results from several different
LASSO-chosen instruments sets. The first row corresponds to the LASSO specification
above; ten percent more theaters unexpectedly in the 65 - 70 degree range (not quite
warm enough for a barbecue) corresponds to about 320,000 additional daily viewership
opening weekend (or about 15 percent of average daily viewership for new releases). For
robustness, subsequent rows show the first stage results when we instead constrain to
two or three instruments, or when we constrain to one instrument from among a choice
set of ten degree temperature bins.22
21Conventional standard errors are fine as long as the number of selected instruments is not close to the
sample size – see Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2011) and Cattaneo, Jansson, and Newey (2012) for
more detail. We probe the instrument constraint specification choice below and show that our results are
robust to different instrument counts.
22In all cases we include our snow, rain, and average precipitation in quarter inches per hour variables
in the set of potential instruments, though in our baseline specifications none is ever chosen by LASSO. We
include these and the temperature variables both for Saturday and Sunday, but in our baseline specifications
LASSO always chooses Sunday temperatures. This is consistent with a high volume of daytime (weather-
dependent) movie-going on Sundays.
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Figure 3.3: First Stage Binscatter
Notes: We plot the percentage of movie theaters with weather shocks in the 65 - 70 degree range against
abnormal viewership. For exposition, the weather shock measure is grouped into 100 equal-sized bins; each
point corresponds to the mean weather shock and abnormal viewership within a bin. The slope of the line
of best fit is 3.151 with a standard error of 0.538.
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Table 3.1: LASSO-Chosen First Stageslassofirst
Set of Potential 
Instruments
Count 
Constraint
LASSO-Chosen 
Instrument(s)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
F-Stat on 
LASSO Choice
Choose 1 65-70F 3.151*** 34.37
(0.538)
Choose 2 65-70F 3.431*** 23.31
(0.547)
90-95F 3.041***
(0.796)
Choose 3 65-70F 3.282*** 16.61
(0.562)
90-95F 2.565***
(0.840)
75-80F -0.813
(0.540)
Choose 1 60-70F 1.402*** 13.78
(0.378)
10 Degree Temp 
Increments
5 Degree Temp 
Increments
Notes: This table presents first stage results for a variety of LASSO specifications. In the first three, the
instrument choice set is as follows: national aggregates of maximum temperature indicators in 5 degree
increments (on the interval [10F,100F]), indicator for snow, indicator for rain, precipitation indicators in
0.25 inches per hour increments (on the interval [0,1.5]), conditioned on year and week of year. From
this set, the LASSO approach is set to choose one, two, or three instruments, respectively. In the fourth
specification, a single instrument is again chosen, but the instrument choice is altered to instead include
the analogous temperature measures in 10 degree increments. Observations are at the opening weekend
by date level (1,614 observations). Standard errors, clustered at the date level, are in parentheses. */**/***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
3.4 Momentum from Exogenous Shocks to Viewership
In this section, we present our main results followed by a discussion of robustness and a
test of exogeneity.
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3.4.1 Main Results
Implementing the second stage (Equation 3.8), we find substantial momentum from
exogenous shocks to opening weekend viewership. Table 3.2 presents our base case
estimates. The first five columns report the relationship between abnormal viewership
opening weekend and subsequent abnormal viewership, separately for each weekend, two
through six; the final column reports the corresponding aggregate relationship, where the
outcome is summed across those weekends. In the first row, we instrument for abnormal
viewership during opening weekend with contemporaneous weather shocks. Since the
first stage is generally stronger when temperature is more precisely defined and when
the set of chosen instruments is kept small (see Table 3.1), for parsimony we focus on
IV estimates derived from a single instrument chosen from among the set of five-degree
temperature increments.
One-hundred additional viewers opening weekend yields an estimated 107 additional
viewers at some point in the following five weekends. The observed momentum is largest
in the weekend immediately following opening weekend: just over half of the total effect
is realized in the second weekend; an additional quarter is realized in the third weekend.
Though the magnitude of the effect falls off in subsequent weeks, it remains relatively
large and statistically significant.
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Table 3.2: Momentum from Viewership Shocksbasecase
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
IV 0.511*** 0.270*** 0.130*** 0.0968*** 0.0586*** 1.066***
(0.0513) (0.0379) (0.0319) (0.0230) (0.0176) (0.134)
OLS 0.434*** 0.257*** 0.156*** 0.0987*** 0.0636*** 1.009***
(0.0159) (0.0108) (0.00734) (0.00515) (0.00369) (0.0400)
    R-squared 0.690 0.581 0.457 0.374 0.284 0.628
Table 1. Ticket Sales Momentum
Notes: Panel A reports the results of IV regressions of residual daily audiences in subsequent 
weekends on daily audiences in opening weekend, where residual audiences are calculated 
controlling for year, week of year, and holiday fixed effects, and observations are at the opening 
weekend by date level. Standard errors, clustered at the date level, are in parentheses. Residual 
weather instruments (calculated controlling for year and week of year fixed effects) are chosen using 
the LASSO approach described in the text; the first stage results are included in Appendix Table XX. 
Panel B report the corresponding OLS results. 
Notes: The first row reports the results of the IV regression of daily abnormal audiences in each later
weekend on daily abnormal audiences opening weekend; the second row reports the corresponding OLS
results. Observations are at the opening weekend by date level (1,614 observations). Standard errors,
clustered at the date level, are in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and
1 percent levels, respectively. National weather shock instruments are chosen using the LASSO approach
described in the text; the first stage results are inclu ed in the first row of Table 3.1.
While the naive prior might be that OLS would tend to overestimate causal momentum
from network externalities because other unobserved shocks would likely be positively
correlated over time, our OLS estimates (presented in the second row) closely resemble
our IV estimates. In some weeks, the OLS estimates lie slightly above, in other weeks
slightly below, but in no week is the difference between the the IV and OLS estimates
statistically significant. Given that our LASSO selection methods yield a single instrument
with an F-statistic over 34, we are not concerned about weak instruments biasing our IV
estimates upward.23
Two other factors instead likely contribute to the close alignment of our IV and OLS
estimate. First, our OLS results are already purged of many major potential confounders.
Since we have conditioned on year, week of year, day of week, and holiday fixed effects,
we have already controlled for any aspects of quality, supply, and demand that would
be captured in seasonality. Second, while our OLS estimates could be biased upward by
23Any inter-temporal substitution that might occur, for example if some people go to the movie on
opening weekend because of the weather shock and subsequently do not go to that movie in later weekends,
would if anything bias our estimates downward.
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additional factors not captured by this set of controls, our IV estimates may still approach
them in magnitude because each is identifying off of a different composition of viewers.
Whereas the OLS estimates capture the average momentum effect across all abnormal
viewers, our IV estimates pertain specifically to abnormal viewers whose viewership choice
was driven by a weather shock. Amid homophily these marginal viewers – whose choice to
see a movie was quite literally thrown to the wind – may be more likely to have friends
who are also marginal movie-goers, suggesting that network externalities from their
viewership could be stronger than network externalities from the average viewership. If
marginal viewers are also more social (e.g., more likely to have alternative activities with
friends as outside options to movies), the difference between network externalities from
their viewership and from viewership by the average viewer could be larger still.
Our base case IV results are robust to different numbers of instruments chosen within
LASSO and also to larger units of observation. Appendix Table C.1 shows the correspond-
ing second stage results with alternative LASSO specifications. The effects are generally
unchanged when LASSO is instructed to choose two, or even three, instruments (rather
than just one). They are also comparable when the potential instrument set is altered
to include temperature variables in broader (ten degree) increments. For robustness, in
Appendix Table C.2 we also present the corresponding results when observations are
defined at the opening weekend by weekend level (rather than opening weekend by day)
level. Here, the estimated coefficients change only slightly and, although the standard
errors are somewhat larger, estimated momentum from exogenous viewership shocks
remains highly significant in each week.
3.4.2 Evidence on Exogeneity
Recall that we seek to estimate network externalities, i.e., how demand for a movie
varies with how many others have seen the movie, all else equal. To isolate momentum
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arising out of preference for shared experience, we need the shocks off of which we
are identifying to be orthogonal to all other demand drivers. Our intention in both (1)
defining our endogenous regressor as abnormal audiences, and (2) instrumenting with
plausibly exogenous weather shocks, is to isolate viewership shocks that are orthogonal
to other potential demand-drivers like a movie’s quality, distributor, or the intensity
with which it was advertised. Table 3.3 shows that, consistent with the exogeneity of
the opening weekend shocks, controlling for expected demand has little bearing on our
results.
We follow Moretti (2011) in proxying for expected demand with the number of screens
on which the movie opened. As Moretti notes, the number of screens is set by profit-
maximizing theater owners who have strong incentives to accurately predict opening
weekend demand; it should thus summarize well all the information the market has up
to the release date about how well the movie will do. In the first row, we reproduce
the results of our main specification for ease of comparison. The second row shows the
results when adding in controls for the number of screens on which the movie opened.
Controlling for expected demand, the estimated momentum falls only slightly and each
week’s estimates remain large and highly significant. In the third row, we define the
outcome variable as abnormal viewership per opening screen. For comparison to our base
case, in the final row we standardize the coefficients so that the first weekend’s coefficient
is one. Our estimates again fall only slightly (insignificantly) relative to the base case and
remain large and statistically significant through the fourth weekend. Our second stage,
then, indeed appears to be picking up viewership shocks orthogonal to expected demand.
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Table 3.3: Momentum per Opening Screen from Exogenous Viewership Shocks
openingtheativ CONTROLS FOR OPENING WEEKEND THEATER (BASE CASE)
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Tickets (1) 1.000*** 0.511*** 0.270*** 0.130*** 0.0968*** 0.0586*** 1.066***
(0) (0.0513) (0.0379) (0.0319) (0.0230) (0.0176) (0.134)
1.000*** 0.500*** 0.252*** 0.111*** 0.0891*** 0.0542** 1.006***
(0) (0.0635) (0.0474) (0.0402) (0.0287) (0.0218) (0.167)
1.307*** 0.664*** 0.312*** 0.145** 0.0747 0.0362 1.231***
(0.244) (0.134) (0.0956) (0.0650) (0.0505) (0.0377) (0.336)
1.000*** 0.508*** 0.239*** 0.111** 0.0572 0.0277 0.942***
(0.187) (0.103) (0.073) (0.050) (0.039) (0.029) (0.257)
Differences:
    (1) - (2) -- 0.011 0.018 0.019 0.008 0.004 0.060
(0.000) (0.082) (0.061) (0.051) (0.037) (0.028)
    (1) - (3) -- 0.003 0.031 0.019 0.0397 0.0309 0.124
(0.115) (0.082) (0.059) (0.045) (0.034) (0.290)
0.312
0.145
0.0747
0.0362
1.231
Standardized Tickets per 
Opening Theater (3)
Appendix 1. Ticket Sales Momentum
Tickets, Controlling for 
Opening Theaters (2) 
Tickets per Opening 
Theater
Notes: This table presents results from three different IV specifications. The first is our base case from
Table 3.2; in the second row, controls for number of opening theaters (proxy for expected demand) are
added in the second stage; in the third row, the outcome variable is defined as abnormal viewership per
opening screen. Observations are at the opening weekend by date level (1,614 observations). Standard
errors, clustered at the date level, are in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. National weather shock instruments are chosen using the LASSO
approach described in the text. The first stage results are included in the first row of Table 3.1.
3.5 A Role for Supply Shifts?
In the preceding section, we demonstrated that positive (negative) exogenous shocks to
viewership opening weekend cause positive (negative) shocks to viewership in subsequent
weekends. Our interest lies specifically in isolating the momentum effects of network
externalities, a demand-side phenomenon. In this section, we present a brief overview of
the supply side of the market and test for any supplier responses to our weather-induced
viewership shocks.
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3.5.1 In-Theater Movie Supply: Institutional Background
The three major categories of players on the supply side are the producers, the distributors,
and the exhibitors. In brief, the producer makes the movie, the distributor decides when
and how it gets released, and the exhibitor shows the movie to audiences.24 Distributors
and exhibitors contract on where the movie will be shown and how the revenues will be
shared.25 After release, the supply-side has two major margins along which it can adjust:
intensive-margin adjustments occur when an exhibitor changes the number of screens on
which the theater shows the film; extensive-margin adjustments occur when a distributor
withdraws the movie from all exhibitors altogether (often replacing it with a new and
different movie).26
Distributor-exhibitor contracts are designed to discourage screen adjustments by the
exhibitors. Since revenues tend to drop sharply after the initial few weeks, exhibitors
usually prefer shorter tenures, all else equal; having paid high fixed costs upfront,
however, distributors prefer longer tenures. Some contracts thus require that the exhibitor
play the film for a minimum number of weeks. More commonly, however, the exhibitor
can drop the movie at will at any point after release, but is discouraged from doing
so by both reputational and monetary considerations. Reputationally, an exhibitor that
drops a movie early may have reduced access to future movies from that distributor.
24Major studios increasingly both produce and distribute themselves.
25Most commonly, exhibitors pay upfront both some advance to the distributor for the movie and their
own direct-to-local-consumer advertising costs, and contracts are usually made well in advance of the
release date, in part to give exhibitors time to advertise the movie to local audiences.
26Though advertising has also been found to play an important role in audience size (see, e.g., Prag
and Casavant (1994), Zufryden (1996), Elberse and Eliashberg (2003)), prior work suggests that potential
post-release adjustments in advertising intensity are relatively small. First, advertising budgets are generally
set before a movie’s production, thereby limiting scope of adjustment (Moul (2007)). Second, the vast
majority (ninety percent) of a movie’s advertising budget is already spent pre-release, limiting post-release
adjustments further still (Elberse and Anand (2007), Vogel (2011)). Moretti (2011) also shows empirically
that the endogenous response of advertising to surprise sales is small both because (1) “only a small amount
of advertising is at risk of being affected by the surprise” and (2) “the elasticity of advertising to first-week
surprise is small.”
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Monetarily, the trajectory of the revenue split is designed to incentivize exhibitors to keep
the movie up: for a major motion picture, for example, it is common for just ten percent
of the first three week’s revenues (net exhibitor overhead costs) to go to the exhibitor,
but thereafter the exhibitor’s share rises dramatically to fifty or even seventy percent.27
Despite institutional factors that incentivize exhibitors to stay the course, there is some
evidence (as in Krider, Li, Liu, and Weinberg (2005)) that exhibitors do monitor box office
sales and respond with screen allocation decisions. There is also evidence (as in Elberse
and Eliashberg (2003)) that the number of screens showing the film in a given week
influences that week’s audience sizes.
3.5.2 Testing for a Supply-Side Response
In the following analysis, we first show that both intensive and extensive margin responses
to our opening weekend viewership shocks are rare. We then show that accounting for
any such responses has little effect on our estimated momentum.
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports estimated supply responses to our weather-induced
viewership shocks. The first row shows the intensive margin response by exhibitors,
i.e., the relationship between abnormal viewership opening weekend and the number of
screens on which the movie is shown each week. The second row shows the corresponding
extensive margin response by distributors, i.e., the probability in each week that the
movie is withdrawn from theaters. The empirics are loosely similar to those of our main
analysis, but differ in three key ways. First, since supply changes occur at most weekly,
observations are at the opening weekend by weekend level (with abnormal viewership
summed across weekend days).28 Second, while the endogenous regressor continues to
27According to Moul (2007), for less major movies, a common rental schedule is 60 percent of net
opening week revenues to the distributor, then 50 percent the second week, 40 percent the third, 35 percent
the fourth, and 30 percent thereafter.
28For additional discussion of the supply change decision see Swami, Eliashberg, and Weinberg (1999);
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be abnormal viewership opening weekend, the outcome variable is abnormal number of
screens (Row 1) or abnormal probability of being withdrawn (Row 2). (Each of these is
similarly conditional for year, week of year, and holiday fixed effects.) Third, viewership
is measured in 10,000’s for ease of exposition.
Before examining supply-side responses, we first address the relationship between
viewership shocks opening weekend and the number of screens on which the movie
opens. The Week 1 estimates suggest that amid weather shocks, movies opening on
more screens may experience slightly (insignificantly) larger viewership shocks. One
possible explanation is that consumers are responding to availability.29 The point estimate,
however, is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude; it suggests that 10,000
additional viewers from weather shocks corresponds to 2.26 additional screens. On
average for new releases in our sample, each screen has about 370 viewers such that the
additional screens would mechanically explain just 8 percent of the viewership opening
weekend.
The similarly small and generally insignificant coefficients in subsequent weekends,
moreover, indicate that exhibitors do not respond to positive (negative) shocks to opening
weekend viewership by substantially increasing (decreasing) the number of screens on
which the movie shows. The magnitudes of the point estimates suggest that any intensive-
margin adjustments can explain little, if any, of the observed momentum. Movies that
sold an additional 10,000 tickets opening weekend showed on just 1.44 screens second
weekend; they also sold about 5,100 more tickets that weekend (see Table 3.2). Since
the average tickets sold per screen for second weekend showings is 200, the additional
any change in number of screens of withdrawal of movies each week almost always occurs on the first day
of the movie-industry week (Friday).
29Suppose that the weather incentivizes additional people to go to the movies, but that the decision
then of which movie to attend is a function in part of the convenience of the available showings. A
movie opening on more screens could be more likely to be showing at a convenient time and/or place,
suggesting a potentially positive relationship between number of screens and (instrumented) opening
weekend audiences.
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screens would mechanically account for less than 6 percent of the observed viewership
effect that weekend. The relative size of the mechanical effects are similarly small in other
weeks, ranging from at most 12 percent (Week 4) to just 2 percent (Week 6).
To estimate any extensive-margin response from suppliers, we add truncated movies
back into our sample. The reported IV estimates in the second row show that the
relationship between abnormal audiences (in 10,000’s) and the abnormal probability in
each week of being withdrawn from theaters is similarly weak. The estimates suggest
that weather-induced viewership shocks do not effect withdrawal probabilities in the
short run. Though still statistically insignificant, point estimates in later weeks do suggest
that movies with positive (negative) abnormal viewership opening weekend could be
slightly less (more) likely to be withdrawn.
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Table 3.4: Supply-Side Adjustmentssupply
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Number of Screens 2.264 1.443 1.658 1.626 1.984** 1.086 7.797
    (obs. 538) (1.914) (1.907) (1.535) (1.208) (0.971) (0.875) (5.377)
Probability Dropped -- 3.51e-05 -0.000243 -0.000698 -0.00107 -0.00217 -0.00225
    (obs. 557) -- (0.000136) (0.000310) (0.000536) (0.000780) (0.00150) (0.00165)
Tickets 1*** 0.511*** 0.270*** 0.130*** 0.0968*** 0.0586*** 1.066***
(0) (0.0513) (0.0379) (0.0319) (0.0230) (0.0176) (0.134)
Tickets per Screen 1.307*** 0.674*** 0.358*** 0.197*** 0.125** 0.0809** 1.435***
(0.244) (0.132) (0.0893) (0.0610) (0.0485) (0.0376) (0.309)
1*** 0.516*** 0.274*** 0.151*** 0.0956*** 0.0619** 1.098***
(0.187) (0.101) (0.068) (0.047) (0.037) (0.029) (0.236)
1*** 0.552*** 0.273*** 0.0937* 0.0818** 0.0380 1.133***
(0) (0.0750) (0.0546) (0.0505) (0.0351) (0.0274) (0.176)
1.291*** 0.700*** 0.335*** 0.0888 0.0153 -0.110 1.490***
(0.313) (0.171) (0.126) (0.102) (0.0870) (0.0922) (0.396)
1*** 0.542*** 0.259*** 0.0688 0.0119 -0.0852 1.154***
(0.242) (0.132) (0.098) (0.079) (0.067) (0.071) (0.307)
538
1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307
R-squared 674 358 197 125 80.9 1435
0.5156848 0.27390972 0.15072686 0.095638868 0.061897 # 1.0979342
34.89
Tickets
Tickets per Screen
Standardized Tickets 
per Screen
C. Main Effects with Supply Adjustments, Includes Dropped Movies (1,671 obs.)
B. Main Effects with Intensive-Margin Supply Adjustments (1,614 obs.)
A. Supply-Side Adjustments
Standardized Tickets 
per Screen
Notes: The first row of Panel A reports the results of IV regressions of abnormal viewership opening
weekend (in 10,000’s, summed across weekend days) on abnormal number of screens showing the movie
each week in our main sample. The second row reports the results of IV regressions of abnormal audiences
opening weekend (in 10,000’s) on the abnormal probability of being dropped each week and includes
truncated observations. The first stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3. In Panel B, the first
row is simply our base case from Table 3.2, reproduced here for ease of comparison; the second results are
from the same specification, but with the outcome variable defined as tickets (in 10,000’s) per screen; the
final row shows these results scaled down by the Week 1 coefficient so that the first weekend’s results are
standardized to one, and later weekends’ results can be compared in magnitude to our base case estimates.
The first stage results are included in the first row of Table 3.1. Panel C replicates Panel B but with the
sample expanded to include truncated observations; (any dropped movie is assigned a ticket sales number
of zero for that and all subsequent weekends). The first stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3.
Throughout, standard errors, clustered at the weekend level, are in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance
at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. National weather shock instruments are
chosen using the LASSO approach described in the text.
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Despite the relatively small and generally insignificant relationships between view-
ership shocks opening weekend and either the number of screens showing the movie
or the probability that the movie is dropped, in Panels B and C we for robustness show
our main effects when accounting for any supply adjustments. Panel B accounts for
intensive-margin adjustments only, before considering any extensive margin response;
here, as in our main analysis, truncated films are not included. For ease of comparison,
the first row simply reproduces our main estimates from Table 3.2; the second row shows
the corresponding results when the outcome variable is instead defined as tickets (in
10,000’s) per screen; the final row shows these results scaled down by the first weekend’s
coefficient so that later weekends’ results can be compared in magnitude to our base case
estimates. Comparing the first and final columns of Panel B, we find that intensive-margin
responses can explain little, if any, of the observed quantity effects. For each weekend,
the point estimates from our main specification and from the per screen specification
(scaled) differ by at most 15 percent; in some weekends the per screen results are just
above, while in other weekends they are just below, the momentum estimated in our
main specification, and in no week is the difference statistically significant.
Although extensive-margin supply shifts also look small in magnitude relative to the
total observed quantity effects, and those shifts are only observed weeks into the run (at
which point the majority of the quantity effects have already been observed), we also
present specifications and samples that account for both any intensive and any extensive
margin supply adjustments. Panel C replicates Panel B with the sample expanded to
include truncated films. Once closed, a movie is assigned an audience size of zero for all
subsequent days. Relative to results on our main sample (Panel B), inclusion of movies
with truncated demand slightly increases our estimates in early weekends and slightly
decreases them in later weekends. This is consistent with the finding in Panel A that
movies with positive (negative) abnormal viewership opening weekend may be slightly
less (more) likely to be taken out of theaters. None of the differences, however, are
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significant. Moreover, accounting in this sample for any intensive-margin responses again
increases estimated momentum slightly in some weeks and decreases it slightly in others,
with the differences not significant in any week. Taken together, then, the results in Table
3.4 suggest that supply-side adjustments can explain little, if any, of the observed quantity
effects.
3.6 A Role for Social Learning?
We have demonstrated a strong relationship between opening weekend abnormal viewer-
ship of a movie and abnormal viewership of that movie in subsequent weekends, even
when the former was driven by exogenous shocks orthogonal to movie quality. We have
also provided evidence that supply shifts on neither the intensive nor the extensive mar-
gins can explain much if any of the observed quantity effects. Given the fixed-price nature
of in-theater movie-going, these findings suggest that demand shifts are driving the
observed quantity effects. The particular nature of the demand shifts, however, remains
important for interpretation. In this section, we examine whether an information story
could be at play.
By instrumenting with shocks that are orthogonal to movie quality, we sought to
isolate shocks to viewership opening weekend that were independent of quality. Those
viewership shocks should thus in and of themselves provide no quality signal and should
not induce quality updating among individuals considering attending the movie in later
weeks. Nonetheless, we might wonder whether larger early viewership boosts later sales,
in part because the individual either has, or believes that she has, better information
on quality. First, if after having seen the movie, people disseminate information about
whether it was good or bad, then the implications of that early viewership would vary
with movie quality. Amid an information dissemination story like this, we would expect
stronger momentum for higher-quality than lower-quality movies. Or second, in an
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observational learning story in which people with imperfect information infer movie
quality from the observed movie-going of others, and are unable to identify perfectly
the component of movie-going driven by exogenous (quality-independent) shocks, we
would expect stronger momentum from an initial viewership shock for movies about
which there was more ex-ante uncertainty about quality. In this section, we examine these
two testable predictions and conclude that such information stories are not driving our
observed demand shifts.
We first examine whether, consistent with the information dissemination story, our
estimated momentum is stronger for higher-quality than lower-quality movies. We proxy
for movie quality with ratings by expert reviewers. The ratings come from IMDB’s
Top-1000 voters, a group characterized by IMDB as “the 1000 people who have voted for
the most titles in [their] ratings poll.”30 Movies in our sample have been rated on average
by 483 of these Top-1000 voters. We cut movies into terciles by rating. Movies with a Top-
1000 voter assigned average rating of 6.3 or above fall in the top third, while movies with
a rating of 5.6 or below fall in the bottom third. Panel A of Table 3.5 shows momentum
effects separately by high quality (top tercile) and low quality (bottom tercile) movies.
Relative to movies with low ratings, movies with high ratings experience about the same
momentum in early weeks and only slightly (insignificantly) more momentum in later
weeks, suggesting that a social learning story is not driving our observed momentum.31
30IMDB notes that they “don’t disclose the number of votes required for a person to make this list nor
can [they] confirm or deny who is on the list.”
31Appendix Table C.4 shows the corresponding OLS results.
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Table 3.5: Momentum by Movie Quality and Information about Movie Quality
learn
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
High-Rated 0.426*** 0.271*** 0.154*** 0.119*** 0.0729*** 1.044***
   (obs. 705) (0.0810) (0.0609) (0.0391) (0.0315) (0.0218) (0.224)
Low-Rated 0.465*** 0.245*** 0.137*** 0.0610** 0.0452*** 0.953***
   (obs. 825) (0.0752) (0.0538) (0.0405) (0.0244) (0.0159) (0.187)
Difference:
    (High - Low) -0.039 0.026 0.017 0.058 0.028 0.091
(0.111) (0.081) (0.056) (0.040) (0.027) (0.364)
High Budget 0.416*** 0.209*** 0.147*** 0.0945*** 0.0682*** 0.935***
   (obs. 744) (0.0669) (0.0442) (0.0332) (0.0257) (0.0181) (0.178)
Low Budget 0.457*** 0.304*** 0.137*** 0.0658*** 0.0324** 0.996***
   (obs. 705) (0.0648) (0.0476) (0.0313) (0.0236) (0.0160) (0.162)
Difference:
    (High - Low) -0.0410 -0.0950 0.0100 0.0287 0.0358 -0.0610
(0.093) (0.065) (0.046) (0.035) (0.024) (0.241)
High Bud Low Bud
estimate1 s.e.1 estimate2 s.e.2 difference den z-score z-score
0.416 0.0669 0.457 0.0648 -0.041 0.0931378 -0.440207945
0.209 0.0442 0.304 0.0476 -0.095 0.06495691 -1.462508019
0.147 0.0332 0.137 0.0313 0.01 0.04562817 0.219162849
0.0945 0.0257 0.0658 0.0236 0.0287 0.03489198 0.82253868
0.0682 0.0181 0.0324 0.016 0.0358 0.02415802 1.481909439
0.935 0.178 0.996 0.162 -0.061 0.24068236 -0.253446074
A. By Movie Quality
B. By Information about Movie Quality
Notes: Panel A replicates the IV results from Table 3.2 separately by for high versus low rated movies,
defined as the top third and bottom third in ratings, respectively. Top-1000 voters are the 1000 people
who have voted for the most titles in IMDB ratings polls; high rated here corresponds to 6.3 and above;
low rated is 5.6 and below. The final column reports the differences in the point estimates. Panel B does
the same separately for movies in the top and bottom third by production budget, respectively. The first
stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3. The final column reports the differences in the point
estimates. */**/*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The
corresponding OLS estimates are in Appendix Table C.4.
Note that initial shocks to viewership also do not appear to vary with reviews.
Appendix Table C.5 reports the number of voters and the likelihood of being characterized
as high-rated and low-rated as a function of (instrumented) opening weekend ticket sales.
First, weather-induced shocks to viewership do not significantly impact the number of
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residual votes cast by expert reviewers.32 Second, ratings also do not seem to be broadly
affected. Movies that experience a one-million viewer shock are no more likely to be rated
in the top third by expert reviewers; movies that experience large positive shocks may be
slightly less likely to be low quality movies, though the difference is not significant.
To test for an observational learning story, we also examine whether movies are
differentially impacted according to the ex-ante level of uncertainty about quality. Under
an observational learning story, we would expect stronger estimated momentum among
films about which there is less good information. We proxy for the ex-ante level of
information about a movie with that movie’s production budget. Though the production
budget does not, according to IMDB, usually include advertising costs, there is likely to be
more aggregate uncertainty in quality for high versus low-budget films; consistent with
this, Einav (2007) notes that advertising budgets are generally set as a fixed percentage
of production budgets. From among the 1,245 movies in our main sample, we have
production budget from IMDB for nearly ninety percent. Panel B of Table 3.5 reports
our momentum estimates separately for movies that fall in the top third (in excess of
$49M) and the bottom third (below $29M) in production budget. The final row reports
the differences between the point estimates. Although low-budget films exhibit slightly
higher momentum in Weeks 2 and 3, they actually have slightly lower momentum in
Weeks 4, 5, and 6, and in no week is the difference in estimated momentum between high-
and low-budget films statistically significant.33
32All movies in our sample have had at least a full year to accrue votes.
33Appendix Table C.4 shows the corresponding OLS results.
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3.7 Magnitudes of Network Externalities by Demographic
We have demonstrated that the observed change in quantity is a demand-side phe-
nomenon and that the momentum we estimate appears to be unrelated to learning;
this suggests that our empirical strategy is indeed capturing momentum from network
externalities. In this section, we explore for whom these network externalities matter
most. We estimate differential network externalities, first between males and females,
and then between youth and adults. Though there exists a relatively rich literature in
sociology and psychology (and to a lesser extent also in political science) comparing
preference for shared experience across demographic groups, we are to our knowledge
the first to analyze the relative impact of network externalities in a large market setting.
3.7.1 By Gender
In an array of settings, the psychology and sociology literature has found that females
have stronger preference than males for group belonging and social connectedness. In
survey work, Barker (2009) finds that females are more likely to report high positive
collective self-esteem, which they argue can partially explain higher usage levels of social
network sites among females than among males. In experimental work, Huberman and
Rubinstein (2000) find that females are more likely than males to choose to side with
the majority, and Clancy and Dollinger (1993) finds that females exhibit higher levels of
self-connectedness while males are more likely to emphasize the quality of separateness
in their self-definitions.
To explore gender differences in network externalities, we classify movies by predom-
inant audience gender based on the predicted gender composition of all IMDB voters
using the leave-one-out method. We first regress the proportion of female voters on genre
and release year dummies for all movies but i. We then use the resulting estimates to
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predict movie i’s proportion of female voters.34 Finally, we classify movies within release
year as female movies if they fall in the top third in predicted proportion voters female
and as male movies if they fall in the bottom third.
We classify based on predicted audience gender because the proportion of actual female
IMDB voters may be endogenously determined. For example, suppose females experience
stronger network externalities than males. If IMDB votes are approximately proportional
to viewership, then a given movie might be more likely to be categorized as a female
movie if it experienced a shock with positive network effect implications. This would
upwardly bias any estimated differences between male-audience and female-audience
movies.
Table 3.6 shows estimated network externalities by predominant movie gender when
movies are classified using the leave-one-out method. The final row reports the difference
in network externalities between female audience and male audience movies. The
estimated network externalities for female movies exceed those for male movies in
Weeks 2 through 5.35 Consistent with a stronger preference for shared experience among
females than males, momentum from network externalities is about twice as high for
female movies as for male movies.36 Panel A of Figure 3.4 plots these estimated network
externalities by gender for each week in theater; the gender differences in network
34IMDB lists 61 genre categories, many of which are quite rare; in our sample, for example, there is only
one “Western Comedy” movie. We condense these 61 genre categories into 19 more general genres: Action,
Adventure, Comedy, Drama, Family, Fantasy, Foreign, Historical, Horror, Musical, Sci-Fi, Sports, Thriller,
War, Western, Romance. When the IMDB-listed genre contains one of more of the above key genre words,
we assign the movie to the first listed genre (e.g., we classify the one “Western Comedy” as a Western
movie and the one “Sports Action” as a Sports movie. Because the aggregate proportion of IMDB votes by
female voters has grown by about ten percent over the decade, we include year fixed effects so as to avoid
confounding our gender results with time trends. Finally, to avoid including mothers’ and fathers’ ratings
of movies targeted to children, we omit all G- and PG-rated movies.
35The corresponding estimates for the omitted group of movies, i.e., movies with a highly mixed gender
composition of IMDB voters, fall between female movies and male movies estimates but align more closely
with those of female movies.
36Panel A of Appendix Table C.6 shows the corresponding OLS results.
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externalities are particularly marked in the weeks immediately following release.
Table 3.6: Network Externalities by Predicted Gender Demographic
bygenderhat
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Female Movies 0.777*** 0.417*** 0.233*** 0.119*** 0.0287 1.575***
   (obs. 732) (0.0928) (0.0590) (0.0432) (0.0354) (0.0435) (0.207)
Male Movies 0.409*** 0.137** 0.123*** 0.0431 0.0484** 0.759***
   (obs. 813) (0.0700) (0.0606) (0.0383) (0.0304) (0.0214) (0.195)
Difference:
    (Female - Male) 0.368*** 0.280*** 0.110* 0.076 -0.020 0.816***
(0.116) (0.085) (0.058) (0.047) (0.050) (0.284)
Fhat Mhat
estimate1 s.e.1 estimate2 s.e.2 difference den z-score
0.777 0.0928 0.409 0.07 0.368 0.11624 3.16585173
0.417 0.059 0.137 0.0606 0.28 0.084578 3.31057164
0.233 0.0432 0.123 0.0383 0.11 0.057733 1.905314
0.119 0.0354 0.0431 0.0304 0.0759 0.046662 1.62659954
0.0287 0.0453 0.0484 0.0214 -0.0197 0.0501 -0.3932104
1.575 0.207 0.759 0.195 0.816 0.284384 2.86936434
Effect of Opening Weekend Audience on Subsequent Audience Size, by PREDICTED Audience Gender
Notes: This table replicates Table XXX except that gender demographics are as predicted based on 
genre and year using the leave-on-out method. 
Notes: This table replicates the IV results from Table 3.2 separately by predicted gender demographic using
the leave-one-out method described in the text. */**/*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent,
and 1 percent levels, respectively. The first stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3.
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Figure 3.4: Network Externalities by Predicted Gender Demographic
Notes: Panel A plots the coefficients from Table 3.6 for each of Weeks 2 through 6. Panel B shows the
corresponding results when classified based on the realized gender composition of voters as detailed in the
text.
For robustness, we can also classify movies based on the realized gender composition
of voters. “Female” movies are those in the top third that year in percentage of votes
female (at least 20.1 percent); “Male” movies are those in the bottom third (i.e., the top
third in percentage of IMDB voters male, or at least 82.5 percent male votes).37 Relative
to the predicted method, gender classifications change for only a small number of movies
and the results, plotted in Panel B of Figure 3.4 and reported in Appendix Table C.7, are
highly comparable.38.
37Because the aggregate proportion of IMDB votes by female voters has grown by about ten percent over
the decade, we categorize within year so as not to confound our gender results with time trends. To avoid
including mothers’ and fathers’ ratings of movies targeted to children, we again omit all G- and PG-rated
movies from this analysis.
38The corresponding OLS results are also similar and are shown in Panel B of Appendix Table C.6
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3.7.2 By Age
We also find differences in estimated network externalities by age. We classify each movie
into one of three categories based on its age appropriateness according to the MPAA:
(1) “Child-friendly,” (2) “Teen-friendly,” and (3) “Adults-only.” Child-friendly includes
all films with a G (General Audiences, all ages admitted) or PG (Parental Guidance
Suggested, some material may not be suitable for children) MPAA rating; teen-friendly
films are those rated PG-13 (Parents Strongly Cautioned; some material parents might
consider inappropriate for children under 13 years); and adults-only films are those rated
R (Restricted; people under 17 years may only be admitted if accompanied by a parent or
guardian).39 Table 3.7 shows estimated network externalities separately by age suitability.
The last two rows report the difference in network externalities between child-friendly
and adults-only movies and between teen-friendly and adults-only movies, respectively.
Suggestive of higher preference among youth for shared experience, child- and teen-
friendly movies exhibit larger network externalities than do adults-only movies.40
39Since NC-17 (No One 17 and Under Admitted, exclusively adult) likely captures a different demo-
graphic, we omit throughout the less than 1 percent of NC-17 films in our sample; their inclusion in the
Adults Only category, however, does not significantly change our results.
40Appendix Table 3.7 shows the corresponding OåLS results; though the network externalities estimated
by IV were much larger for youths than for adults, the more general momentum estimated by OLS is quite
similar across age suitabilities.
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Table 3.7: Network Externalities by Age Suitabilitybympaa
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Child-Friendly Movies 0.706*** 0.387*** 0.237*** 0.149*** 0.112*** 1.591***
   (obs. 688) (0.0896) (0.0518) (0.0403) (0.0327) (0.0279) (0.203)
Teen-Friendly Movies 0.518*** 0.325*** 0.234*** 0.172*** 0.129*** 1.377***
   (obs. 1217) (0.0767) (0.0608) (0.0519) (0.0384) (0.0313) (0.244)
Adults-Only Movies 0.379*** 0.253*** 0.119*** 0.0725** 0.0649** 0.888***
   (obs. 909) (0.0735) (0.0585) (0.0452) (0.0355) (0.0319) (0.210)
Differences:
    (Child - Adult) 0.327*** 0.125 0.118* 0.077 0.047 0.703***
(0.116) (0.078) (0.061) (0.048) (0.042) (0.292)
    (Teen - Adult) 0.139 0.072 0.115* 0.100* 0.064 0.489
(0.106) (0.084') (0.069) (0.052) (0.045) (0.322)
OLS COULD GO IN AN APPENDIX
High % Under 18 Voters 0.415*** 0.304*** 0.166*** 0.108***0.0801***
   (obs. 951) (0.0362) (0.0295) (0.0218) (0.0170)(0.0142)
High % Age 18 to 29 Voters 0.415*** 0.253*** 0.135*** 0.0855***0.0568***
   (obs. 1,020) (0.0298) (0.0265) (0.0179) (0.0137)(0.00991)
High % Age 30 to 44 Voters 0.482*** 0.300*** 0.171*** 0.0897**0.0378
   (obs. 963) (0.0690) (0.0640) (0.0466) (0.0383)(0.0275)
ADULT CHILD
estimate1 s.e.1 estimate2 s.e.2 difference den z-score z-score
0.379 0.0735 0.706 0.0896 0.327 0.11588965 2.821649836
0.253 0.0585 0.378 0.0518 0.125 0.07813763 1.599741277
0.119 0.0452 0.237 0.0403 0.118 0.06055683 1.948582753
0.0725 0.0355 0.149 0.0327 0.0765 0.04826531 1.584989353
0.0649 0.0319 0.112 0.0279 0.0471 0.04237948 1.111387027
0.888 0.21 1.591 0.203 0.703 0.29207704 2.406899183
ADULT TEEN
estimate1 estimate2 s.e.2 difference den z-score stars
0.379 0.0735 0.518 0.0767 0.139 0.10623154 1.308462633
0.253 0.0585 0.325 0.0608 0.072 0.08437351 0.853348354
0.119 0.0452 0.234 0.0519 0.115 0.06882332 1.670945145
0.0725 0.0355 0.172 0.0384 0.0995 0.05229541 1.90265261
Notes: This table replicates Table XXX separately by Movie MPAA rating. Child-friendly Movies are those 
rated G or PG; teen-friendly Movies are rated PG-13; and adult-only Movies are rated R. 
Notes: This table replicates the IV results from Table 3.2 separately by film MPAA rating. Child-friendly
films are those rat d G or PG; teen-friendly films are r ted PG-13; and adult-only films are rated R. */**/***
denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The first stage results are
included in Appendix Table C.3.
Figure 3.5 shows the estimated network externalities for each of the age suitability
categories by week in theater. Child-friendly movies exhibit the largest momentum
from network externalities in early weeks; for 100 additional viewers opening weekend,
child-friendly films bring in 70 additional viewers the second weekend, compared to only
50 additional viewers for teen-friendly films and 40 for adults-only films. The network
effects momentum among children, however, is least persistent: by the third weekend
marginal network externalities in child-friendly films is about on par with teen-friendly
films.41
41We have estimated larger network externalities among females than males, and among children and
teens than adults. The interested reader may review Appendix C.3 in which we explore variation in the
magnitude of network externalities by adult ages; there we find that network externalities are larger among
the oldest available age category (45 plus) than among mid-life adults (either 18 to 29 or 30 to 44).
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Figure 3.5: Network Externalities by Movie Age Suitability
Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from Table 3.7 for each of Weeks 2 through 6. Child-friendly films
are those rated G or PG; teen-friendly films are rated PG-13; and adult-only films are rated R.
3.8 Substitution and Aggregate Viewership
We have thus far been agnostic as to the sources of the network-externality induced
viewerships. Were these viewerships simply from individuals substituting across movies?
Or do they instead represent a more dramatic substitution across activities?
The results in Table 3.8 suggest that most of our estimated viewerships from network
externalities come from substitution across activities. In the first row, the endogenous
regressor is abnormal viewership of new releases in week w; the outcomes are abnormal
viewership in w + 1 of (1) those same movies (i.e. our base case results), (2) all movies
showing in both w and w + 1, (3) new movies opening in w + 1, and (4) all movies
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showing in w + 1, respectively.42 Each reported coefficient is from a separate regression.
The first column simply reproduces our base case results for comparison; the second
shows that (unsurprisingly) shocks to opening weekend viewership are correlated with
higher viewership in w + 1 of all movies that played both weekends. The first and third
columns taken together provide suggestive evidence of some (statistically insignificant)
substitution across movies: amid 100 more viewers of movies opening last weekend,
we see 51 more viewers of those movies this weekend and 16 fewer viewers of new
movies just opening. This is consistent with a partial substitution story in which network
effects in consumption increase the utility from seeing movies that did particularly well
last weekend, thus reducing demand for new movies this weekend (which experienced
no such shock). The large and statistically significant coefficient in the final column,
moreover, suggests that even accounting for substitution away from new movies, network
externalities produce significant momentum in aggregate movie-going. That is, network
externalities drive many who would otherwise have engaged in a different activity to
attend the movies instead.
42The first stage is the same as in our standard base case (see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.8: Substitution across Movies and Activities
substitution
Endogenous regressor: 
Audiences this week
Movies in 2nd 
Week
Movies in 2nd 
to 6th Week 
Movies in 1st 
Week
Movies in 1st 
to 6th Week
Movies in 1st Week 0.511*** 0.474*** -0.159 0.332*
(0.0513) (0.0970) (0.192) (0.202)
Movies in 1st to 5th Week 0.468*** -0.139 0.327*
(0.0734) (0.187) (0.193)
 
Outome variable: Audiences next week
Notes: Each reported coefficient is from a separate regression. In the first row, the endogenous regressor is
abnormal daily tickets sales weekend w to movies that opened in weekend w; the outcome variables are
abnormal daily ticket sales in weekend w + 1 to movies that (1) opened in week w, (2) played in both w
and w + 1, (3) opened in week w, and (4) played in week w + 1, respectively. The corresponding first stage
is in the first row of Table 3.1. In the second row, the endogenous regressor is abnormal daily ticket sales in
weekend w to movies they played in both w and w + 1; the corresponding first stage is Appendix Table 3.1.
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Since weather shocks may well engender momentum for any movie showing both
that weekend and the next (not just movies that opened that weekend), the second
row of Table 3.8 shows the corresponding results when the endogenous regressor is
defined as ticket sales in week w for all movies that showed in both w and w + 1.43 With
this specification, we again find (1) strong momentum from network externalities; (2)
some (statistically insignificant) evidence of substitution away from new movies released
the following weekend; and (3) large and significant substitution across activities the
following weekend. For 100 additional viewers in weekend w to movies showing in both
w and w+ 1, we observe about 47 more viewers of those same movies in w+ 1; just under
one-third of these would otherwise have seen one of the new releases in w + 1, but the
majority (70 percent) were drawn into theaters in w + 1 by positive network externalities
in consumption.
43The instrument is the same as in our base case specifications; the first stage is reported in Appendix
Table C.3
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we exploit the randomness of weather, and the relationship between
weather and movie-going, to test for and quantify network externalities in movie con-
sumption. In the first stage, we instrument for opening weekend viewership with
unanticipated and plausibly exogenous weather shocks that weekend. Given the large
number of potential instruments, LASSO variable selection methods are key in generating
a strong and econometrically sound first stage. We expect this approach will prove simi-
larly fruitful in other settings where weather is a powerful and exogenous determinant of
behavior, but specifying the optimal first stage is otherwise non-obvious.
Previous work on momentum in entertainment goods has highlighted the role of
learning; we find that network externalities are also important. Using our LASSO-chosen
instruments, we estimate the effect of exogenous shocks to opening weekend viewership
on viewership in later weekends. Our results show that network externalities engender a
multiplier effect: a shock to opening weekend viewership on average yields at least as
many viewers again in the following five weekends. The effects appear to be stronger
for females than males, and for youth than adults. Overall, these network externalities
have non-trivial impacts on behavior: most of our estimated momentum comes from
substitution across activities.
We’ve found that people follow in the consumptive footprints of others. They do so
even when suppliers are not pushing the fads, and even when those footprints provide no
information about quality. The powerful and prolonged effects of network externalities
in this context suggest potentially important implications of network externalities in
behaviors with more obvious social welfare impacts (e.g., school attendance, fertility,
smoking). Moreover, amid the rise of potentially solitary activities like gaming, remote
work, and online learning, further research into where and how network externalities
might deepen participation and engagement could also prove fruitful.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Communication in the Team Experiment
Here we discuss communication differences across team types. In light of our findings, for
robustness we also re-estimate performance differences by team type with the inclusion
of several additional controls.
Panel A of Appendix Table 9 shows how the team types differed in their commu-
nication methods. We regress each communication outcome on indicators for being in
Type A and Type C teams; as before, the base group is Type B teams. Controls for the
characteristics of referred and non-referred workers are included throughout. The first
column considers chat box use, defined as both partners typing at least one message in
the chat box. The second column considers the total number of messages sent by both
partners during the task and is limited to teams that used the chat box. Because we
directly observe what is written in the chat box, both of these measures are known for all
teams and do not rely on worker reports.
The last two columns consider communication outside the chat box, such as on Skype.
When workers submitted their slogans for each task, we asked if they had used other
forms of communication. We code teams as using other forms of communication if at
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least one partner reported doing so. The third column addresses selection into answering
this question. Here we regress a dummy for whether at least one teammate answered
this question on team type. In the final column, we regress an indicator for reporting
using other forms of communication on team type. This final specification includes only
teams that answered the communication question.
Type A teams communicated the most, both in and out of the chat box. Relative to
Type B teams, Type A teams were slightly, though insignificantly, more likely to use the
chat box. When they did use the chat box, Type A teams sent about one-third more
messages. The biggest difference between the communication of Type A and Type B
teams, however, is in the frequency with which they used other forms of communication.
While 38 percent of Type B teams reported using other forms of communication, Type
A teams were twice as likely to do so; the magnitude of this difference implies that the
difference itself cannot be driven by the small difference in the likelihood of answering
this question.1
On the other hand, Type C teams were significantly less likely to use the chat box.
This is not surprising since the chat box was on the site and non-referred workers were
significantly less likely ever to log in.
We have observed that, relative to Type B teams, Type A teams communicated more
both in and out of the chat box. They also spent more time on the task (Table 5). Panel
B of Appendix Table 9 provides evidence that, even controlling for communication and
time spent, Type A teams still outperformed Type B teams. We replicate the main
team performance specifications with controls for referred and non-referred workers’
characteristics (from Panel B of Table 4), adding as controls an indicator for using the chat
box, the number of messages sent in the chat box, an indicator for using other methods
1At least one partner answered this question in 95 percent of Type B teams; Type B teams were slightly
more likely to answer this question than either of the other team types.
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of communication, and the number of minutes spent by each partner.2
Unsurprisingly, more communication and more time spent both led to better outcomes.
For example, teams that sent the median number of messages in the chat box (eight)
were 21 percentage points more likely to answer the team question the same way and
15 percentage points more likely to provide the same slogan than were teams that did
not use the chat box, all else equal. Teams in which each partner spent an additional five
minutes each on the task were, all else equal, three percentage points more likely to have
their team question match and two percentage points more likely to submit the same
slogan.
Even conditioning on the type of communication used, number of messages sent, and
minutes spent by each partner, however, Type A teams remained 14 percentage points
more likely to provide the same answer to the team question and 23 percentage points
more likely to submit the same slogan than Type B teams. Type C teams, meanwhile,
remained substantially less likely to do either (11 percentage points and seven percentage
points, respectively).
2If neither partner answered the question about using other forms of communication, we set the
indicator for having reported communication outside the chat box to zero. Thus, this dummy also directly
captures the effect of having at least one partner submit work.
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A.2 Supplementary Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Individual and Team Experiments, Workers Asked to Refer
Referred 
Someone
Difference Included 
Referrers
Has Prior Experience 1.00 1.00
Earnings $2,917 ** $2,932
Number of Previous Jobs 12.58 ** 12.35
Has Feedback Score 1.00 1.00
Feedback Score 4.80 4.81
Posted Wage $2.84 * $2.85
Days Since Joining oDesk 689 666
Has Portfolio 0.69 ** 0.69
Number of Tests Passed 5.80 5.84
Has English Score 1.00 ** 1.00
English Score 4.79 4.77
Agency Affiliated 0.25 0.21
Number of Degrees 1.40 1.41
Proposed Wage $2.50 $2.51
Observations 1,246 455
Notes: Each statistic in the table presents the mean of the characteristic indicated by the 
row for the sample indicated by the column. Referred Someone denotes workers who 
referred at least one other worker to our firm, whether or not we hired that worker. 
Referred No One denotes workers who referred no workers to our firm. Included 
Referrers is a subset of Referred Someone and includes only those workers whose 
referral we hired. English Score is self-reported English ability on a one-to-five scale, a 
portfolio is where a worker posts prior work, and agency-affiliated workers pay a fraction 
of their earnings to report they are part of a given group of oDesk workers (an agency). 
*, ** denotes that the means of the characteristic for Referred Someone and Referred No 
One are significantly different at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
1,867
5.60
0.99
4.79
0.24
1.35
$2.51
0.61
Appendix Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
Referred 
No One
1.00
$2,397
11.07
1.00
4.80
$2.77
709
Individual and Team Experiments, Workers Asked to Refer
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Table A.2: Randomization Assessment
Individual Experiment
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Has Prior Experience 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.75
Earnings $2,919 $2,996 $1,396 $1,379
Number of Previous Jobs 12.78 13.09 8.28 10.14
Has Feedback Score 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.64
Feedback Score 4.80 4.76 4.66 4.59
Posted Wage $2.78 $2.85 $2.68 $2.72
Days Since Joining oDesk 645 676 489 566
Has Portfolio 0.64 0.68 0.47 0.50
Number of Tests Passed 5.78 5.78 4.98 5.31
Has English Score 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00
English Score 4.84 4.79 4.75 4.66
Agency Affiliated 0.08 0.08 0.05* 0.10*
Number of Degrees 1.50 1.36 1.34 1.51
Proposed Wage $2.53 $2.53 $2.40 $2.37
Observations 86 87 127 128
Appendix Table 2. Randomization A essment
Referred WorkersReferrers
Notes: Each cell presents the mean of the characteristic indicated by the row for the sample indicated 
by the column. Only workers in the individual experiment are included. English Score is self-reported 
English ability on a one-to-five scale, a portfolio is where a worker posts prior work, and agency-
affiliated workers pay a fraction of their earnings to report they are part of a given group of oDesk 
workers (an agency). * denotes the Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 group means are statistically 
different at the 10% level.
Individual Experi ent
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Table A.3: Performance and Persistence, with Different Controls
Individual Experiment: Base Group is Non-Monitored Referred Workers (Treatment 2)
Submission
On-Time 
Submission Accuracy Re-Application
0.036 0.053 0.034 -0.032
(0.042) (0.047) (0.039) (0.030)
-0.132** -0.079* -0.101** -0.225**
(0.042) (0.045) (0.039) (0.038)
Constant 0.757 0.563 0.640 0.953
(0.031) (0.034) (0.028) (0.019)
Controls No No No No
Observations 2,610 2,610 2,610 435
R-squared 0.027 0.013 0.020 0.085
Submission
On-Time 
Submission Accuracy Re-Application
0.012 0.043 0.015 -0.027
(0.042) (0.046) (0.040) (0.039)
-0.143** -0.080 -0.109** -0.184**
(0.050) (0.052) (0.046) (0.054)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,610 2,610 2,610 435
R-squared 0.190 0.160 0.180 0.270
Submission
On-Time 
Submission Accuracy Re-Application
-0.045 0.023 -0.032 -0.041
(0.049) (0.057) (0.043) (0.039)
-0.161** -0.104* -0.090* -0.125**
(0.054) (0.057) (0.046) (0.050)
Daily Performance Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 435 435 435 435
R-squared 0.617 0.510 0.625 0.452
A. All Days, No Controls
Monitored Referred 
(Treatment 1)
Non-Referred
Notes: Panel A replicates Panel A of Table 2, eliminating the controls for worker characteristics. 
Panels B and C replicate Panels A and B, respectively, of Table 2 with additional control variables. In 
addition to the characteristics listed in footnote 18, these regressions all include Second Order 
Controls: the square of each non-binary characteristic in footnote 18 and the interaction of each pair of 
characteristics in footnote 18.   *, ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Appendix Table 3.  Performance and Persistence, With Different Controls
Monitored Referred 
(Treatment 1)
Non-Referred
Monitored Referred 
(Treatment 1)
Non-Referred
B. All Days, with Second Order Controls
C. Last Day Only, with Second Order Controls
Individual Experiment: Base Group is Non-Monitored Referred Workers (Treatment 2)
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Table A.4: Selection into Accepting Job Offer in the Supplemental Experiment
Data from the Individual and Supplemental Experiments
Submission
On-Time 
Submission Accuracy Re-Application
0.131 0.133 0.219 0.008
(0.129) (0.123) (0.135) (0.143)
0.164* 0.113 0.159 0.217*
(0.096) (0.081) (0.099) (0.119)
Non-Referred -0.122 -0.114 -0.165* -0.026
(0.106) (0.086) (0.098) (0.136)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 435 435 435 435
R-squared 0.154 0.144 0.161 0.149
Appendix Table 4. Selection into Accepting Job Offer in the Supplemental Exp riment
Dependent Variable: Accepted Job Offer in Supplemental Experiment
Notes: Each column presents the results of a separate regression of an indicator for a worker 
accepting our job offer in the supplemental experiment on a measure of her performance in the 
individual experiment, an indicator for being a non-referred worker, and the interaction of these two 
indicators. Each column uses a different performance measure indicated by the column heading. 
Observations are workers; only referred and non-referred workers are included. Each regression 
contains controls for the individual characteristics listed in footnote 18. * denotes significance at the 
10% level.
Performance in Individual 
Experiment  × Non-Referred
Performance in Individual 
Experiment
ata fro  the Individual and Supple ental Experi ents
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Table A.5: Performance and Persistence in New Firm, with Different Controls
Supplemental Experiment: Base Group is All Referred Workers
Accepted Job 
Offer
Submission On-Time 
Submission
Accuracy Re-Application
Non-Referred -0.167** -0.182** -0.178** -0.079** -0.236**
(0.047) (0.042) (0.042) (0.022) (0.047)
Constant 0.678 0.518 0.499 0.247 0.553
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.015) (0.031)
Controls No No No No No
Observations 435 2,175 2,175 2,175 435
R-squared 0.029 0.033 0.031 0.019 0.055
Accepted Job 
Offer
Submission On-Time 
Submission
Accuracy Re-Application
Non-Referred -0.042 -0.073 -0.073 -0.020 -0.097
(0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.029) (0.064)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 435 2,175 2,175 2,175 435
R-squared 0.268 0.242 0.239 0.201 0.292
Submission On-Time 
Submission
Accuracy Re-Application
Non-Referred -0.119* -0.118* -0.047 -0.198**
(0.067) (0.070) (0.038) (0.090)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable
     Base Group (Referred Workers) 0.763 0.735 0.363 0.815
Observations 1,325 1,325 1,325 265
R-squared 0.247 0.25 0.192 0.358
Appendix Table 5.  Performance and Per istence in New Firm, with Diff ent Controls
B. All Workers, with Second Order Controls
C. Conditional on Accepting  Job Offer, with Second Order Controls
Notes: Panel A replicates Panel A of Table 3, eliminating the controls for worker characteristics. Panels 
B and C replicate Panels A and B, respectively, of Table 3 with additional control variables. In addition to 
the characteristics listed in footnote 18, these regressions all include Second Order Controls: the square 
of each non-binary characteristic in footnote 18 and the interaction of each pair of characteristics in 
footnote 18.   *, ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
A. All Workers, No Controls
Supplemental Experiment: Base Group is All Referred Workers
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Table A.6: Performance in Team Experiment, with Different Controls
Team Experiment: Base Group is Referred Workers Paired with Someone Else’s Referrer (Type B)
Logged in Submitted Individual Question 
Correct
Own Criteria in Slogan
0.018 0.046** 0.053* 0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.033)
-0.294** -0.312** -0.287** -0.138**
(0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.052)
Controls No No No NO
Observations 846 846 846 846
R-Squared 0.124 0.134 0.102 0.018
Logged in Submitted Individual Question 
Correct
Own Criteria in Slogan
0.018 0.046** 0.053* 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.035)
-0.131** -0.176** -0.193** -0.044
(0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.051)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 846 846 846 846
R-Squared 0.420 0.388 0.309 0.213
Both Submitted Team Question 
Matches
Same Slogan Same Slogan
 & Both Criteria
0.099** 0.287** 0.372** 0.103**
(0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024)
-0.280** -0.206** -0.142** -0.053*
(0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.029)
Controls No No No No
Observations 846 846 846 846
R-Squared 0.117 0.164 0.194 0.031
Both Submitted Team Question 
Matches
Same Slogan Same Slogan
 & Both Criteria
0.099** 0.287** 0.372** 0.103**
(0.024) (0.030) (0.034) (0.025)
-0.162** -0.075 -0.032 0.026
(0.061) (0.054) (0.054) (0.031)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 846 846 846 846
R-Squared 0.314 0.327 0.311 0.170
Notes: Panels A and B replicate Panel A of Table 4 eliminating the controls for worker characteristics (Panel A) and 
adding Second Order Controls (Panel B). Panels C and D replicate Panel B of Table 4, eliminating the controls for 
worker characteristics (Panel C) and adding Second Order Controls (Panel D). The Second Order Controls are the 
square of each non-binary characteristic in footnote 18 and the interaction of each pair of characteristics in footnote 18.   
*, ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Referred Worker and Own 
Referrer Team (Type A)
Non-Referred Worker and 
Referrer Team (Type C)
Referred Worker When 
Working with Own Referrer 
(Type A)
Non-Referred Worker When 
Working with Referrer (Type 
C)
B. Individual Diligence, with Second Order Controls
C. Team Performance, No Controls
Referred Worker and Own 
Referrer Team (Type A)
Appendix Table 6.  Performance in Team Experiment, with Different Controls
A. Individual Diligence, No Controls
Referred Worker When 
Working with Own Referrer 
(Type A)
Non-Referred Worker When 
Working with Referrer (Type 
C)
D. Team Performance, with Second Order Controls
Non-Referred Worker and 
Referrer Team (Type C)
Tea  Experiment: Base Group is R ferred rkers Paired with Someone Else's Referr r (Type B)
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Table A.8: Characteristics of the Referrer-Referred Worker Relationship
Appendix Table 8.  Characteristics of the Referrer-Referred Worker Relationship
Included Referred 
Workers
Excluded Referred 
Workers
How Well Referrer Knows Referral
1 (Hardly at all) 1% 2%
2 2% 2%
3 5% 3%
4 14% 9%
5 20% 19%
6 (Extremely Well) 57% 65%
Observations 535 1,314
Frequency of Interaction
Less than Once a Month 2% 4%
About Once a Month 5% 4%
Less than Weekly, More than Monthly 8% 4%
About Once a Week 13% 9%
Less than Daily, More than Weekly 21% 14%
About Once a Day 19% 16%
More than Once a Day 32% 47%
Observations 533 1,311
Number of People Known in Common
0 to 4 21% 18%
5 to 9 16% 16%
10 to 19 16% 18%
20 to 29 11% 10%
30 or more 37% 39%
Observations 535 1,314
Sometimes Work in Same Room 0% 44%
Observations 537 1,317
Notes:  This table presents the distributions of referrers' responses to questions about 
their relationships with their referrals for two different samples, indicated by the column 
headings. Included Referred Workers are referred workers we hired in either the 
individual or team experiment. Excluded Referred Workers are workers who were 
referred to us, but who were not included in any experiment. 
Individual and T am Experiments
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Table A.9: Team Communication and Performance Controlling for Communication & Time Spent
Team Experiment: Base Group is Referred Workers Paired with Someone Else’s Referrer (Type B)
Chat Box Use Total Chat Messages 
(Conditional on Use)
Answered Communication  
Question
Reported Outside 
Communication
0.025 4.346* -0.028* 0.376**
(0.042) (2.544) (0.016) (0.040)
-0.090* 0.805 -0.032 -0.043
(0.047) (2.706) (0.027) (0.038)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable
Base Group (Type B) 0.408 13.522 0.947 0.378
Observations 846 307 846 778
R-Squared 0.047 0.062 0.017 0.193
Both Submitted Team Question 
Matches
Same Slogan Same Slogan & 
Both Criteria
-0.028 0.140** 0.225** 0.025
(0.026) (0.031) (0.037) (0.029)
-0.144** -0.112** -0.066* -0.014
(0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.029)
Used Chat Box 0.223** 0.167** 0.116** 0.020
(0.028) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041)
Total Chat Messages 0.001* 0.005** 0.006** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
0.236** 0.320** 0.336** 0.173**
(0.030) (0.033) (0.042) (0.031)
0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
0.005** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable
Base Group (Type B) 0.730 0.500 0.337 0.142
Observations 846 846 846 846
R-Squared 0.497 0.478 0.467 0.171
Notes: Each column in each panel reports the results of a separate regression of the dependent variable indicated by 
the column on indicators for being in a Type A team and for being in a Type C team. Observations are at the worker-
PSA level. Chat Box Use is an indicator for whether each partner typed at least one message in the chat box. Total 
Chat Messages is the aggregate number of messages sent between the two partners, and is conditional on chat box 
use. Answered Communication Question is an indicator for whether at least one partner responded to the question at 
the end of that task about how the partners had communicated. Reported Outside Communication is an indicator for 
whether either partner reported communicating using methods other than the chat box and is conditional on at least 
one partner having answered the communication question. Regressions in both panels control for the characteristics 
of referred and non-referred workers listed in footnote 18. Regressions in Panel B also control for whether the team 
used the chat box, the number of chat messages sent, whether either partner reported using other forms of 
communication, and (separately) the number of minutes spent by both partners. Standard errors are clustered at the 
blocking group level.  *, ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Minutes Spent by Referrer
Minutes Spent by Referred 
or Non-Referred Worker
Appendix Table 9.  Team Communication and Performance Controlling for Communication and Time Spent
Used Outside 
Communication
A. Communication by Team Type
Non-Referred Worker and 
Referrer Team (Type C)
B. Team Performance Controlling for Communication and Time Spent
Referred Worker and Own 
Referrer Team (Type A)
Non-Referred Worker and 
Referrer Team (Type C)
Referred Worker and Own 
Referrer Team (Type A)
Team Experiment: Base Group is R f r  orkers Paired with Some ne Else's R ferrer (Type B)
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A.3 Supplementary Figures
Figure A.1: Individual Experiment Task Site
Referred and Non-Referred WorkersAppendix(Figure(1.(Individual(Experiment(Task(Site,(Referred(and(Non?Referred(Workers((
((Appendix(Figure(2.(Performance(Report(Example((
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Figure A.2: Performance Report Example
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Figure A.3: Supplemental Experiment Task SiteAppendix(Figure(3.(Su l ental(Experiment(Task(Site((
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Figure A.4: Submission Rates by Day
Supplemental Experiment
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Figure 5. Submission Rates by Day, Supplemental Experiment
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Figure A.5: Team Experiment Task Site
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Figure 5. Submission Rates by Day, Supplemental Experiment
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Supplementary Tables
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics on Variables Underlying SES Proxysessumstats
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Educational Attainment Father-Figure 9,027 11.86 7,279 13.00
    (Years) Mother-Figure 9,905 11.60 8,234 12.87
Annual Household Income Wave 1 5,122 20,538 6,342 52,351
    (Nominal Dollars) Wave 2 3,839 22,999 1,053 65,210
Wave 3 2,674 24,812 1,071 60,019
Wave 4 1,628 26,226 856 56,188
Wave 5 651 25,234 783 64,837
Wave 6 -- -- 554 72,843
66000 inflation adjusted
NLSY79 NLSY97
Notes: Sample restrictions and variable definitions as outlined above. Population weights used throughout.
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Table B.2: Rise of the Female Advantage Similar across SES Quartilesbysesappend
Overall
Bottom Q 2nd Q 3rd Q Top Q
Female 0.206*** 0.122 0.063 0.194 0.155***
(0.080) (0.085) (0.093) (0.120) (0.047)
NLSY97 0.317*** 0.079 0.548*** 0.763*** 0.417***
(0.104) (0.098) (0.110) (0.115) (0.053)
Female x NLSY97 0.300 0.771*** 0.923*** 0.320** 0.571***
(0.185) (0.189) (0.193) (0.159) (0.091)
SES 1.082***
(0.040)
Female x SES -0.009
(0.052)
SES x NLSY97 0.063
(0.056)
0.021
(0.082)
Constant 10.758 12.099 12.691 13.314 12.186
(0.127) (0.351) (0.512) (0.297) (0.148)
Observations 6,777 4,611 3,980 3,468 18,836
R-squared 0.015 0.021 0.054 0.064 0.206
CHANGES VERY LITTLE, APPENDIX TABLE AT BEST
By Quartile
Female x SES x NLSY97
Notes: This table reproduces Table 2.3 with the inclusion of indicators for race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic)
and for childhood household structure (single-mother household, two-parent household).
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Supplementary Tables
Table C.1: LASSO Robustness Checks
Set of Potentials, 
Count Constraint Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
5 Degree, Choose 1 0.511*** 0.270*** 0.130*** 0.0968*** 0.0586*** 1.066***
  (0.0513) (0.0379) (0.0319) (0.0230) (0.0176) (0.134)
5 Degree, Choose 2 0.457*** 0.277*** 0.160*** 0.109*** 0.0660*** 1.069***
(0.0430) (0.0313) (0.0258) (0.0239) (0.0178) (0.121)
5 Degree, Choose 3 0.458*** 0.278*** 0.163*** 0.110*** 0.0711*** 1.081***
10 Degree, Choose 1 0.526*** 0.227*** 0.0687 0.0545 0.0417 0.918***
(0.0757) (0.0580) (0.0551) (0.0372) (0.0283) (0.213)
lassorobust
Notes: This table presents second stage results for a variety of LASSO specifications. In the first three
specifications, the instrument choice set is as follows: national aggregates of maximum temperature
indicators in 5 degree F increments (on the interval [10F,100F]), indicator for snow, indicator for rain,
precipitation indicators in 0.25 inches per hour increments (on the interval [0,1.5])). From this set, the
LASSO approach is set to choose one, two, or three instruments, respectively. In the fourth specfication, a
single instrument is again chosen, but the instrument choice is altered; temperature indicators are in 10
degree F increments. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.2: Momentum from Viewership Shocks, by Weekend
basecasewkend
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
IV 0.493*** 0.280*** 0.0878 0.102*** 0.0630** 1.026***
(0.0918) (0.0656) (0.0584) (0.0380) (0.0298) (0.239)
OLS 0.440*** 0.258*** 0.154*** 0.101*** 0.0636*** 1.018***
(0.0173) (0.0124) (0.00943) (0.00723) (0.00552) (0.0450)
    R-squared 0.674 0.549 0.431 0.366 0.270 0.609
wkend ticks 0.493*** 0.280*** 0.0878 0.102*** 0.0630** 1.026***
-0.0918 -0.0656 -0.0584 -0.038 -0.0298 -0.239
2.226 1.473 1.657 1.600 2.011** 1.103 7.845
(1.926) (1.905) (1.535) (1.208) (0.968) (0.874) (5.370)
wkend ticks per t
Table 1. Ticket Sales Momentum
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.2 but observations are defined at the opening weekend by weekend
level (528 observations). */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The first
stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3.
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Table C.3: Additional First Stages
Sample Instrument Coefficient F-Stat
Child-Friendly 15.87*** 19.43
(3.601)
Teen-Friendly 80-85F -2.075*** 11.43
(0.614)
Adults-Only -4.149*** 14.22
(1.100)
Female 10-15F 3.106*** 20.30
(0.689)
Male -4.750*** 14.47
(1.248)
Predicted Female Snow -1.668*** 13.58
(0.453)
Predicted Male 75-85F -1.943*** 12.53
(0.572)
Age 45+ 35-40F -2.375*** 10.94
(0.718)
Age 30-44 65-70F 1.670*** 12.41
(0.474)
Age 18-29 85-90F 3.163*** 11.38
-0.938
Predicted Age 45+ 35-40F -2.439*** 14.07
(0.650)
Predicted Age 30-44 25-30F 3.528*** 13.02
(0.929)
Predicted Age 18-29 90-95F 4.170*** 11.68
(1.220)
Top-1000 High-Rated 90-95F 5.165*** 13.42
(1.410)
Top-1000 Low-Rated 55-60F -1.764*** 11.17
(0.528)
All High-Rated 65-70F 4.570*** 38.11
(0.740)
All Low-Rated 55-60F -2.798*** 20.73
(0.615)
Includes Truncated 65-70F 2.285*** 14.17
(0.607)
Main Sample, Weekly 65-70F 9.001*** 12.60
(2.536)
High Production Budget 95 - 100F 4.164*** 17.15
(1.006)
Low Production Budget 95 - 100F 4.917*** 23.09
(1.023)
Weeks 1 through 5 65-70F 6.394*** 25.32
(1.271)
0.25-0.5 in 
0.5-0.75 in 
0.25-0.5 in 
Notes: This table presents first stage results from all addditional IV specifications in the paper, along
with the corresponding F-statatistic on the excluded instrument(s). In each case, the instrument of choice
was chosen with LASSO methods described in the text from the following choice set: national aggregates
of maximum temperature indicators in 5 degree F increments (on the interval [10F,100F]), indicator for
snow, indicator for rain, precipitation indicators in 0.25 inches per hour increments (on the interval [0,1.5]).
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.4: OLS Estimates of Momentum by Movie Quality and Information about Movie Quality
learnols
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
High-Rated 0.411*** 0.216*** 0.126*** 0.0754*** 0.0492*** 0.878***
   (obs. 705) (0.0327) (0.0204) (0.0129) (0.00875) (0.00624) (0.0771)
    R-squared 0.711 0.548 0.416 0.296 0.190 0.593
Low-Rated 0.412*** 0.229*** 0.143*** 0.0777*** 0.0445*** 0.906***
   (obs. 825) (0.0152) (0.0125) (0.00955) (0.00616) (0.00338) (0.0433)
    R-squared 0.746 0.596 0.499 0.380 0.346 0.659
High Budget 0.375*** 0.205*** 0.122*** 0.0802*** 0.0564*** 0.839***
   (obs. 744) (0.0267) (0.0184) (0.0122) (0.00880) (0.00657) (0.0696)
   R-squared 0.637 0.483 0.397 0.327 0.264 0.547
Low Budget 0.426*** 0.256*** 0.145*** 0.0771*** 0.0378*** 0.942***
   (obs. 705) (0.0197) (0.0147) (0.00938) (0.00703) (0.00466) (0.0516)
   R-squared 0.710 0.558 0.424 0.243 0.095 0.578
A. by Movie Quality
B. by Information about Movie Quality
Notes: This table presents the corresponding OLS results from Table 3.5. */**/*** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: Opening Weekend Viewership Shocks and Ratingseffectonratings
IV Estimates OLS Estimates
Number of Votes -9.483 11.40*
(48.31) (6.493)
    R-Squared -- 0.006
High Rating -0.0102 0.0240* -0.102
(0.0829) (0.0111) 0.024
    R-Squared -- 0.009
Low Rating -0.0803 -0.0427***
(0.0875) -0.0117
    R-Squared -- 0.024
Difference:
    (High - Low) 0.0701 0.0667***
(0.875) (0.118)
Note: per 1mil tickets
82.4
0.01863354
Notes: This table shows the relationship between opening weekend sales (in millions) and the film’s
number of voters. It also shows the relationship between opening weekend sales (in millions)and the film’s
likelihood of being high rated (top third) and low rated (bottom third). The outcome variables and the
endogenous regressor are conditional on week of year, year, and holiday fixed effects. Observations are at
the opening weekend level. In aggregating across films that open in the same weekend, we weight each
film’s rating by the number of screens on which it opened. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. The first stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3.
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Table C.6: OLS Estimates of Network Externalities by Predicted and Realized Gender Demographicbygenderols
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Female Movies 0.413*** 0.225*** 0.131*** 0.0768*** 0.0521*** 0.897***
   (obs. 732) (0.0578) (0.0336) (0.0206) (0.0129) (0.00939) (0.130)
   R-squared 0.734 0.585 0.470 0.335 0.244 0.641
Male Movies 0.397*** 0.228*** 0.135*** 0.0879*** 0.0585*** 0.906***
   (obs. 813) (0.0238) (0.0166) (0.0114) (0.00853) (0.00662) (0.0640)
   R-squared 0.754 0.644 0.527 0.445 0.367 0.687
Female Movies 0.371*** 0.191*** 0.112*** 0.0633*** 0.0411*** 0.779***
   (obs. 777) (0.0539) (0.0292) (0.0193) (0.0118) (0.00809) (0.117)
   R-squared 0.693 0.518 0.369 0.234 0.170 0.564
Male Movies 0.403*** 0.217*** 0.122*** 0.0743*** 0.0452*** 0.861***
   (obs. 882) (0.0276) (0.0150) (0.00942) (0.00636) (0.00395) (0.0604)
   R-squared 0.754 0.644 0.527 0.445 0.367 0.687
A. Predicted Demographic
B. Realized Demographic
Notes: Panel A presents the corresponding OLS results from Table 3.6; Panel B presents the corresponding
OLS results from the specifications in Appendix Table C.7. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
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Table C.7: Network Externalities by Realized Gender Demographic
bygender
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Female Movies 0.523*** 0.326*** 0.188*** 0.157*** 0.0617** 1.256***
   (obs. 777) (0.0692) (0.0634) (0.0427) (0.0432) (0.0270) (0.194)
Male Movies 0.362*** 0.199*** 0.111*** 0.0333 0.0169 0.722***
   (obs. 882) (0.0813) (0.0510) (0.0377) (0.0281) (0.0188) (0.190)
Difference:
    (Female - Male) 0.161 0.127 0.077 0.124*** 0.0448 0.534**
(0.107) (0.081) (0.057) (0.052) (0.033) (0.272)
F M
estimate1 s.e.1 estimate2 s.e.2 difference den z-score
0.523 0.0692 0.362 0.0813 0.161 0.106763 1.508013616
0.326 0.0634 0.199 0.051 0.127 0.081367 1.560832711
0.188 0.0427 0.111 0.0377 0.077 0.056961 1.351797011
0.157 0.0432 0.0333 0.0281 0.1237 0.051535 2.400313282
0.0617 0.027 0.0169 0.0188 0.0448 0.0329 1.361683258
1.256 0.194 0.722 0.19 0.534 0.271544 1.966534047
Notes: This table replicates Table XXX separately by Movie predominant gender demographic. 
Female Movies fall in the top third in percentage of IMDB voters female; male Movies fall in the 
bottom third (i.e. the top third in percentage male).
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.2 separately by the movie’s realized gender demographic. Female
movies fall in the top third in percentage of IMDB voters that are female, male movies in the bottom third
(i.e., top third in percentage of IMDB voters that are male). */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. The first stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3.
Table C.8: OLS Estimates of Network Externalities by Age Suitabilitybympaaols
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Child-Friendly Movies 0.475*** 0.302*** 0.181*** 0.111*** 0.0720*** 1.141***
   (obs. 688) (0.0188) (0.0127) (0.00909) (0.00614) (0.00483) (0.0442)
   R-squared 0.764 0.735 0.599 0.508 0.416 0.77
Teen-Friendly Movies 0.407*** 0.221*** 0.133*** 0.0826*** 0.0531*** 0.897***
   (obs. 1217) (0.0228) (0.0149) (0.0101) (0.00732) (0.00513) (0.0572)
   R-squared 0.696 0.541 0.438 0.324 0.241 0.595
Adults-Only Movies 0.448*** 0.257*** 0.150*** 0.0880*** 0.0540*** 0.996***
   (obs. 909) (0.0169) (0.0134) (0.00880) (0.00624) (0.00527) (0.0486)
   R-squared 0.799 0.641 0.509 0.375 0.25 0.675
Notes: This table presents the corresponding OLS results from Table 3.7. */**/*** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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C.2 Holiday Controls
Our holiday indicators are exactly those of Dahl and DellaVigna (2009), and are similarly
motivated by the fact that holidays impact movie audience sizes (usually positively), the
effect varies across holidays, and audience sizes are often also impacted in the days just
around each holiday. We include indicators for Martin Luther King Day, President’s
Day, Memorial Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Independence Day, Veteran’s Day, Easter,
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Eve, Christmas, New Year’s Eve, New Year’s Day, St.
Patrick’s Day, Valentine’s Day, Halloween, Cinco de Mayo, and Mother’s Day. We also
include separate indicators for the Friday, Saturday, and Sunday before each of MLK
Day, President’s Day, Memorial Day, Labor Day, and Columbus Day; for the Friday and
Saturday before Easter; for the Wednesday before Thanksgiving and for the weekend
after; for the three days before Christmas Eve (December 20 - 23) and the four days after
Christmas (December 26 - 30); and for the two days after New Year’s Day (January 2 - 3).
Finally, for Independence Day, Veteran’s Day, Christmas, New Year’s, and Valentine’s Day,
we include an indicator for whether each falls on a Saturday or Sunday. Several of these
indicators drop out when we restrict our sample to movie weekends (Friday, Saturday,
Sunday) only.
C.3 Network Externalities by Adult Audience Age
We here discuss differences in observed network externalities by adult ages. IMDB
provides adult voter ages in the following categories: 18 to 29, 30 to 44, and 45 and up.
As with gender classifications, we first classify all PG-13 and R movies by predominant
audience age based on the predicted age composition of IMDB voters using the same leave-
one-out method; we then estimate network externalities by predicted age demographic.
Among adults, we observe the largest network externalities among the oldest demo-
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graphic. Appendix Table C.9 shows estimated adult network externalities for each of the
three predicted age audiences: Age 45 Plus, Age 30 to 44, and Age 18 to 29. The final
two rows report the difference in network externalities between age 45-plus movies and
movies in each of the two younger age categories. Movies categorized as age 30 to 44 are
estimated to have network externalities almost as large as movies categorized as age 45
and up, but the difference between movies for the youngest group (18 to 29) and those
for the oldest (45 and up) are large and generally significantly different at the 1% level.
When an unexpected weather shock opening weekend causes an additional 100 people
to attend a movie popular with the 45 plus age demographic, more than 180 additional
viewers attend in the next five weekends; for movies popular with the 20-somethings,
though, an additional 100 in opening weekend audience size results in only about half as
much total momentum (less than 90 additional viewers in later weekends).
Table C.9: Network Effects by Predicted Adult Ageadultageshat
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Age 45 Plus Movies 0.707*** 0.361*** 0.298*** 0.245*** 0.240*** 1.851***
   (obs. 744) (0.104) (0.0605) (0.0538) (0.0508) (0.0567) (0.268)
Age 30 to 44 Movies 0.582*** 0.390*** 0.280*** 0.241*** 0.219*** 1.712***
   (obs. 756) (0.0618) (0.0536) (0.0534) (0.0487) (0.0479) (0.244)
Age 18 to 29 Movies 0.347*** 0.252*** 0.137*** 0.0870*** 0.0449*** 0.868***
   (obs. 771) (0.0768) (0.0585) (0.0380) (0.0262) (0.0171) (0.203)
Differences:
    (45 Plus - 30 to 44) 0.125 -0.029 0.018 0.004 0.021 0.139
(0.121) (0.081) (0.076) (0.070) (0.074) (0.362)
    (45 Plus - 18 to 29) 0.360*** 0.109 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.195*** 0.983***
(0.129) (0.084) (0.066) (0.057) (0.059) (0.336)
0.298
0.245
0.24
1.851
45plus
estimate1
0.707
0.361
0.298
0.245
0.24
1.851
Notes: This table replicates Table C.7 except that gender demographics are here predicted using the
leave-one-out method described in the text. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The first stage results are included in Appendix Table C.3.
Panel A of Appendix Figure C.1 shows the estimated network externalities by week
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in theater for each of the three adult age categories; movies with older predicted demo-
graphics exhibit larger momentum effects in each week. We can also classify movies by
predominant audience age based on the actual age composition of the movie’s voters on
IMDB. 1 Under this classification, we similarly observe the highest network externalities
in the oldest demographic group and the lowest network externalities in the youngest
demographic, but the estimated network effects for “Age 30 to 44” movies then fall more
directly in between (Panel B).
1Because the age distribution of IMDB voters has changed over the decade duration of our sample, we
define these variables within release year so as not to confound our age results with time trends. There are
far fewer older voters than younger voters. To qualify for the 45 plus age group, a movie needs only 2% of
voters in that age range; for the 30 to 44 age group, the corresponding number is 16%. Meanwhile, only
movies with more than the majority of voters aged 18 to 29 (53%) fall in the top third in percentage voters
in that age range.
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Figure C.1: Network Externalities by Predicted and Realized Adult Age Demographic
Notes: Panel A plots the coefficients from Panel A of Table C.9 for each of Weekends 2 through 6; Panel B
plots the coefficients from Panel A of Appendix Table C.10
Appendix Table C.10 shows the corresponding regression results. When an unexpected
weather shock opening weekend causes an additional 100 people to attend a movie
popular with the 45 plus age demographic, more than 170 additional viewers attend in
the next five weekends. The number for movies popular among 30 to 44 year olds is just
over half that (90 viewers). And for movies popular with the 20-somethings, an additional
100 in opening weekend audience size results in only about 50 additional viewers in later
weekends.
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Table C.10: Network Externalities by Realized Adult Ageadultages
Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Weeks 2 - 6
Age 45 Plus Movies 0.615*** 0.377*** 0.309*** 0.248*** 0.185*** 1.736***
   (obs. 747) (0.0673) (0.0505) (0.0558) (0.0538) (0.0441) (0.233)
Age 30 to 44 Movies 0.504*** 0.219*** 0.0986*** 0.0458* 0.0349* 0.902***
   (obs. 705) (0.0550) (0.0441) (0.0343) (0.0270) (0.0182) (0.161)
Age 18 to 29 Movies 0.308*** 0.130** 0.0606 0.0177 0.00417 0.521**
   (obs. 783) (0.0785) (0.0604) (0.0463) (0.0359) (0.0288) (0.228)
Differences:
    (45 Plus - 30 to 44) 0.111 0.158*** 0.210*** 0.202*** 0.150*** 0.834***
(0.087) (0.067) (0.065) (0.060) (0.048) (0.283)
    (45 Plus - 18 to 29) 0.307*** 0.247*** 0.248*** 0.230*** 0.181*** 1.213***
(0.103) (0.079) (0.073) (0.065) (0.053) (0.326)
0.185
1.726
45plus
estimate1
0.615
0.377
0.309
0.248
0.185
1.726
Notes: This table replicates Table 3.2 separately by the movie’s actual adult age demographic. Age 45 plus
movies fall in the top third in percentage of IMDB voters aged 45 and up; similarly for age 30 to 44, and for
age 18 to 29 movies. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The first stage
results are included in Appendix Table C.3.
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